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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
•

With the Molitar decision, the Supreme Court of Illinois abrogated the

I~~ity

Doctrine and ruled that the Illinois School

Districts were liable in tort for injuries to pupils resulting
the negligent acts of the sohool employees.

fro~

Since recovery can be

obtained for injuries to pupile, an increase in tort litigation cal
be expected in the Illinois Public Schools.

Parents are becoming

more litigation-oonsoious, and the expanding sohool program in
Illinois will multiply the number of instanoes in whioh the studen1
be exposed to greater risk of harm.

~1l1

An

increase in litigatiol

may be evident by the great numbers of cases brought against the
school districts in California, New York, and Washington, where the
o

Immunity Dootrine has been abrogated.
There is need for sohool administrators and educators to bepome awnre of their legal responsibilities and the
~hioh

can be imposed for their negligent oonduct.

~erstanding

liabillt~as

Through an un-

of liability, administrators and educators can take

preoautionary measures to prevent injuries to pupils and avoid lit.
igation against thG schools. \,
The Master-servant relationship between the sohool distriots
1

2

and teaohers was established in Illinois in 1959, and the sohool
distriots will respond for the negligenoe of a teaoher.

There may.

be no finanoial 10s8 to a teacher, but educators have a profession
al duty to keep the sohool distriot out of the oourts.
eduoators bave a
harm.

le~al

Moreover,

and moral duty to proteot sohool pupils

1'101

In the event that aotion is brought against a teaoher, and

the suit proves unseooessful, there is still the mental stress,
loss of time, and the possible loss of reputation, not to mention
the burden brought upon the distriot.
To this effeot, Burrup

statBs~

"Probab17

t~

most important

reason why a teaoher should know something about sohool law is

t~

ine will be more oareful of the interests of ohildren i f he realize.
the possible implioations involved in bis teaohing assignment."l
The purpose of this study is to reveal and interpret the

le~

liability for the injur,y of pupils in the publio sohools in Illinois.

A preliminary study revealed that records of court oases

brought against the sohool distriots in Illinois are too limitedte
effeot a signifioant study of liability.

Sohool oases from other

states are used to show the reasoning of the oourts in applying 'the
oommon law prinoiples in litigations involving the sohool.

IUino~

oases from out-of-sohool situations are used to reveal and inteqx9t
the oommon law prinoiples whioh are followed by the Illinois Courts
lperoy E. Burrup, The Teaoher and Publio Sohool System, (Hew
York. 19601. P. 214.
-

1milarities and differenoes in the

appl~at1on

of these principles

ill be revealed in the study.
It is not the purpose of this study to speoulate preoedent.
t most, the reader may take the presumption that the reasoning of
he courts in school oases from other states mal affeot the deciions arising from future actions in the Illinois Sohool System.
Cases 4ecided from oourts of last resort in other jurisdiotions
re not binding in the Supreme Court of Illinois, but they would be
ersuasive in any oase of first impression in Illino1s. n2
This study is intended for administrators, teaohers, and stuents in the field of Education.
~round

for the study of liability.

Chapter two forms a general backOhapter three presents a case

lnalysis of the immunity of the Illinois Sohool Districts and the
~brogation

~cent
~er

Chapter four inoludes a study of the

Illinois statutes which pertain to school liability.

Chap-

five is devoted to an analysiS of the common law prinoiples as

~hey
~ix

of this principle.

apply to aotionable negligenoe in sohool situations.

Chapter

is an analysis of the legal defenses which are employed in

~ctions

against the school districts.

ions derived from this study

~re

Conclusions and recommenda-

presented in chapter seven.

A study of tort liability for the injur,y of school pupils in

2Information from a personal interview of the writer with
rohn C. Hayes, Dean of Law Sohool, Loyola University.

4

Illinois involves an analysis of legal prinoiples.

The following

are a pertinent part of the study:
What oommon law prinoiples are followed by the courts of
other states in rendering deoisions in tort aotions for
negligence in the sohool?
What oommon law prinoiples are followed by the Illinois
Courts i~ rendering deoisions in tort actions for negligenoe?
Whioh similarities are found in the extension and application of these prinoiples between the Illinois Courts
and the courts of other states?
Some of the questions involved in this study are briefly summarise :
Are school employees in Illinois liable for negligence?
Are sohool offioers in Illinois liable for negligenoe?
Are the sohools in Illinois insurers of safety?

What l1mitations did the Illinois Legislature provide for
aotions brought against the sohool distriots?

What provisions did the Illinois L~gislature pass for the
proteotion of the sohool distriot personnel as a result
of the Molitar deoision?
What are the elements of

actior.~ble

negligenoe?

What degree of oare is required of teaohers for the proteotion of pupils?
What degree of care is required of bus drivers for the
proteotion of students?
What degree of care iE' required of students for their own
proteotion?
What oonstitutes negligenoe in the

SC~lOols?

Whioh legal defenses are available for the sohool distriots
against aotionable negligenoe in Illinois?
The soope of this study will be limited to oases arising from

5
injury to pupils through the negligent oonduot
employees.

o~

school district

The study applies to teachers, school administrators,

supervisors, school custodians, and other employees.

Teaohers, by

sheer numbers, oomprise the greatest number of employees who oome
in oontaot with sohool pupils, so that the majority of the oases
which are presented deal with teachers and pupils.

School board

members, while in their official oapaoity, are state offioers, not
employees, and are exempt from liability.
Corporal punishment will not be inoluded in this study sinoe
it has been adequately desoribed ~rom the sooial' and the lega1 4
standpoint,
This study is not intended as a substitute for legal advioe.
Those who need legal advioe should seek oounsel.
1'0 study whioh bears any similarity to the study whioh the

writer proposes has been oompleted. A reoent legal study was made
in Illinois by Harry Smith. 5 His dissertation summarized the
legal status of teaohers in regard to oertifioation, appointment,
'Herbert AI'nold Falk, coSorel Punishment: A Sooial Inte~ret.
ation of its Theory in the So~ols of the ttnited-States, (New ork.

1941).-

~

-- - -

---

4Hubert Freestrom, "Court Deoisions on Corporal Punishment,"
Unpublished Master's Thesis (De Paul University, Chicago, 1957).
5Har r,y H. Smith, "The Legal Status of Teachers in Illinois,"
Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation (Washington Ur.iversity, St. Louif.
1954) •

6

tenure, and retirement.
Studies in to I"t liability have been made in othe I' states.
Rosenfield, in his book, presented a study of the liability of
school board members, school administrators, and teachers for injuries to pupils. 6

Poe made a oomparison of the legal liability

for the in3ur,y of ohildren in out-of-school situations with the
liability for injury of pupils in the public schools. 7

Leibee des-

cribed the liability of sohool boards in the states whioh have abolished the Immunity Doqtrine. 8

His work dealt largely with cases

arising out of the physical education department.

These studies

in liability inolude summaries or discussions and definitions of
negligence and the defenses whioh are available.

The proposed

study, however, will exemplify the principles of negligenoe in
greater detail and will not be limited to the way in whioh the
acoidents happened or the conditions which occasioned the acoident.
Referenoe was made to the following legal indices and hand~ooks

in order to locate citations to the cases whioh deal with

Illinois Common Law Prinoiples:
Illinois Annotations to the Restatement of the Law of Torts,

6Harr,r N. Rosenfield, Liability
York, 1940).

f2!

7Arthur C. Poe, Sohool Liabilitl
York, 1941).

School Aocidents, (New

!2!

Injuries to Pupils, (New

SHoward C. Leibee, Liability for Accidents in physical Education, AthletiCS, and Recreation, (Ann Arbor, 195~.

~-

-

7
II, Ohapters 16 and 17, (§28l·§50;).
Illinois Digest, ;rd, - XXIX - Negligenoe
XXXIV ... Schools and F.ducat ion.•
Illinois Law and Practioe - XXVIII - Negligenoe
XXIV - Torts

After the csses were located, referenoe was made to the Illinois Reports and to the Illinois Appellate Reports where the infor
ma;ion pertinent to the cases was lo·oat.d.
Referenoe was made to the following indioes in looating the
citations to sohool oases from other states:
American Jurisprudenoe, XXXIVII - Tort Liability, (§56-§6l).
Corpus Juris Secundum, LXXVIII ... Schools and Sohool Distriots
Liability for Torts, ,!2;8. ~;20-!;22).
After the citations are located, reference was made to the
Reports of the states and the National Reporter System to looate
the oaSes and obtain the information.

Referenoe was made to

Shepard' 8 Oi tat ions to obtain an analysis of the bisto17 and treat
ment of the oases.

The Index to Legal Periodicals and Shepard's

Oitations were used in looating legal artioles pertaining to oases
and legal theories.

The Amerioan Law Reports and the Amerioan

Digest S,ystem were used as a oheok in the organizing and writing
of the material.

CHAPTER II

SCHOOL DISTRICT

I~dUNITY

IN GENERAL

In order to understand the reasoning of the oourts' deoisions
in dealing with sohool cases, the reader should understand the
basic oharaoteristios of a oorporation, sinoe the oourts, in dealing with the sohool districts, recognize these as publio oorporations.
lSohool distriots are oorporations oreated by the state to administer the eduoational programs on a looal level.

Although 10-

oally administered, sohool distriots are subdivisions of t,he state
and sohool board members ere stpte offioers while aoting in,their
oapaoity.

Sohool distriots possess limited powers or those powers

expressed by statute, hence they are oalled quasi or inoomplete
oorporations.

In addition, sohool districts are granted the use

0

disoretion in per.torming aotivities essential to their local needs
Sohool boards in the exercise of disoretionary powers have oooasioned muoh litigation.

The plaintiff's oontention generally ques

tions the board's authority to exercise suoh powers.
Whenever it seems the better polioy or for the matter of oonvenience and economy, municipalities are often dalegated authority
to per.torm oertain duties in relation to education.
8

Municipal

9

authorities, when in the performanoe of eduoational aotivities, are
aotually performing for the state beoause munioipalities have no
vested powers in relation to eduoation.

Moreover sohool distriots

may also hold the same geographioal boundaries as a oity, but when
this is the oase, the two oorporations retain their distinot identities.
l,t

,j~he dootrine of Sovereign Immunity in this oountry has been
oritioized as being too antiquated and unjust in our modern sooiety, but a majority of the states uphold the immunity of sohool distriots against tort liability.

The immunity of the sohool dis-

triots was born in the oommon law when the early oourts deoided
that a sohool distriot, being a subdivision of the state, should
share the state's immunity.

The oourts, in following preoedent,

have expressed dissatisfaotion with this ruling.

Othe r oourts

haVtl

gone farther by diverting from prior deoisions and abrogating the
ruling.

In jurisdiotions where the immunity dootrine has been ab-

rogated, the sohool districts are liable for the negligent acts of
their offioers, employees, and agents. '
The immunity doctrine has also been abrogated by statute, and
seoondary sources often state that "in the absenoe of statutes to
the oontrary," sohool distriots are not liable to pupils for injuries resulting from the negligent aots of its offioers, agents, anc
employees.

This indioates that where there is no statute abrogat-

ing the immunity doctrine in a stc-ite, the school distriot in that

10

state is immune by common law.

Because of recent court decisions,

sources should probably state, in the absence of statutes,

~

court ruling, to the contrary.
The immunity doctrine provides immunity to school districts
while they are engaged in governmental activities.

School board

members, while acting in this capacity, are immune from liability,
but immunity does not extend to the school district employees such
as prinoipals, teachers, custodians, and supervisors.

Employees

are answerable tor their own negligent acts when dealing with pupils in states where the distriots are immune.

Employees are also

liable instates where the districts themselves are liable, buts
actions are usually ini t1ated against the districts beoause the
districts become responsible for the torts of their employees.
Actions are initiated against employees in states which have "save
harmless" statutes because the statutes state that employees should
be reimbursed for judgments passed against them.
The courts and legislatures have provided exceptions to the
immunity doctrine, and while these are not a direct abrogation of
the doctrine, they have almost the same effect.
Exoeptions to the doctrine are found in the "save harmless"
statutes and in the "safe place" statutes which the courts have
applied to school distriots.

Some courts have allowed judgments

against schooldistriots whioh have liabilIty insurance,

contendi~

that the damages awarded to the plaintiffs would not constitute

11
harm to the defendant districts.

Other courts have awarded damages

to plaintiffs where school districts, in acting beyond their authority, have engaged in proprietary functions, therefore being
liable as a private corporation would be.

The courts have also

held the school districtB liable in cases where the school districts have engaged in activities which constitute a nuisance.
There has been much litigation on these two counts, the first

bei~

a technical transgression beyond the district's immunity, and the
second one being a legal prinoiple in the

oomm~n

law.

This chapt6I

does not include an exhaustive study of liability, bat eases are
used in illustration of the signifioance of these points.
The Corporate Nature of School Districts
School districts are publio corporations created by the state
in order to facilitate the administration of government.

Their

primary function is the execution of state policy: publio education.
A oorporation is defined by law as "an artificial being, inVisible, intangible, and existing only in the oontemplation of the
law. nl Hemm18in pursues the definition further: "Being the mere
crcFtion of law, it possesses only those properties v4hioh the

113 Amerioan Jurisprudenoe 154. This definition was h;:::J1ded
down by Justioe Marshall during the oelebrated Dartmouth College
Case. (Dartmouth v. Woodward, 4 Wheat U. s. 518, 636 4th Ed 629,
659) Aooording to the Amerioan Jurisprudenoe, this definition "ha~
frequently been approved."

12
oharter oonte rs upon it. • • •

Among the most important are imBlor.

tality,and. • • • individuality:

properties by whioh a perpetual

suooession of many persons are oonsidered the same, and may aot

8S

a single individual."2
Thus a oorporation is Lot, in the law, the individual members
whioh comprise it, but instead it is a separate and distinot legal
entity.

The suooession of individuals in no way alters its oharao.

ter, but insures its existenoe.

A

sohool distriot is likewise a

oorporate entity, separate and distinot from the persons comprisiIij
it:

the sohool board members and the looal inhabitants.
Private oorporations in

gene~l

are oreated through oharters

granted by the state upon request or petition.

In this wayan ar-

tifioial being is oreated for the legal benefit of the members.
Citizens of a locale ordinarily exePOise the right to petitioI
in oreating a new SOhool distriot as the need arises.
is a matter of policy, not an inherent right.

This howeve

Legally the state

can create a sohool district without the oonsent of the

residents.~

It oan oreate any agenoy or seleot and authorize any existing subdivision of the state to oarry out the eduoational polioy.
Sohool distriots are publio corporations oreated for the sole

2Madaline Kinter Remclein t The Law of Looal Puolio Sohool
Administration (New York, 1953J,-P:
~-'n~~\3N~wtgR Edwards, The Courts ~ ~ Publio Schools, (Chicago,

13
purpose of carrying out the eduoational polioy of the state, and
they are granted limited powers, or only those power8 deemed necessary for the aocomplishment of this purpose.

The oourtc, for

this reason, have olassified sohool districts as being quasi or
incomplete corporatlons. 4 The term quasi, according to Blaok, is
applied to corporations which are oreated involuntarily.5
Confusion often arises as to the true identity of sohool distriots when theae are oalled munioipal cOl]?orations by the couz'ts.
Constitutional or statutor,y provisions ordinarily make referenoe
munioipal

00 rporat ions •

~

The question of whether these provisions

were meant to inolude sohool distriots is left to the oourts.

If

it is found that these provisions were meant to inolude sohool di&
triots, the sohool distriots are then defined as munioipal
tiona in oourt.

oorpora~

The variation is named for the purpose of inter-

pretation of the statutes only, and the status of sohool distriots
as quasi oorporations is in no way ohanged.
Edwards oites several examples from oases whioh involve the
oourts' interpretation of a munioipality.

The following is used

8!1

4 Remmlein, Local Public School Administration. p. 7-8. Aooording to Remmlein, the statutes o~ most states re~er to the
school district merely as corporations or corporate bodies. The
task of cla8si~ication has been left to the courts.

4'

5Henr,y Oampbell Black, Black's Law DictioDa5[, 4th ed. (St.
Paul, Minn., 1951), p. 411. ~fie terii'applles to corporations
"possessing a low order of corporate existence or the most limited
range of corporate powers.

14
an illustration:
The question arose as to whether a contractor who
was erecting a school building oould employ labo:, for
more than etght hourS a day. t strictly speaking,' said
the conrt, 'cities are the onl:- oorpor-ntions in this
state. We have no doubt, ho~aver, that the lawmakers,
by the use of the word "mun..t.cipali ty" in the oonneot ion
in whioh it is employed in the eight hour law, intended
to include school distriots.' 6
Distinction of School Districts and Munioipalities
In establishing sohool distriots to

car~r

funotion, the state does so without regard
oal subdivisions.

~o

the eduoational
boundaries of politi

If the better polioy or convenienoe diotates,

the state 7 may make use of existing subdivisions suoh as oounties,
townships, towns, or oities.

It is not unoommon then to find a

munioipality and a sohool district superimposed over the same geographical area.

Confusion arises beoause of the failu.Pe to distin

guish between a city as a municipal corporation and the sohool di
trict as

fA

quasi oorporation.

When the two oorporations are geo-

graphioally superimposed, it oannot be assumed that the two have
merged, or that one is subordinate to the other.

The two oorpora-

tions retain their distinct identities, eaoh with a different
tion to perform.

Edwards states that a munioipal oorporation is

oreated primarily for the purpose of looal self government, and a
sohool distriot is a quasi oorporation, a politioal or civil subdivision, oreated as an instrumentality of the state for its

........... -....
6Edwa rds

The Courts and the Publio Sohools

• 55.
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purpose. 7
The main distinction between sOhool districts and other public
corporations is the limitations plaoed on the powers granted by the
state.

-

Corporations generally possess oommon law and speoifio or

speoial powers as authorized by charter or statute.

School dis-

triots have no oommon law powers, but only those expressed by law.
, A munioipality is restrioted to the exeroise of those powers
whioh are authorized by oharter or statute, n'amely expressed
powers.

Munioipalities oan also exeroise powers whioh are inoiden1

to, ,or are fairly implied by these expressed powers, and also

thos~

powers whioh are oonsidered essential for the aooomplishment of the
purpose of the oorporation.

Sohool distriots, in the exeroise of

their powers, are limited to those powers expressed by statute and
those implied to be neoessary for the funotion of the expressed
powers. 8
Where a munioipal oorporation oan exercise those pOWel'"8 which
are fairly implied to be neoessary by statute or oharter, a sohool
distriot oan exercise only those whioh are implied to

be

necessary,

Remmlein states that a school board must be able to point to a
statute oonferring power upon it directly or be neoessary implication when its authority to exercise a power is challenged.

7Ibid., p. 93.
SRemmlein, Local Public School Administration, p. 9-10.
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statutes receive a strict interpretation, and further implication
cannot be interpreted by a school board.
existence of power is resolved

oy

Any

doubt concerning the

the courts against the school

district .9
statutes whioh oonfer power on sohool districts oannot possibly cover all phases or 8Qtivities neoessary for the complete eduoational program.

Disoretionary powers allOW for some flexibility

in the eduoational program and enable a school board to meet the
needs of the oommunity,
It is usually within the disoretion of the board to determine whether or not to furnish preschool, junior college,
adult, vocational, tr other kinds of education; to repair
an old school build ng; to have French, Spanish, Polish,
or any othe r language taugh1i in high schools; to require
physically normal pupils to take physioal education, to
offer agriculture, musio, or home economics courses; to
acoept tuition pupilsJ to e~ploy teachers within the
legal requirements for certification and salary pqyments;
and to make hundreds of other decisions within the provisions of la~Oand the requirements of the state board
of eduoation.J.
For a comprehensive study of the discretionary powers of the

-

sohool boards as defined by judicial interpretation, oonsult The
Discretions;r Powers of Sohool Boards. ll

9Ibid. t 11 ...13.
10Char1es Edwards Reeves, Sohool Boards Their Status, ~
tiona ~ Activities {New York, 1954}, p. 142-143 •.
llJohn D. MeSSick, The Disoretionary Powers of School Boarus
(Durham N. Carolina, 194m-:
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Theories of Sohool District Immunity
It is a conwon law ruling in this oountry that sohool distrio
are not liable in the absenoe of statute for damages resulting fro
the negligent acts of their offioers or employees.

In order to be

held liable, there must exist a statute expressly making the
sohool distriot liable.
oo~~on

The power "to sue and be sued," whioh is

to all oorporations does not overcome this immunity beoause

it refers to suits arising out of oontraots.
This ruling, whioh is deeply ingrained in our oommon law, is
referred to as the Dootrine

£!

Sovereisa Immunity, and its develop

ment oan be attributed to several theories in law to whioh courts
often refer in their deoisions.

The most prominent of these is th

theor,y of Divine Sovereignty or the Divine Right

~

oped in English Common Law during the Middle Ages.

KiI$s, develThe doctrine

stated that the king, being infallible, oould do no wrong, and
hence was immune from punishment.
In this oountry the state replaoed the kine, but the dootrine
persisted beoause the state was assumed to be sovereign.

The doo-

trine now holds thBt no liability oan be attaohed to the state for
negligenoe in the performanoe of governmental funotions.
distriots are

or~atures

Sohool

of the state, performing a governmental

funotion, the refore they share this immunity.

Some jurisdiotions

whioh follow this ruling have stated that sohool distriots are
capable of performing only governmental duties

sinoe they are not

18
granted the powers to perform proprietary duties.

In order that

the oourts hold a district liable, the state must consent to it in
"clear and express terms. n12
Private corporatiops do not share this immunity because their
activities are for profit or self gain rather than governmental.
Munioipalities generally share this immunity while in the perform.
anoe of governmental funotions.

However, munioipalities are as

liable as private oorporations are while in the performanoe of proprietary funotions. l , The operation ot a buSiness, suoh as a tranE~
portation system, which is operated as if privately owned and
derives an inoome, is considered a proprietary function. 14
~

In this country the cese of first impression regarding governmental immunity of a state involved a suit against a county in
Massachusetts.

In holding the oounty immune from liability, the

court deolared that the county was a quasi corporation created by
legislature for the purposes of public polioy and not voluntarily,
like a city, and th&t as a state agency it was therefore immune. 15
A similar reasoning, whioh substantiates the doctrine of

l2Edwards. p. 394.
l3Warder v. City of Grafton, 128 S. E. 375. "Almost universally, the police, school, health, and fire departments are classified as governmental."
14 Remmle in, Local Public School Administration, p. 243.
15Mower v. Leioester, 9 Mass. 247, (1812).
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immunity, is that the relationship of master-servant does not axis'"
between the sohool distriot and its employees.

Acoording to

Edwards, this relationship does not exist "between a municipality
and the agent it appoints ov employs in the execution of its governmental powers. n16
In private employment, the employer is usually held responsible for the neglisent aots of h1a employees while in the oourse
17
of their employment.
,

The assumption of responsibility of an

employer 1s founded in the doctrine, Respondeat Superior: let the
maste r answer.

The dootrine wus developed in English Oommon Lew,

where the master was held "vioariously liable for the torts oomm.1 tted by his servants in the oourse of their employment. n18

The applioation of this dootrine

~~s

been largely restrioted

to private employment, but it bas been applied to sohool distriots
in states where the immunity dootrine has been abrogated.
The Supreme Oourt of Washington, in refusing to attaoh liabil.
ity to a sohool district stated:
But this presupposes that the oounty superintendent in
this oase 1s the agent of the oounty, and that as suoh,
the oourts must respond under t.be ma:tim of respondeat

l6Edwnrds, p. 396.
17:&'01' a comprehensive study of this dootrine, oonsult OUtl1neJ]
of the Law of A~enol' by Floyd R. Me ohem , 4th ed. (Ch10ago. J.!1:>~J,
~pterS-XI!; X II, and XIV.
~Alaph1ll1p James. Introduction to English Law, (London, 1950),

'n ..

-'JUV.

--

-
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superior for the tort or negligence of the oounty superintendent. The relationship of prinoipal and agent does
not exist however between a munioipali ty and the agents
it apPoints orl1mploys in the exeoution of its governmental powers. ~
In upholding the immunity of sohool districts some oourts baM
stated that sohool distriots have no funds out of whioh to pay
damages.

This reasoning stems from the Trust

~

Theo17, a doo-

trine initiallY applied by the oourts in the defense of oharitable
institutions against liability.

Funds for ohari table institutions

like hospitals were held in trust for oharitable purposes.

This

reasoning was later applied to the sOhools by some courts whioh
held the sohool funds were set aside to provide publio eduoation
and oould not be used to satisfy damages.
The following oitations will serve to illustrate the applioation of the dootrine of trust funds to hospitals:
But it is manifest that if we uphold a rule which
would make an institution of oharity liable to a patient
who has been injured by an inoompetent servant, negligently seleoted, we destroy the principle we have endeavored to make plain, that charitable trnst funds cannot
be direoted from the purposes of the donor. 20
It was similarly stated by the Supreme Court of Missouri:
The law has been fairly established by the great
weight of authority that the funds of a charitable

19smith v. Seattle Sohool Distriot Ho. 1 et al., 191 Pac. 858
112 Wash. 64, (1920).
20Adams v. University Hospital, 122 Mo. App. 675, 99 S. W.

453. (1907).
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hospital or association are trust funds devoted to the
alleviation of human suffer'ing, and cannot be diverted
nor absorbed by claims arising from the negligence of
trustees or their employees in administering the trust
or charity.21
In sustaining the immunity of a sohool district, a court justified the application of the doctrine to the district:
If it is against public policy as ruled in the forgOing cases to divert char.itable' funds, so called, from
other than the purposes for which they have been collected, how much stronger is the case where the funds
are the fruit of taxation, belong to the people, and are
to be used for the beneficent purpose of free education.
• •• School funds are oollected from the public to be
held in trust by the boards of education for a specific
purpose. This purpose is education. An attempt, therefore, otherwise to apply or expend these funds is without
legislative sanction and finds no favor with the courts. 22
Of

some importance is the theory which states that sohool dis·

tricts are involuntary corporations created for public benefit, ane
not for gain or profit.

It follows that i f the functions of a

school are purely governmental, they are then irrwune.

In passing

judgment fcr the defendant school district, Judge Brannon made
reference to the rule stated by Illinois Municipal Corporations
966s

The municipal corporations are organized, not for
gain, but for public weal, as important instrumentalities
in government, and they are supported by the taxation of
their people, and should not be made liable for acts of
their officers, done in the performance of purely governmental powers for the benefit of the public, and not for

21Micholas v. Evangelical, etc. Hospital, 219 S. W. 643, (192()
22Cochran v. Wilson, 287 Mo. 210, 229 S. W. 1050, (1921).
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private beneflt. 23
Exceptions to the Immunity Doctrine
The doctrine of immunity has been attacked by legal commentators as well as by the oourts.

Critical comments against this

doctrine appeared before the turn of the century, but widespread
criticism did not appear until 1924, when Professor Borchard of
Yale University published a notable series of articles in which he
challenged the foundation of sovereign immunity:
Yet it requires but a slight appreciation of the
faots to realize that in AnglO-American law the individual citizen is left to bear almost all the risks of
a defective, negligen'. perverse, or erroneous administration of the state's functions, an unjust burden which
is beooming graver and more diversified • • • • The reason
for this long-oontinued and growing injustioe in AngloAmerioan law rests, of course, upon a Medieval English
theory that "the King can do no wrong," which without
sufficient understanding;was introduoed with the common
law into this oountry and has survived mainly by reason
of its ant1quity.24
Attaoks and criticism against the doctrine appeared more numeAous afterwards, and today many of the oourts express dissatisfaotion.

Since the doctr1ne of immunity is in the common law, it has

been abrogated and modified by statute and changed by judicial
interpretations.

The existing exceptions to the doctrine may be

23Krutile v. Board of Education, 99
486, (1925).

w.

Va. 466, 129 S. E.

24Edwin M. Borchard, Government Liabilitl in Tort, Yale Law
Journal, Vol. 34 (New Haven, conu., 1924), p. 1:--
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olassified into two oategories: those involving legislative enaotments, and those arising from court deoisions. 25
The legislatures of the states have tried in various ways to
provide some oompensation for those injured in the sohools.

Two

states, California and Washington, have abrogated the immunity
dootrine by statute, and both have imposed direct liability on the
sohool distriots.

The California statutes are by far the most

oomprehensive and make no exoeptions, but impose striot liability.
These statutes are found in the Government Code, The Education
Code, and The California Vehiole Code.

The statute passed in 1917

by the legislature in Washington makes exceptions to liability by
"reviving" immunity i f accidents oocur on a playground, a park, or
a field house, or if the accident involved athletic apparatus, or
manual training equipment owned by the district.

The statute

passed in 1917 severely limits the liability imposed by an earlier
statute which was passed in 1869.
for many years until 1917 when

H.

The first statute lay dormant
judgment was passed against a

sohool district for an accident on a gym ladder.

A flood of schooJ

cases followed, and the limiting statute was enacted in 1917.

In

1953 an amendment to the Aot of 1917 stated that counties and
corporations were not entitled to the "priviledge of governmental
immunity," but the Supreme Court, in testing the amendment, stood

25E, Edmund Reutter, Jr., "Tort Liability and the Sohools,"
Amerioan School Board Journal, CXXXVI (March 1958) , 28-30.
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by the statute of 1917. 26

In these two states the statutes have \

brought the status of the sohool distriot to the same level as
private oorporations.
Another legislative approaoh whioh is used by several states
does not abrogate the doctrine of immunity. but it provides a meanf
of reoovery for those who are injured.

The statutes are known as

"save harmless" laws, and they provide that the employees be
"saved" by the distriot from "finanoial

ha~"

resulting from a

judgment against the employees for damages.
Recent cases indicate

.

t~~t

these statutes do not oonstitute a

waiver of immunity27i although an earlier deoision indicated that il

New York action must be brought against the defendant employee for
reoovery.28

Sohool distriots maintain their status as quasi cor-

porations and in this way teaohers are protected from their negligent aots while in the course of their employment.

26Baboock v. Sohool District, 358 P. (2nd) 547, (Wash.), 1961
27Swa inbank v. Coombs, 115 A. (2nd) 468, 19 Conn. Sup. 391.
Coates v. Taooma Sohool Distriot No. 10, 347 P. (2nd) 1093, 55 Wasl.
(2nd) 392. Lipman v. Brisbane Elementary School Distriot, 11 Cal.
Rptr. 97, 359 P. (2nd) 465. 55 C. (2nd) 224. Harrell v. City of
Jaokson, 92 Sp. (2nd) 240, 229 Miss. 815. Thompson v. Board of Ed·
uoation. Ctty of Millville, 90 A. (2nd) 63, 20 N. J. Sup. 419.
Bertols v. Board of Eduoation of City of New York, 150 N. Y. S.
(2nd) 831, 1 A. D. (2nd) 973.
28In an earlier decision the court in New York interpreted thE
statute as imposing direot liability on the school distriots.
Reeder v. Board of Eduoation, 263 App. Div. 23, 31 N. Y. S. (2nd)
113, (1941).
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The statutes in Conneotiout, New Jersey, and New York require
the sohool boards to reimburse their employees against judgments, .
/
.

while those of Wyoming permit the sohool boards to do so.
In North Carolina olaims may be filed indireotly against the
state in oertain oases.

The North Carolina Industrial Commission

has the power to deoide upon tort olaims brought against the oountJ
or other administrative units for injuries arising out of the operation of school bUses.

Those olaims are filed against the state,

Hnd if' damages are awarded for the plaintiff', the state board of'
eduoation pays the damages, the maxUntm of whioh is set at ten
thousand dollar5. 29
"Safe place" statutes are again exoeptions to the immunity
dootr1ne although they do not constitute a waiver or abrogation ot
the doctrine.

Under these statutes public buildings and publio

places ot employment must be maintained in a safe oondition.
Sohool buildings must be inoluded under this legislation sinoe
these are publio buildings.

Califomia enaoted a statute known as

the Publio Liability Aot of' 192' and suits were successf'ully

brougl~

against the school districts under this act prior to the state's
abrogation of' the immunity doctrine by statute.

In Wisconsin, the

"sate plaoe" statute was inapplicable to school distriots, but
later it was amended in order that it would be applioable.

29Reutter, p. 28-,0.
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A number of oourts have expressed dissatisfaotion with the
immunity dootrine, oontending that it is illogioal and unjust.
However the majority of the oourts have generally taken the positi( n
that i f the dootrine were to be abrogated, it would be done throug}
legislation.

A study of oourt oases has revealed that some oourts

have taken positive steps against the dootrine.
Some oourts have provided a judioial exoeption to the immunitJ
dootrine in oonneotion with the purchase of liability insuranoe.
Legislation has permitted or required the sohool distriots to purohase liability insuranoe.

While most oourts have held that the

purchase of liability insuranoe does not oonstitute a waiver of
immunity, the Appellate Court of Illinois in a reoent deoision held
that the oarr,ying of liability insuranoe did waive the immunity to
the extent of the insuranoe ooverage. 30
Other oourts have deviated from preoedent and have abrogated
the immunity rule.

The oourts of New York we re the first ones to

depart from the immunity ruling.

Prior to the passage o:f the Cour1

Claims Aot, whioh waived the immunity of the state, the oourts
allowed suooessful judgments to be brought against the sohool distriots for injuries resulting from the negligence of sohool staff. 3l

30Thomas v. Broadlands Community Consolidated Dis triot No. 201,
348 Ill. App. 567, (1957).
3lUerman v. Board of Eduoation, 234 N. Y. 196, 137 N. E. 24,
(1922). Garber v. Central School Distriot, 251 App. Div. 214, 294
N. Y. S. 850, (1937).
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The school boards in this state are liable, through these court
deoisions, in their own oorporate oapaoity for injuries resulting
from their own negligence.

In cases arising from the negligent

performanoe ot nondelegable duties,

tl~

oourts impute the aot of

nellis.noe directly on the board itself rather than on the agent
employees.

04

The re are two kinds of duties imposed on the boards of

eduoation in New York: delegable and nondelegable.

Delegable dutils

involve instruotion and no liability is attaohed for any neg11genot
whioh ocours during the teaohing prooess.

Among nondelegable

duties are the maintenanoe of sate premises and equipment, the provision of o ompe tent personnel, and the provision of adequate supervision.

It is only for the negligent performance of nondelegable

duties that a board is liable in New York.32 The courts of Bew
York have also interpreted the "save harmless" law in that state
8S

imposing on the district in oertain circumstances direot liabil-

ity to perlSons injured as well as indemnity to the school employeell

should they suffer loss due to their negligence while disoharging
their duties. 3'
The 8tate of Illinois is the most reoent to abrogate the dootrine ot immunity.

In a reoent and prominent oase, the Supreme

Oourt of Illinois deolared that the sohool distriots were liable it
32Harry N'. Rosenfield, Liability for Sohool Aooidents (New
York, 1940), p. 34.
--'3Reeder v. Board of Eduoation, 263 App. Div. 23, 31 N. Y. S.
(2nd) 113, (1941).
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tort for the negligent acts of their agents and employees, overruling all prior deoisions, I:lnd stripping the state of its immunity.'4

The legislature moved quiokly to plaoe statutory l1mitationl

on this decision.
Judicial exoeptions to the immunity dootrine are also made by
the oourts in csses involving nuisanoes.

The diffioulty of distin-

guishing between negligenoe and nuisance has made the nuisanoe
exoeption a d1ffioult one to apply.

OonsequentlY the oourts do noo!

always agree on what oonstitutes a nuisance, and are not in aooord
with its application.
It can be said that where actions for negligence usually orig nate from injuries reoeived by an individual through the careless
actions of another, nuisanoe actions generally arise from harm don4
to property.

A

oontinuing danger whereby a child has been hurt ha.

been called a nuisance by some oourts.
Nuisanoes have been classified into two categories by law:
publio nuisanoes and private nuisanoes.

The majority of the echooJ

oases involving nuisances are private nuisances.

A private

nui~

sance, as defined by Prosser, is an "interference with the interes""
of an individual in the use or enjoyment of his land."'5

A

'41iolitar v. Kaneland Community Unit District No. ,02, 18 III
(2nd) 11, (1959).
35William L. Prosser,
p. 389.

!h!

~ of Torts (st. Paul, Minn., 1955 ,
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nuisance
from

~quir.s

t~8pa8s,

property.

A

substantial harm to property, as distinguished

which oonsists of a teohnioal invasion of one's

nuisanoe is defined as "everything that endangers

life or health, gives offense to senses, violates the laws of
deoenoy, or obstruots reasonable and oomfortable use of property."3E
Some jurisdiotions have held the sohool distriots are not
liable for personal injuries arising trom nuisanoes oreated by the
distriot's agents or employees.

It has been held by the oourts

that a sohool distriot is not held answerable where a flagpole
falls and injures a Ohild,37 a pedestrian is hurt where children
hold a raoe on a sidewalk,38 or whe~ a ohild suffered a mild burn
when seated near a radiator by the teacher. 39 Ne1ther have they
been held laible where a football player

suffe~d

an eye injur,y

upon oontaot with unslsked lime used to mark the f1eld,40 or where
a boy stepped on live ooala left from a burning tree stump on the
playground. 41 Some jurisdio~iona have held steadfast and have
36Blaok, p. 1214.
~7Carlo v. Sohool Distriot of Soranton, 319 Pa. 417, 179 Atl.
561, (1935).

3SXoDonel v. Bro~o, 285 M1oh. 38, 280 N. W. 100, (1938).
39Mo11nari v. City of Boston, 130 N. E. (2nd) 925, (1955).
40Mokovioh v. Independent School Distriot, 225 N. W. 292, 171
Minn. 446, (1929).
41Rose.v. Board of Eduoation of Abilene, 337 P. (2nd) 652,
184 Kan. 486, (1959).
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denied reoovery even in oases of death.

A court found a school

district not liable when a speaker, in mounting a speaker's platform lost his balance, fell backwards, and diad &s a result of his
injuries,42 and where a young boy wandered off the playground and
drowned in a bayou adjoining the school grounds. 43
Other oourts have stated the immunity dootrine does not applY
in cases arising from nuisances: school distriots would then be

held liable for nuisanoe.

School districts have been held liable

in damages where a flagpole fell and fatally injured a boy, 4-4 and

where a student was injured in a gym class when he fell off a
"balanoe beam. n45

When a janitor contraoted a disease as a result

of breathing ooal dust in a boiler room, a court stated that propel
ventilation should have been provided and held the school liable. 4E
Actions have been suocessfully initiated against the school
district for trespass and damage to property.

A home adjacent to

a school playground was damaged by baseballs batted over the fence

by the sohool children.

A lower court deoreed against similar

42Laren v. Independent School District of Kane Township, Council Bluffs, 272 N. W. 632, (1937).
4-3Whitfield v. East Baton Rouge Parish Sohool Board, 23 S. (21d)
708, (1945). Louisiana.
44.o0 a rtan v. Ci~ of New York, 133 N. Y. S. 939, 24 R. C. L.
606, (1912).
45Bush v, City of Norwalk, 122 Conn. 426, 189 Atl. 608, (1937 •
46Este1e v. Board of Eduoation of Borough of Red Bank, 26 li ....

Sun. 9. 97 Atl. (2nd) 1. (1953>'.
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aotivities

by the sohool and made the distriot liable for damages

The supreme oourt. later oalled this judgment "too stringent" and

_

relieved the sohool on both oounts. 47

In an early deoision, Ferril

Education,48 the defendant sohool distriot was held
-v. Board of ...................................
liable for involuntary trespass and subsequent injury to the plain.
tiff'.

In this oase the defemant owned and oooupied a house on a

lot adjoining the sohool building.

The roof of the building had

no gutters, and during the winter months, snow and ioe slid from
the roof onto

t~,

adjoining lot and the sidewalks leading to the

baok part of the house.

The owners had not ified the board of edu-

oation about this oondition, but nothing was

done~

One evening,

returning from work, the plaintiff was told by his wife that large
quantities of snow and ioa l had fallen On his baok yard and steps.
While going out to investigate, the plaintiff slipped on the ioe
and was injured.

In holding the sohool distriot liable, the

Supreme Court stated.
the defendant, being a munioipal oorporation, oould not
be held liable Lor negligent injuries umer the oommon
law, and there being no liability oreated by statute,
the plaintiff oould not reoover • • • • but it is oontended that, where the injury is the result of the 41.
reot aot or trespass of the munioipality, it is liable,
no matter whether aoting in a publio or private oapaoity.
47Ness v. Independent Sohool Distriot of Sioux City, 298 N. W
855, 230 Iowa 771, (1941).
48~erris v. Board of Eduoation, 122 Mioh. 315, 81 N. W. 90

(1899).
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In this deoision, the Supreme Court stated that the immunity
dootrine did not affeot the liability of sohool distriots involved
in nuisanoe oases in jurisdiotions wbere the dootrine was reoog-

nized.

Sohool distriots in Miohigan would be held liable for tres-

pass and subsequent harm and in this oase, nonfeasanoe oonstituted
a nuisanoe.
In reoent oases, sohool authorities have been held liable for

damages to propert7.

In Vermont workers, in an effort to looate a

water supply for a sohool, exploded dynamite near the plaintiff's
spring, diverting the flow of water and drying up his spring.49

In a similar situation workmen blooked a waterway flowing past the
plaintiff's property in suoh a way that mud aooumulated in the
stream and on his propert7 and later sewage baoked up due to the
operation of a raw sewage disposal devioe. 50
The Supreme Court of Kansas reoently held that a softball
game did not oonstitute a nuisanoe.

When the game was played at

night, and the publio address system and the flood lights were
operated after ten otclook, a nuisanoe was oreated.

An

injunction

was plaoed against games conducted after ten o'clock at night.5l

49Gr1swold v. Town Sohool Distriot of Town of Weatherfield, 8f
Atl. (2nd) 829, (1952). Vermont.
50£11en v. Board of Eduoation, 242 N. C. 584, 89 S. E. (2nd)
144, (1955).
51Netman v. Common Sohool District No. 95, Butter County, 232
P. (2nd) 422, (1951).
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A last exoeption to the immunity rule is found in cases where
the sohool districts allegedly have engaged in proprietary funotions.

The oourts again are not in accord.

Some courts have

stated that sohool districts are incapable of engaging in a proprietary function.

Other courts have stated that a school distric-l

is answerable in damages i f found to be engaged in a proprietary
function.

In a

~ority

of the actions initiated, the plaintiffs have

contended that a fee was oharged for some sohool funotion or aotiv
i ty on the school premiaea.

The sohools are engaged in a proprie-

tary funotion and therefore are l1able for damages.

The majority

of the oourts have not agreed with th1s oontent10n in the past.
This oan be attested by the numerous oases listed in lega1 52 and
seoondary53 souroes where judgments have been passed for the defendant school distriots.

In granting immunity for the sohool dis

tr1cts, the courts have held that a funotion does not beoome proprietary because 1t produces some revenue, or yields a peouniary
profit.
tion.

This is just one of the elementa of a proprietary funaSome oourts have made judgments on the basis of a test in

deoiding whether a school distriot is engaged 1n a proprietary
funotion or a purely governmental one.

The following oases illus-

trate the oourt' s reasoning.

52corpus Juris Seoundum, Vol. LXXVIII, (Brooklyn), p. 1325.
5'Edwards, p. 403·04.
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The test was developed by the Supreme Court of Miohigan.
a

whe~

county, under oontraot to the state for maintenanoe and repair 01

a trunk highway, was being sued for the negligent operation of

truok whioh resulted in injuries to the plaintiff.

El

The test statef:

"The underlyir...g test 1s wllether the aot 1s for the oommon good of
all without the element of speoial oorporate benefit or peouniar,y
p rofi t • ,,54

The oounty in this oase was found not lia ble beoause

it was engaged in a purely gover.nmental funotion.
The same test was later applied to a sohool by the Supreme
Court of Oregon. 55 Aotion was brought against a sohool distriot
for the negligent operation of a sohool bus.

The oourt, after

applying the test, found the distriot not liable, and stated: "The
sohool distriot, in the operation of the bus, pursuant to authority vested in it by statute was aoting as an agenoy of the state."
The SUpreme Oourt of Miohigan applied this rJle to a sohool

_-

distriot in the oase of Daszkiewioz

_

of ........
Det~o1t.56
........

y. Board

~

Eduoation

2£

Oitl

The oity sohool distriot owned and operated a medi-

oal oollege where a medioal student fell down an open elevator
shaft and reoeived severe injuries.

Aotion was based on the raot

54Gunther v. Board of Road Commissioners of Oheboygan Oounty,
225 Mioh •. 619, 196 N. W. 386, (1923).
55i~1n.

v. Sohool Distriot, 143 Ore. 449, 23 p. (2nd) 132,

(19'3) •
W.

56Daszkiewioz v. Board of Eduoation of Ci~ of DetrOit, 3 N.
(2nd) 71, 301 Mioh. 212, (1942).
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that tuition was paid, there£ore the board was engaged in a proprietary funotion in maintaining the oollege.

The oourtrefused

this oontention and s-tated that this was a purely governmental

funotion: the oollege was a "state agenoy.lf
Through this rule and similar contentions, the oourts have
agreed that an activity does not beoome a proprietary function
because it produoes a revenue or a profit to help maintain it.
The courts have in reoent oases awarded damages to plaintiffs
for injuries where it was found that the distriot was engaged in
proprietar,y funotions.

Jurisdiotions have held schools liable in

Arizona and Pennsylvania.

In the case of Sawaya

~.

Tusoon

~

School District,57 the Tusoon sohool authorities leased the school
stadium to another school for the purpose of holding a football
game.

In the course

o~

the game, a speotator fell as a result of

a loose railing in tm stadium.

The court found the school author·

ities, in leasing the stadium and receiving oompensation, were
engaged in a proprietary function, and therefore liable for injuries sustained by the speotator.
In the oase of Morris v. Sohool District of Mount Lebanon

----

-

Township,58 the school sponsored a suw~r recreation program.

A

57Sawaya v. Tusoon High School District No. 1 of Pima County,
281 P. (2nd) 105, 78 Ariz. 389, (1955).
58 Morr1s v. Sohool District of Mount Lebanon Township, 144 A.
(2nd) 737, 393 Pa. 633, (1958).
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ohild, while enrolled in the reoreation program, drowned in the
swimming pool.

In reviewing the oase, the Supreme Court of Penn-

sylvania found that a fee was payable for admission, and the program was open to the publio.

Furthe rmore t the aoti vi ties were not

part of a regular ourrioulum as required by statute.

These aotiv-

ities were "normal for a summer day oamp" beoause they inoluded
arts and orafts, danoing, and swimming.

On these faots, the oourt

found the school to be engaged in a proprietary funotion, and held
it liable for the ohild's death.

Negligence was not mentioned in

the opinion of the oourt, but the whole issue was decided on the
proprietary funotion of a school district.

CHAPTER III
THE IMMUBITY OF THE ILLINOIS SCHOOL DISTRICTS TO 1959
The immunity of the state of Illinois from tort liability was
guaranteed by the State Oonstitution of 18701 "The state of Illinois shall never be made defendant in any oourt of law or equity.".
The politioal subdivisions of the state, or

quasi-oorporation~,

were not granted oonstitutional immunity, but instead aohieved the
same immunity through judioial deoisions in the oommon law.

The

first political subdivision to reoeive immunity from the oourts wal
the county.2

The oourts later granted immunity in their deoisions

to a townshiP,' a drainage distriot,4 a sohool distriot,5 and a
park distriot,6 and these have long sinoe enjoyed oomplete immunit~
from tort liability.
The courts, however, made an early distinotion between these

lConstitution of the State of Illinois, Artiole IV, Seotion 2E •
2Hedges v. County of Madison, 6 Ill. 567, (1844).
'Town of Waltham v. Kemper, 55 Ill. 346, (1870).
4Elmore v. Drainage Commissioners, 135 111.269, (1890).
5Xinnare v. Oity of Ohioago, 171 111.332, 49 N. E. 536, (189E~
GLove v. Glenooe Park Distriot, 270 Ill. App. 117, (1933).

'7
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oorporations and munioipal corporations in determin1ng their liability.

Quasi-munioipal oorporations, such as counties, townships

sohool districts, and park districts are reoognized by the courts
a8 being oreated by the state solely for the purpose of carrying
out the state polioies, and these have enjoyed immunity.

Municipa~

corporations, such as cities, towns, and villages, have enjoyed
immunity only when engaged in the exercise of governmental aotivities.

While engaged in the exercise of proprietary :functions,

municipal corporations have been held liable to the same extent as
private oorporations.
According to Helfand,7 the early Illinois courts placed indis
oriminate liability for torts on municipalities.

It was not until

1883 that the Supreme Court of Illinois deolared a oity immune frol
tort liability while in the performanoe of governmental aotivities
as distinguished from proprietary activltiea. 8
The immunity of sohool distriots in Illinois is traoed in
this ohapter through an analysis of the leading oourt OBses.

The

study embraoe. two d90trtn8s1 the Dootrine of Governmental Immun1tJ
or'Sovereign Immunity of the state, and

immuni~

granted to

charitable lnsti tutlons which WBS based on the Trust Fund Theo ry.

7Marvin Helfand, "The Status of Government Immunity Prior to
Molitar," Northwestern University Law Review, LIV (November, 1959>,
p. 589.
8Wiloox v. Chioago, 107 Ill. 334, (1883).

I
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Both are closely assooiated and both played an important role in
the development of immunity of the sohool districts and in its
final repudiation by the Illinois Supreme Court.

Governmental

immunity originally granted to the publio sohools by the Supreme
Court formed an impregnable wall against liability, and school
oases whioh followed crystalized the law in forming absolute immunity.

Charitable immunity, initially applied in defense of a

private school, was founded in the trust fund theory and afforded
complete proteotion to the trust funds

o~

cha.ritable institutions.

The courts in time softened or changed their attitude, and this
dootrine was finally modified by the oourts when it was found that
liability insuranoe oould be used to satisfy judgments without
impairing the trust funds of private sohools.

Insurance was the

"wedge" whioh also modified the dootrine of governmental immunity
of the publio schools when a oourt drew an analogy between the
proteotion of trust funds of charities through insurance and the
same protection granted to publio funds in respeot to the publio
sohoolsa judgments were satisfied from insuranoe.

The dootrine of

governmental immunity, thus modified, was finally abolished -in .......
tot"'"'+
in 1959 by a SUpreme Ooul"t; ruling.

Illinois EXtends the Immunity Doctrine

to Sohool Distriots
Immunity was first guaranteed to the school districts of
noia in 1898, wilen the Illinois Supreme Court, in the case of

Illi~
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Kinner. 1_ Chicago,9 stated that a board of eduoation was a

'1

quasi.

oorporation Oharged with duties purely governmental."
The oase had been dismissed by the appellate oourts, and suit
was filed on appeal to the Supreme Court. 10 The administrator of
the estate alleged that Kinnare, a workman in the oonstruotion of
the roof of a "deaf-mute sohool, 'f fell off the roof and came to bia
death as a direot result of the defendant oorporationss negligenoe
in failing to provide the proper safeguards suoh as railings Fmd
soaffoldings needed for the workmen's safety.
The appellate oourt sustained a demurrer entered by a trial
oouI't, but upon appeal, the Supreme Court was more explioit in reaffirming the immunity of the sohool district:
It therefore appears that the appellee board is a
oorporation or tuaSi-oorporation oreated nolens volens
by the general aw of the state to aid in the adminls- tration of the st&te government, m::.d charged, as such,
with duties purely governmental in charaoter. It owns
no property, bas no private oorporate interests, and
derives no speoial benefit from its oorporate acts. It
is simply an agenoy of the State, having existenoe for
t!le sole purpose of perl'om1ng oertain duties, deemed
neoessary to the maintenanoe of an effioient system of
free schools within the partioular looality in its jurisdiotion. The state acts in its sovereign capaoity, and
does not submit its aotions to the judgment of oourts
and is not liable for the torts or nelgigenoe of its
agents, and a oorporation oreated by the state as a mere
agenoy foz- the more ef'fioient exercise of governmental
funotions is likewise exempted from the obligation to

9Kinnare v. City of Chioago and Board of Eduoation of Chioago,
70 Ill. App. 106, (1897).
10Kinnare v_ City of Chicago, 171 Ill. 332, 49 U. E. 536, (18~~)
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respond in damages, as master, for the negligent acts
of its servants to the same extent as in the state itself, unless suoh liability is expressly provided by
the statutes oreating suoh agency.
Thus the Supreme Court deolared that school districts were
quasi oorporations oreated nolens volens or involuntarily and
oharged with duties "purely governmental in character:" tl» administration of the publio school.

The oourt also asserted that the

state, being sovereign, was not liable in tort, and school districts, being agenCies of the state, were likewise immune from
tort liability.
The oourt then stated that the City, in oo-operating with the
board of eduoation in ereoting a school building, was aotually
working for the state anl it was therefore not liable:
The erection of the sohool building was of no benefit
to the oity as a municipality, and whatever conneotion
it had with the board of eduoation in the matter of oonstruction of the building was simply for the purpose of
discharging a publio duty oast upon it by the law-making
power of the state. That duty, as we have seen it, is
governmental in oharaoter and nature. It was performed
in obedienoe to a statute whioh was enacted beoause it
was deemed expedient by the legislature, in the distribution of the powers of government, to require the oity,
nolens volens, to perform a publio servioe in whioh the
oity, as a oorporation, has no interest. The intestate
of appellant, and others engaged in the work of construoting the building, must bA regarded as servants and agents
of the State, and not of the City, and for that reason
the dootrine of Respondeat Superior is not applicable
against the oity.
After passing judgment for·the oity of Chioago, the oourt
stated that the oity, in being cleared of damages, did not indioat
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that a municipal oorporation was held in the same status as a
quasi-munioipal corporation_

This distinotion made in a prior

decision was upheld and oited in Cltl

£!

Chica~o

!_ Seben:ll

The reason for the distinotion, as given by this
oourt in the cases above referred to, is that cities and
ohartered towns and villages aot under charters, at their
request, these privileges being held to be a consideration for the duties imposed upon them, and for the performanoe of these duties, like individuals, they must
be responsible in an aotion.
The immunity granted to the sohool distriots by the oourt
stood seoure for over fifty years.

In oases involving quasi

001'-

porations, the oourts showed no intention of ohanging the law.

I~

a late oase, a oourt stated that the question of whether the law
respeoting tort liability of the oounties was outmoded and should
be ohanged was one for the legislature, and not for the oourts. 12
Illinois Grants Immunity to Oharitable Institutions
Immunity was first granted to a oharitable institution in
Illinols in Parks y_ Northwestern Unlveraitz.l,

A medical student

sued for damages arising from a laboratory explosion whioh cost
him the loss of an eye.

The oourt dismissed the oase, stating

ths~

tne university was a oharltable institution, and would not be
liable.

The oourt stated that although it required its students

llcity of Chioago v. Seben, 165 Ill. '71, (1897).
12Lake County v. Ouneo, '44 Ill. App. 242, (1950).
13Parks v. Northwestern University. 218 Ill. 381. (1905).
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to pay tuition and was oonsidered a private oorporation, the universitywas organized £or purely charitable purposes: the dissemination of learning.
do so.

It deolared no dividends and had no power to

It depended for its maintenanoe upon the inoome from its

property and the

endowment~

and gifts whioh were held in trust

"for the objeot of its organization."
The Supreme Court granted absolute immunity to these institutions based on the Trust

~

Theorl:

The funds and property thus aoquired are held in
trust, and cannot be directed to a purpose of paying
damages for injuries oaused by the negligent or wrongful aots of its servants and employees to persons who
are enjoying the benefit of the charity. An institution
of this oharaoter, doing oharitable work of great benefit to the publio withou,t profit, depending upon gifts,
donations, and legacies, and bequests made by charitable
persons for the suooessful aocomplishment of its beneficial purposes, is not to be hampered in the acquisition
of property and funds from those wishing to oontribute
and assist in the charitable work, by any doubt that
might arise in the minds of such intending donors as to
whether the fund& whioh are supplied by them will be
applied to the purpose for which they were intended to
devote them, or diverted to the entirely different pu.;&:'pose of satisfying judgments reoovered against the donee
beoause of the negligent aots of those employed to oarr.y
the benefiolent purpose into exeoution.
The dootrine expressed by the Supreme

Cou~t

to preserve the

trast funds of charitable institutions was later reaffirmed in
Hogan y. Chicago !JiDj:l-,!! Hospital, 14, and the lower courts a180

14Hogan v. Chioago Lying-in Hospital, 335 Ill. 42, 166 N. E.
461, (1929).
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stood by this decision. 1S

These were cases in whioh the plaintiff~

sought relief on the basis of this insurance, the courts .differed
in their decisions.

Two cases are shown in illustration.

first oase involves a hospital where the oourt stood by
Decisis.

The

Stal~

The seoond case involves a private institution, and the

courts rendered this corporation

liab~

This decision was not a

repudiation of preoedent, but an extension through a different
interpretation of former Su.preme Court

deoision~.

An appellate cou~ in Pi~et ~. Epstein16 followed tne Supreme
Court ruling.

In this case, suit was brought ae8inst a hospital

by a plaintiff for the death of his wife.

The surgeon, the super-

vising nurse, and a student nurse were named co-defendants, and it
was alleged that death had resulted from infection oaused by their
leaving a laparolomy sponge in her abdomen following a Caesarean
seotion.
The appellate oourt dismissed the suit stating that the rule
of non-liability for negligenoe was absolute in Illinois.

It was

pointod out during the oase that the hospital oarried liability insuranoe, and reoovery could be had without depleting the trust

l5Lenahen v. Anoilla Domini Sisters, 331 Ill. App. 27, 72 N.

E. (2nd) 445, (1947)·. Wattman v. st. Lukes Hospital Assooiation,
314 Ill. APP. 244, 41 If. E. (2nd) 314, (1942). Maretiok v. South

Chioago Oommunity HospitAl, 297 Ill. App. 488, 17 N. E. (2nd)1012,
(1938).
<I

- l6piper v. Epstein, 326 Ill-. App. 400, 62 N. EoO (2nd) 139,
(1945).
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funds.

To this the court replied that the procurement of liabilitr

insurance did not affeot the oha:r>ities t
gent injury.

non-liability for negli-

"Policy of insurance indemnifying oharitable hos-

pital against liabi11ty for neg11genoe imposed by law does not
sffect an enlargement of soope of hospital's liability beyond that
existing without insuranoe."
In the P1per oase, the lower oourt stood by for.mer deoisions,
and then ruled that the cax'rying of 11ab111ty insuranoe in no way
affeoted the immun1ty of a charitable institution.

Shortly after,

another appellate court luled to the contrary.17
Suit was

bro~ht

against the

ferv~t.

Fathers by Wendt for in-

juries sustained by his son after falling from a roof of a tioket
office

~t

st. Phillip Stadium.

The oourt review the Parks ruling,

and then deoided that exemptions from liabi11ty were not aosolute.
It contended that the only basis for the Supreme Court's decision
was that i f liability were admitted, the trust fund would be diverted to satisfy claims. thus thwarting the donors' intent.
added that the case went no further, stating that t

If

It

It does not

hold or employ any language indioating the exemption from liabilit,
1s absolute."
The oourt then reversed the trial oourt's judgm6nt for the

l7Wendt v. Serv1te Fathers, 332 Ill. App. 618, 76 N. E. (2nd)
342, (1947).
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defendant, and remanded the oase with direotions stating:
The immunity dootrine was devised for the benefit
of the oharitable oorporation, and if the oorporation
wishes to waive immunity, we know of no prinoiple in
law whioh would prevent it from doing so. To hold that
the exemption from liability is "absolute" and that a
hospital or charitable institution may not protect its
benefioiaries as well as itself by insuranoe beoause it
oreates a new liability where none existed before is to
extend the dootrine far beyond Parks v. Northwestern
universitf or any other decision
tnis state. If the
absolutemmunity rule enunoiated in the }iper oase were
to prevail, it would seem a sheer waste 0 money for a
ohari table corpo'ration to purchase insuranoe protection~
We hold that where insuranoe exists and provides a fund
from which tort liability may be oollected so as not to
impair the trust fund, the defense of immunity is not
available.

rn

The ruling of the appellate cou rt thus modj,fied the dootrine
to permit recovery when insuranoe prooeeds were available for payment.of damages.
Insuranoe Coverage Permits Court Aotion
Against A Charitable Institution
The Supreme Court of Illinois, in deciding the oase of Moore

!. Moyl.18 in 1950, had its first opportunity to olear up the oonfliot of deoisions whioh had developed in the appellate oourts.
Bradley University had purchased a trapeze to be used in a
oollege oircus, and in May of 1940, While the plaintiff was praoticing on the trapeze in preparation for the circus, it collapsed,
18Moore v. Moyle et al., 405 Ill. 555, 92 N. E. (2nd) 81,
(1950).
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allowing ber to fall some twenty-five feet to a hardwood floor.
Suit was brought against Bradley University, and against the indi-

.

vidual instruotors in its department of physical eduoation.

It wa

alleged that Bradley University was fully insured and had other
non-trust funds from whioh judgment could be satisfied.

A circuit

oourt dismissed the suit, and the appellate oourt affirmed this
judgment.

The suit was then appealed to the Illinois Supreme

Court.
In reviewing the previous deoisions, the oourt found that the
immunity granted in the Parks case did not impose a "disability to
be sued in tort upon the oharity." and the immunity oouldbe
waived.

In other words, the Parks oase provided a defense only

against trust funds, but it did not destroy the right of aotion
against ohari ties.

Onoe right of aotion against o hanties was

established, the Supreme Court stated that in the Parks oase immunity olearly extended to all funds!!!.!!

!!! _t_rtl_s_t_, but nothing was

mentioned in oonneotion with non-trust funds.

The oourt oonoludes

by stating that it was not overruling or ohar..ging the Parks oase,
but instead, extending the rule, reoovery would be allowed, provided.. that trllst funds or trust property are not sUQjeoted to the
payment of any judgment obtained for tort liability:
We are of the opinion there is no justifioation for
absolute 1mmunity i f the trust is proteoted, beoause that
has been the reason for the rule of absolute immunity.
Reason and justioe require an extension of the rule in
an attempt to injeot some humanitarian prinoiples into
the abstraot rule of absolute irnmunity. The law is not
statio and must follow and oonform to OPllanging oondi tions
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and new trends in human relations to justify its existenoe as a servant and protector of the people and, when
necessary, new remed1es must be applied where none exist.
From a oarefUl analysis of the many cases, we are of
the opinion that the law of IlliLois is that the trust
funds of charitable oorporations are immune from liab1lity
for the torts of the corporation's employees and agents.
Beyond that, the rule of respondeat superior is in effeot.
Thus the ru11ng of the Parks case was not reversed, but rathe
1t was reaffirmed insofar as trust funds or charities were oonoerned.

The court extended the ruling so that inst1tut10ns wh10h

-

possessed insuranoe or other non-trust funds would
be subject to
.
the ordinary rules of negligenoe and respondeat sUR-er1'!.1'.

Judgmen s

against these institut10ns would henoeforth be satisfied from
these funds.
The difference between th1s ruling and the Parks decision lay
1n the fact that the Parks oase established absolute immunity, and
the Moore decision established that oharities were held liable for
their torts.

Judgment could be passed against the oharities, but

-_

they would have to be oollected from non-trust
......- funds.

This oourt

did not define what oonstituted non-trust funds, but it regarded
liability insuranoe as suoh.

L1ab1lity insuranoe, being a non-

trust fund, would only effeot the oolleoting of judgments.
A School Distriot Beoomes Liable to the Extent
of Insuranoe Ooverage
Up to this time, the trust fund theory has been developed and
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modified by the oourts in cases involving hospitals and private
schools only.

The rule was finally applied to the publio sohools
in Thomas v. Broadlands. 19
The plaintiff, a minor. sued the sohool distriot thrOugh his

father for personal injuries reoeived at the school playground.

I

was alleged in this complaint that the sohool authorities were neg
ligent. and the injury received by the plaintiff cost him the loss
of an eye.

The trial court made a motion to dismiss the complaint

on the grounds that the school district was created nolens volens.
Thomas elected to stand by his oomplaint and the court then enterec
judgment against him.

Appeal was brought on two questions of law,

(1) Is the defendant school distriot immune from suit for negligence in this case? and (2) If immunity exists, does the carrying
of liability insuranoe remove this

immunity either completely or

to the extent of suoh insurance!
The court first oited Kinnare,~n and stated that, "Absent the
question of insurance, the law in Illinois is clear that a school
district, as a quasi-municipal oorporation, is not liable for injuries resulting from tort."

The appellate oourt then explained

that immunity of quasi-municipal
!sted from two theories in law.

and municipal oorporations exThe first theory was the dootrine

19Thomas v. Broadlands Community Consolidated Sohool Distriot
No. 201, 348 Ill. App. 567, 109 N. E. (2nd) 636, (1952).
20Xinnare v. City of Chicago, 171 Ill. 332, 49 N. E. 536,(189 ).
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of sovereign immunity: the state is

soveI~ign

without its consent, and the second one

WbS

and cannot be sued

one of public policy

which dictated that public funds and corporate moneys devoted to
government purposes could not be diverted to any other purpose.
The oourt was influenced by decisions in other states and
stated that the don trine of sovereign immunity did not apply to
munioipal or quasi-munioipal corporations because it could not be
justified in the present age, and society condemned it: "The whole
doctrine of gove rnmental Immunity rests upon a rotten foundation.· ' ~l
The court's treatment of the doctrine was also influenoed by legal
oommentaries: "It seems, however, a prostitution of the ooncept of
sovereign immunity to extend its scope in these ways, for no one
could seriously contend that local government units possess sovereign powers themselves."

The court then reoognized that the only

reason for granting immunity to school districts was publio policy
In reviewing the reasoning of the Moore case, the court then

found direct applioation of that ruling, and followed

pI~cedentf

The only justifiable reason for the immunity of
quasi-munioipal oorporations from suit for tort is the
sound and unobjeotionable one that it 1s the public policy to protect public funds and publio property, to prevent the diversion of tax moneys, in this case, schocl
funds, to the payment of damage olaims. There is no justification or reason for absolute immunity if the public
funds are proteoted. Their proteotion has been the real
and historical reason for the absolute immuni~, both
21Barker v. City of Santa Fe, 47 N. M. 85, 136 P. (2nd) 480,
(1943) •
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elsewhere and in Illinois • • • • Liability insuranoe,
to the extent that it proteots the publio funds, removes
the reason tor, and thus the immunity to suit. The reasoning in the Moore case, supra, applied with equal
foroe to the question betore us. If the publio funds
are proteoted by liability insuranoe, the justifioation
and reason tor the rule of' immunity are removed.
In a final defense the defendant declared that there was no
statutory authorization in Illinois for the purohase of insuranoe
by a sohool distriot, and therefore it oould not be used to waive
the immunity of the district.

The oourt did not reoognize "an

illegal aot" as a defense and oonoluded by stating: "We need not
deoide the question of waiver beoause immunity from tort liability
of a quasi-munioipal oorporation is required or justified by the
need for the proteotion of publio funds.

The reason for the rule

of immunity vanishes to the extent of available insuranoe."
The oourt in this oase relied on the Moore deoision and drew
an analogy between the trust funds and publio funds.

In both

oases, the funds of the institutions were protected, and in both
oases liability was imposed from

~-trust and·~-pub110

funds.

The Broadlands OBse was the first instance in whioh judgment was
passed against a publio sohool distriot.

The deoision of this

oase modified the immunity dootrine, and later affeoted legislation.
Allegations Against Sohools are Limited
to Non-Publio Funds
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The doctrine of limited immunity thus far developed was reoog
nized in·Tracy !. .. Davis,22 a case whioh originated in an Illinois
court and was settled in a circuit court of the United States.

In

this oase, a sohool district was named defendant in an automobile
acoident.

The oourt held the sohool district liable, and added

that tort aotions against school distriots should not be dismissed
when it was not alleged that the school distriot had any means of
paying jUdgments.

It went further to s tate that funds need not be

available at the time judgment was entered, as they could be aoquired later. 23

This theory was influential in this oase beoause

it was oited in the Moore case.

It held that the properties of

oharities were tax exempt and exempt from tort liability, but property could probably later be acquired not exempt from tort liabl1
ity or the status of some existing property oould be ohanged to
make it liable to taxation and tort.

"No one oan say what the

future may bring forth."
This decision in essenoe held the school distriot striotly
liable for torts, but it expressly limited the collection of judgments passed against oharities and the sohool distriots:
It is now clearly established that a charitable corporation is n{)t immune from tort liability. However, the
exeoution on the judgment, i f obtained, is limited to
non-trust funds. The allegations praying for a judgment
22Traoy v. Davie, 123 F. Sup. 160, 181 N. E. (2nd) 363,(1954)
2'Anderson v. Armstrong, 171 S. W. (2nd) 401, 180 Tenn. 56,
(1943) •
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in a complaint against a school district should probably
allege and be limited to funds other than publio funds.

The Supreme Court of Illinois Abolishes

--

the Immunity Dootrine in toto

The Supreme Court of Illinois in Molitar .!. Kane land Communi t
Distrlot 24 overruled all prior deoisions, and deolared sohool distriots liable in tort for pupil injuries.
Suit was brought against the sohool distriot by the father of
the plaintiff, a student in that distriot, who suffered injuries
and severe burns when a sohool bus in whioh he was riding left the
road , hit a oulve rt, exploded, and burned.

It was alleged thB. t t ru

bue left the road as a result of the driver's negligenoe.

It was

not alleged in the oomplaints that the sohool distriot oarried insuranoe, but plaintiff's abstraot showed that the sohool oarried
liability insuranoe with limits of $20,000 for eaoh person injured
and $700,000 for eaoh ooourrenoe.

The plaintiff purposely omitted

suoh allegations.
Both the trial oourt and the appellate oourt dismissed the
suit on the grounds that the sohool distriot was immune from liability for tort.

The suit was then appealed.

The plaintiff asked

--

the oourt either to abolish the rule in toto or find it did not
24Molitar v. Kaneland Community Unit Distriot No. 302, 18 III
11, 163 N. E. (2nd) 89, (1959).
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apply to a sohool distriot such as Kaneland, whioh was organized
through the voluntary acts of petition and election by the voters
of the district, as oontrasted with a sohool distriot oreated
nolens volens by the state.
The court stated that no logical distinction oould be drawn
between a school distriot organized by petition and election of
voters and any other distriots all are quasi-munioipal oorporation
oreated for the purpose of performing oertain duties necessary for
the maintenanoe of a system of free sohools.
The oourt then admitted that the only problem to be deoided
was that of determining whether a school distriot should be immune
from liability for personal injur,y to a pupil arising out of the
operation of a sohool bus.

t The Supreme Court stated that while it

had not re-evaluated the doctrine of immunity for over fifty years
the dootrine has almost unanimously been oondemned by legal writer.
and soholars.

The ooul"t then reviewed the history of the dootrine ~

Illinois adopted the theor.y of sovereign immunity from .Rus
__s.e_l.l

~.

Men of Devon,25 an English case whioh granted immunity to a oounty,

--.;;;".;;...;...;,;;;;

The deoision in this oase was based chiefly on the faot that there
were no funds out of whioh to pay a judgment. The oase was later
overruled. 26 Illinois adopted the immunity dootrine in relation t~

25Russell v. Men of Devon, 2 Term Rep. 671, 100 Eng. Rep. 359
(1788) •
26Crisp v. Thomas, 63 L. T. N. S. 756, (1890).

~,-----------_--a
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towns and counties in ~:om
case..

E!

Waltham..!, .. Kemper27 from the Russell

Eight yea;;'s after the Bussell oase was overruled, Illinois

courts extended the immunity doctrine to school distriots in
Kinnare y_ City .2! Chicago. 28 :.eha oourt for this reason found the
dootrine unsound.
The

Gene~dl

Assembly had frequently indioated dissatisfaction

with the dootrine: governmental units, inoluding sohool districts,
were now subjeot to liability under the Workmen's Oompensation and
Occupational Disease Acts. 29 The article dealing with bus insurance of the Illin01s Sohool Code was found inapp110able because 1t
author1zed, but d1d not require, sohool distriots to purchase insuranOe.

It would therefore allow school districts to determine

for themselves their financial responsibility for wrongs inflioted
by them.
In searahing for former deoisions, the court stated thcJt the
issue "ould be d.eaided on the basis of the Moore dectrine J or the
immunity rule would be abolished.

The court did not find the

Moore decision applicable because that decision had implied tha"t 1J
1t appeared that the trust funds could be impaired, suit would be
dismissed.

The SUpreme Court reasoned that not only the oollectio)

27Tow~ of Waltham v. Kemper, 55 Ill. 346, (1870).

28K1nnare v. City of Chioago, 171 Ill. 332, 49 N.. E. 536,(1898 •
29Illin01s Revised Statutes, 1957, Chapter 48, paragraph
138.1 .. 172.36.
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of judgment, but liability itself, would depend upon the presenoe
o! non-trust assets.

There was a oontradiotory element in the

Moore deoision whioh the oourt found to be unsatisfactor,y in applying limited liability under that dootrine.
The Moore deoision had found that the reasoning of the Parks
oase was based solely on the proteotion of trust funds.

The Moore

caSe stood by the Parks deoision insofar as trust funds were ooncerned, but it allowed suit to be brought against a oharity, where
Parks held that immunity was absolute.

The Moore deoision held

oharities liable for torts, the judgments to be paid out of nontrust funds.

It was argued that suoh a deoision would give rise t

a situation whioh would oreate liability only in the
oharities were insured.

ev~nt

The oourt answered that insuranoe had no

bearing on the liability of a oharity, but only on the manner of
oolleotion: "It is suggested that liability is predioated upon the
absenoe or presenoe of liability insuranoe."

By this statement th

oourt implied that oharities would be held liable for tortp per !!
and judgment would be pressed where found negligent.

The oolleo-

tion of suoh judgments, however. would be another matter, and they
would be limited to non-trust funds.

The Supreme Court in review-

ing this deoision agreed with this opinion, but found the element
of oontradiction in the last part of the opinion of the Moore oase
In remanding the oase, the opinion of the Moore oase stated:
It appears that the trust funds of Bradley will not
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complaint, and therefore it was error to dismiss it.
The judgment, therefore, of the Appellate Court, in sustaining the motion to dismiss the complaint as to the
appellee, Bradley Polytechnio Institute, is reversed and
the oase remanded to the ciroui t court of Peoria County.
The

Sup~me

Court in Molitar interpreted this opinion as

meaning that sinoe Bradley Polyteohnio was fully insured, the
court should not have dismissed the oase, but impressed liabili V •
This then could later be interpreted by enlargement to mean that
a charity were not ooveredby insuranoe or possessed other than
trust funds, suit against a oharity would be dismissed, thereby
reveMiing to immunity.

Charities oould then diotate their own

liabllit 7.
The oourt in reviewing the Broadlands deoision found it also
objeotionable where that deoision stated, "It 1s the publio polioy
to protect publio funds and public property, to prevent diversion
•

of tax moneys, in this case sohool funds, to the payment of damage
claims. It

The SUpremeCourt interpreted this opinion as meaning tha

school distriots would beoome bankrupt i f oalled upon to compeneat
for their torts.

The oourt further reasoned that immunity oould

not be justified on the protection-of-publio-funds theory: school
distriots in whioh common law

~e

was abandoned have not been com

pel led to shut down.
In diotum the oourt stated, "We are of the opinion that none
of the reasons advanoed in support of school distriot immunity hav
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immunity should be abolished by legislature, not by the oourt, it
responded, "The dootrine of sohool distriot immunity was oreated
QY this oourt alone.

Having found that dootrine to be unsound and

unjust under present oonditions, we oonsider that we bave not onlJ
the power, but the duty, to abolish that immunity."
The oourt finally oonoluded and established liability

!a toto

by stating, "For reasons herein expressed, We aooordingly hold

t~

in this oase, the sohool district is liable in tort for the negligenoe of its employee, and all prior deoisions to the oontrar,y are
hereby overruled."
The Molitar deoision presented some unique problems whioh de.erve further consideration and olarifioation.

There were e1S1te.a

children involved in the sohool bus aooident, and only Thomas
Molitar was allowed to recover damages.

The Supreme Ooul"t, in 1ts

final opinion, announoed that the new ruling whioh abrogated the
doctrine of 1mmunit7 would be applied prospeotively.
be held liable in future oocurrences only.

Schools would

This applioation was

based on the reasoning that sohool distriots prior to the Molitar
deoision had relied on the dootrine of immunity and bad not
themselves: this was the "relianoe test."

~d

If the rule were appl1e~

ret roaotively , the sohool distriots would suffer undue hardship.
The oourt then announoed that the ruling would apply to the
"instant 08se,"
for this ruling.

Molitar~.

Kaneland •. The oourt gave two reasons

First, if the oourt were to merely announoe the
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rule without applying it, the ruling would amount to me.re diotum.
Seoond, and more important, to refuse to apply the new rule to the
instant oase would deprive the appellant, Molitar, of' any benefit
from his efforts and expenses.

There would then be no inoentive

to appeal in future oases where an appellant reoeived no benefit
even though he had won a d&oision.
Sinoe Thomas Molitar was the only ohild represented in that
oase, the deoision in effeot deprived the other ohildren who were
involved in the same aooident of any benefit. 30 Parties represent
ing all ohildren appealed, and the four appeals were oonsolidated
into one. 3l The appellate oourt stood by the Molitar ruling, and
deprived judgment to the plaintiffs.

This oourt bas9d its deoisio

on the faot that all parties had or1ginall1 brought suit against
the sohool distriot, and the suit was dismissed

by

the oourt.

Thomas Molitar alone had eleoted to appeal to the SUpreme Court.
"Future ooourrenoes" meant aooidents oocurring after the
Molitar deoision.

The aooidentooourred on Maroh 10, 1958, and

the oase was heard on May 22, 1959.

A rehearing was held on the

,OMolitar v. Keneland Community Unit Distriot No. 302, 29 III
App. 471, 173 N. E. (2nd) 599, (April, 1961).
31Molitar v. Kaneland Community Unit Distriot Bo. 302, 29 III
App. 471, 17' N. E. (2nd) 599, (April, 1961); Nelson v. Kaneland
Community Unit Distriot No. 302, Id.; Meek v. Keneland Community
Unit Distriot No. 302, Id.; Probst v. Keneland Community Unit Distriot No. 302, Id., (April, 1961).
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case

and the ruling went into effect December 16, 1959. I Tlia new

ruling excluded the children injured in the accident before the
decision, even though their injuries were sustained in the same
accident which gave rise to that deCision.

From an

info~al

ap-

peal, the Supreme Court has now modified its original deoision
again to hold that the ohildren involved in the aocident will not
be barred by the ruling of December 16.

The ruling has not been

abrogated, but an exception to it was made in this case.
language of the opinion made this olear:

The

"It should be evident

that this holding in no way modifies or effects our holding in the
Molitar cBse or the cut off'date relative to governmental tort
immunity
~ome

8S

previously established in ~he oas8."32

school cases have been decided subsequent to and relat-

ing to the ruling of Deoember 16.

-

-

In Terzy v. Mount Zion Commun-

!tl ~ ~chool Distriot,3; the appellate court dismissed the oase
holding that the Molitar decision did not apply.

In this case, a

school boy sustained injuries from a fall while performing gymnastics.

The accident, however, ocourred on Maroh,3, 1959, prior to

the .!2].itar decLsion, and it was pl°operly dismissed.

The oase of

32Molitar v. Kaneland Community Unit Distriot No. 302, 24
(2nd) 467, 182 N. E. (2nd) 145, (1962).

Ill~

'3Terry v. Mount Zion Community Unit Sohool Distriot No. :5 in
Maoon and Moultioe Counties, ;0 Ill. App. (2nd) 307, 174 N. E.
(2nd) 701, (1961).
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Bergman !. Board ~ Eduoation ~ Chioag0 34 was also dismissed beoause the deoision of Molitar did not apply.

The plaintiff in

this oase oontended that the accident ooourred on May 28, 1959,

s~

days after the Supreme Court rendered its first opinion in the
Molitar deoision.

The oourt pointed out that the original Molitar

opinion was released on May 22, 1959, and a rehearing was held on
Deoember 16, 1959.

The results of the rehearing were identioal to

those of the original opinion.

The only differenoe was that the

Supreme Court stated that ita opinion would beoome law, effeotive
Deoember 16, 1959.

The appellate oourt oited other oases in whioh

the Supreme Court has reasserted its stand as to the effeotive
date of the Molitar ruling.3S
Summary
Governmental immunity initially granted to sohool distriots
in Illinois was based on an extension of the dootrine of sovereign
1mmunity.36

Deoisions whioh followed and whioh involved the sohod

distriots and other quasi oorporations stood by stare deoisis and
advanoed additional explanations.

The most oommon was that it waa

34Bergman v. Board of Eduoation of City of Ohio ago, 30 Ill.
App. (2nd) 65, 173 N. E. (2nd) 565, (1961).
35Peters v. Bellinger, 19 Ill. (2nd) 367, 166 N. E. (2nd) 58~
(1960), List v. O'Connor, 19 Ill. (2nd) 337, 167 N. E, (2nd) 188,
(1960); Garrison v. Community Oonsolidated Sohool Distriot No. 65,
34 Ill. App. (2nd) 322, '.181 N. E. (2nd) 360, (1962).
36Xinnare v. City of Chioago, 171 Ill.332, 49 N. E. 536,(1898
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publio polioy to proteot the publio funds and to prevent the diver
sion of tax moneys for payment of damages.

It was sometimes added

that the sohool distriots, having limited powers, had no authority
to spend money other than in ways speoified by the legislature.
Immunity granted to the sohool distriots held firm for over siXty
years, until the Supreme Court in a notable deoision severed immun
ity and held the distriots liable

!2

toto, with no exoeption.;7

The oourt's ohange in attitude toward the dootrine was not an
abrupt one.
~eoisions

In the interim the Illinois courts were influenoed by

in other jurisd10tions and by legal oommentaries, but
~

Ithey were unw1lling to abandon preoedent.
Charitable immun1ty ran a parallel oourse to that of governmental immunity.
Piper oase.;8

The oourt's adherenoe is illustrated in the

However oases involving the oharities were instru-

in the oourt's abandonment of the immunity dootrine.

~ental

The first break with tradition appears in Wendt !. Servite
'athers,;9 when the appellate oourt used insuranoe prooeeds to'
grant

~2nd)

~udgment

while still adhering to the immunity of trust funds.

;7Molitar v. Keneland Community Unit Distriot No. ;02, 18 Ill.
11, 16; B. E. (2nd) 89, (1959).
;8Piper v. Epstein, 326 Ill. App. 400, 62 N. E. (2nd) 139,

~1945).

;9Wendt v. Servite Fathers, 3;2 Ill. App. 618, 76 N. E. (2nd)
~42, (1947).
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The Parks40 oase, along with other oases from other states, was
influential in the Moore 4l deoision, whioh is oredited with the
first breaoh in the total immunity of charities.

Being a Supreme

Court deoision, it had the authority to ohallenge the Parks deoision and establish precedent: charities were held liable, but
their trust funds were proteoted.
The first break from total immunity oonoerning sohool distriots appears in Thomas ~. Broadlands. 42 This oourt openly condemned the dootrine of

gove~8ntal

immunity, while holding that

publio policy was the only justifiable reason for granting immunity.

The Moore 088e had been'deoided under similar oiroumstances

and it was found to be whOlly applioable in this deoiston.

The

importance of the Broadlands deoision lay in the fact that it conl

stitu~ed

the first breaoh in the total immunity traditionally

granted to the sohool distriots in Illin01s.

It beld the sohool

distriots liable to the extent of insuranoe ooverage.

This oase

also was instrumental in amending the Sohool Code in relation to
iDSurance. 43 This decision affecting the publio sohools was

40Parks v. Northwestern University, 218 Ill. 381, (1905).
41Moore v. Moyle, et al., 405 Ill. 555, 92 N. E. (2nd) 81,
(1950).
42Thomas v. Broadlands Community Conso11dated School Distriot
No. 201, 348 Ill. App. 567, 109 N. E. (2nd) 636, (1952).
43Sohool Code of Illinois, 1959, Artiole 6, Seotion 35.1,
Liability Insurance for Sohool Board Employees, p. 89.
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reaffirmed in Tracl !. Davis. 44

According to Franklin,45 the

oourt in this oase interpreted the law so as to remove all to rt
i~un1ty

from the schools, and to substitute "immunity of 001180-

t10n~n

The Illinois Supreme Oourt in tie Molitar46 deoisioD seems to
have rea.soned that the courts in prior decisions had not asserted
themselves strongly enough, and the law was resay for a change.
It found the Moore decision inapplicable beoause of the oontradiotion found in that opinion.

It also

replldiate~. ';;b.,; ~cotY.'1ne u~d..~

the Broadlands decision because immunity

~as

based on the protec-

tion of public funds, which was not justifiable in this age.

It i

probable that the Supreme Court in the Moli tar case would have
found the Moored.eision unaooeptable even i f the oontradiotions
were absent in that opinion.

The Supreme Oourt had vigorously

attaoked immunity based on sovereignty, and also the polioy of
proteoting publio funds.

If it had attaoked immunity based on the

proteotion of publio funds, it could not possibly have reoonciled
immunity based on the trust fund theor.y.
Finding no justifiable reason for holding the school distriot.

44Traoy v. Davis, 123 F. Sup. 160, 181 N. E. (2nd) 363,(1954)
45John L. Franklin, "Tort Liabil1ty of the Schools," Univarsi ~y
of Illinois Fornm, (1958), 43'.

-

46Mo11tar v. Keneland Community Unit District No. 302, 18 III
(2nd) 11, 163 N. E. (2nd) 89, (1959).
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immune, the Supreme Court stated that school distr10ts would be
held liable with no except1ons.

The Stat e of Illinois then became

one of the most recent states to abrogate the iIllmu.n1ty doctrine.

CHP~ER

IV

ILLINOIS LEGISLATIVE ENACTMENTS
Prior to the time that the oourts challenged the immunity
dootrine of the school distriots in Illinois,l the sohool distriots were provided with permissive legislation oonoerning health
and aocident insurance and liability insurance.
The first statute to be enacted provided liability insurance
restricted to operation of buBes, and purohased at the disoretion
of the sohool boards.

This statut& provided liability insuranoe

ooverage to the sohool distriots, its agents, or employees in oonneotion with the ownership or maintenanoe of sohool buses:
Any sohool distriot, inoluding any non-high sohool
distriot, whioh provides transportation for pupils may
insure against any 10s8 or liability of such district,
its agents, or employees, resulting from or incident to
the ownership, maintenance, or use of any sohool bus.
• • • Every policy for suoh insurance coverage issued to
a sohool district shall provide, or be endorsed to provide that the oompany issuing suoh policy waives any
right to refuse payment or to deny liability thereunder
within the limits of said policy, by reason of the nonliability of the insured school district for the wrongful or negligent aots of its agents and employees, and
its immunity from suit. as an agenoy of the state

Lrhomas v. Broadlands Community Consolidated District No. 201,
348 Ill. App. 567, 109 N. E. (2nd) 636, (1952).
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performing governmental functions. 2
Shortly thereafter, another statute was enacted which permitted the school districts to purchase medical insurance to protect pupils while partioipating in athletic activities.

Thie in-

sumr..ce was not pl'Ovid.,d for by "public funds, tt but it was to be
derived from Admissions to athletio events.
The sohool board of any school district may, in its
discretion, provide medical or hospital servioe, or both,
through accident and health insuranoe on a group or individual pasis, or through ~on-profit hospital servioe
oorporations or medioal service plan oorporations, or
both, for pupils of the distriot injured while participating in any athletio aotivity under the jurisdiotiQn
of or sponsored or oontrolled by the distriot or the
authorities of any sohool thereo;t'~. The cost of suoh insuranoe or of stlbsoriptionB to su~h non-profit oorporations, when paid from the funds of the distriot, shall be
paid from moneys derived from athletio aotivities.'
The

--

distriot was held liable in Thomas v. Broadlands
....................
when it was found that the sohool distriot oarried publio liab11it r
s~hool

insuranoe.

Damages paid from insuranoe prooeeds provided a means

ot recovery for injury ot the plaintiff, while the pub1io funds
2Sohool Code of Illinois, Article 29, Section 9, p. 363, ,(enaoted August 10, 1949).
.
Illinois Revised Statutes, Chapter 122, Artiole 29, Seotion 9
Liability Insuranoe, p. 2015.. '
Smith Hurd Annotated Statutes of Illinois, Chapter 122, Artio e
29, Seotion 9, p. 449.

'Sohool Code of Iltinois, Artiole 22, Sect. 15, p. 270, (enaoted June 21, 1951).
Illinois Revised Statutes, Chap. 122, Art. 22, Sect. 15, p.
1985.
Smith Hurd Annotated Statutes, Chap. 122, Art. 15, Sect. 19,
T}

.. ~
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remained untouohed.

The Illinois sohool distriots were not then

authorized to purohase liability insuranoe.

statutes provided onl

for the purchase of sohool bus aooident liability polioies.

De-

fendant t s last plea to the court was based on this contention, add
1ng that the school was not authorized to purchase this insuranoe,
and

therefore was not authorized to satisfy a judgment olaim.

The

oourt refused this argument, held the sohool liable, and as a direct result, the legislature enacted a statute authorizing the
-:"

sohool distriots to purohase liability insurance to protect themselves in the faoe of liability,
To insure against any loss or liability of the school
district or of any agent, employee, teacher, offioer,
or member of the supervisory staff thereof resulting
from t he wrongful or negligent act of suoh agent, employee.
teaoher, offioer, or member of the supervlsor,y staff,
whether such wrongful or negligent aot ocourred within
or without the sohool building, provided suoh agent,
employee, teacher, officer, or member of the supervisory
staff was, at the time of suoh wrongful or negligent aot,
aoting in the dischar&e of his duties within the, soope
of his employment and/or under the direotion of the
Board of School Directors.. Such insuranoe shall be oar..
ried in a. company licensed to write suoh ooverage in this
Stat~.
Ever.y polioy for suoh insuranoe shall provide,
or be endorsed to provide, tmt the company issuing suoh
polioy waives any right to refuse payment or to deny liabili ty thereunder within the 11m1 ts of said polioy" by
reason of the ~on-l1ability of the insured sohool distriot for the wrcngful or negligent aots of its agents
a.nd emplOYees, and its immunity from suit, as an agenoy
of the state engaged in governmental funot10ns. 4
.
The legislature, fearing a broad applioation of the Molitar
40 0de, Art1cle 10, Seot10n 22.3, P. 89, (enacted July 23, 195~.

Statutes, Chapter 122, Article lOt Seotion 22.3, p. 1932.
Smith Hurd. Obapter 122. Artiole 6. Seotion 35.1. 1). 300.
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ruling to quasi corporations, passed a series of bills granting
Immunity to several state agenoies
Molitar opinion was released.

two months after the first

Total irrlJJlunity was granted to park

districts,5 oaunties,6 and forest preserve districts. 7 The sohool
distriots had been declared

liable, but the legislature extended

limitations to liability with the passage of the
Act. 8

!2!!

Liability

-

The Tort Liability Act expressly inoludes religious and private

~non-profit·

schools.

This would seem to include schools as

well as colleges and universities.

The .olitar decision made only

the sohoo1 districts liable, but it found the Moore dootrine inapplioable, and it is unlikely that oourt. in future deCisions will
allow the3e mstitutions protection under that ruling ~

In oase

that these institutions are found liable as were the sohoo1 distriots, they are granted proteotion under the same statute.
In regard to publio education, the Tort Liability Act include
school districts only.

This covers elementary and seoondary

schools, and probably ino1udes junior 0011eges. 9

A

more speoifio

5statutes, Chap. 105, Art. 12.1, Seot. 1, p. 1075.
Art. 333.2, p. 1099.

1'15

6Statutes, Chap,

;4, Art.

7Sta~tes, Chap.

57i. Art.

Seela1so

301.1, p. 1498.

'a,

p. 26B.
BStatutes, Chap. 122, Seot. 821-831, p. 2100.
9Statutes, OhaP. 122, Art. 13, Seot. 2B t p. 1950.
Seot. 25 .. 'D. 168.

Code, Art.
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definition oan only be provided through a oourt ruling.

Publio

institutions of higher learning are not mentioned in the statute,
but the University of Illinois and its branches are oovered by the
Court of Olaims Act .10
It has been stated that the referenoe to purely govel"lmlElntal
funotions in the statute l1 is somewhat puzzling beoause the govern
mental-proprietary test whioh is used in determining the liability
of municipalities has not been applied to the sohool districts in
Illinois. 12

Other jurisdiotions have used this distinotion in de-

oiding liability,l, but it is doubtfUl that tl~ legislature inten~
ed to introduce thisdietinct10n into the law of Illinois.

The

term 1s probably meant to be descriptive and reat'f1rm the sohool
activities whioh the Supreme Court initially reoognizod as being
"purely governmental" in oharaoter. 14

lOStatutes, Chap. 37, Art. 439.8, Sec. 8, part D, p. 1698.
llCode, Art. 1, p. 457.

Statutes, Chap. 122, SeC. 821, p.210).

12 f1 Governmental Immunity in Illinois, n Northwestern Un1versit
Law Review, ed. Edwin Misktn, (Evanston, Illrno!s, 1959} VOl. ,~,

P:-594.

r

,

13Sawaya v. Tuscon High Sohool Distriot No.1 of Pima County,
281 P. (2nd) 105, 78 Ariz. 3891 (1955). Morris v. Sohool Distriot
393 Pe. 633, 144 A. (2nd) 72, \1958).
14K1nnare v. City of Chioago, 171 Ill. 332, 4·9 N. E. 5'6,
(1898). Linoke v. Moline Board of Eduoation, 245 Ill. App. 459.
(1927). Lindstrom v. City of Chioago, '31 Ill. 144, 162 N. E. 128
(1928). Chioa.go City Bank end Trust Co. v. Bor:rd of Education, '8 ~
Ill. 508, 54 N. E. (2nd) 498, (1944). Sohreiner v. City ot CMoag >,
406 Ill. 75, 92 N. E. (2nd) 133, (1950).

n
A reoent (post~Molitar) lower oourt decision has stood by

prior deCisions, and has restated that sohool distriots are oharge
with duties whioh are purely governmental in charaoter and exist
for the sole purpose of eduoation. 1S
Publio Polioy. Seotion 1. The General Assembly finds
and hereSy enacts the publio polioy of the State of Illinois that publio schools in the exercise of purely governmental functions should be proteoted from exoessive diversion of their funds for purposes not direotly oonneoted
with their statutory funotions, if there is liability
imposed by any court • • • from injuries inourred as a
result of negligenoe in the oonduot of sohool distriot
affairs; and that non-profit private sohools oonduoted
by bona fide eleemosynary or religious institutions ahould
be proteoted from exoessive diversions" of their tunds
for purposes not direotly oonneoted with their eduoational
funotions • • • toward alleviation of the burden of individual loss arising from injuries inourred as a result
of negligenoe in the oonduot of suoh non-profit private
8ohools.l 6
The general

s'~atute

of lim1tations for personal aotion allows

a period of two years from the time of injury to the time of oommenoing the suit. 17 !be Sohool Distriot Tort Liability statute
in this oase deoreases the time limit in that it requires aotion
to be oommenoed within one year from the time the oause of aotion
aoorued. 18 It also imposes a more severe limitation. The general

lSGarrison v. Oommunity Consolidated Sohool Distriot No. 65,
34 Ill. App. (2nd) 322, 181 N. E. (2nd) 360, (1962).
16Code, Art. 1, p. 457.

Statutes, Seo. 821, p. 2100.

17statutes, Ohap. 83, Art. 14, p. 692.
l8Cod., Art. 2, P. 458.

Statutes, Seo. 822, p. 2101.
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statutes of limitations allow exceptions to the two year 11mitatioA
in cases where the plaintiff is a minor.

Limitations do no run

against a minor until he reaches majority, eighteen for a female,
and twenty-one for a male.
years.19

A minor can then bring suit within two

The school statute expressly places one year limitation

on all persons, regardless of age.

In effeot this means that a

child, i f hurt in any area outside the sohool, would have up to twc
years after reaching

majority to commence suit, but failure to

commenoe suit against the schools within one year would forfeit th4
right of aotion against the school.
L1mitation of Aotion. Seotion 2. No civil action shall
be oommence~in any court against any sohool district or
non-profit private sohool by any person for any injur,r
to his person or property unless it is commenoed wlth~
one year from the date that the injur,y was received or
the oause of aotion aocrued. 20
The school statutes require that a "olaim" or motive must be
filed with the school distriot authorities prior to the commencement of the suit, and within six months of the injury.2l Failure
to file suoh notice would result in dismissal of the suit even i f
suit were brought withi~ the one year 11m1tation. 22 Oourts in

19statutes, Chapter 83, Article 21, p. 693.
20C04e, Artiole 2. p. 458.
Statutes, Seotion 822» p. 2101.
21Code, Artiole 3, p. 458.
Statutes, Seotion 823, p. 2101.
22Code, Artiole 4, p. 458.
Statut es~ Seotion 824~1". 2101.

other jurisdiotions have affirmed a similar restriotion, and it is
unlikely that the Illinois Supreme Oourt will go against this
restriotion. 23
Fili, Statement of Ingurz. Section 3. Within six months
trom he da=Ee tIiarsuo injury was reoeived or suoh oause
of aotion aoorued, any person who is about to oommenoe
any oivil aation in any oourt against any sohool district
for damages on acoount of any injury to his person or property shall file in the office of the sohool board attorney • • • and also in the offioe of the olerk or seoretary
of the sohool board, • • • a statement in writing • • •
giving the name of the pe non to whom the oause of aotion
has aocrued, the name and residenoe of the person injured,
and the date and about the hour of the acoident. the plaoe
or looation where the aocident oocurred, and the name and
addresfJ of the attending physioian, i f any •.
II

•

With respeot to non-profit private sohools the statement in writing required hereunder shall be filed in the
offioe of the Superintendent or Principal of suoh sohool. 24
Failure to File.

Seotion 4. If the notice provided by
filed as provided therein, any suoh civil
action oommenoed against any sohool distriot or non-profit private sohool shall be dismissed and the person to
whom any suoh oause of action aocrued for any personal
injur,y or property damage shall forever be barred from
further sUi!!§.25
- ~eotIon ~iS-not

Seotion five of the Statute l1m1ts the amount of recovery to
ten thousand dollars for eaoh separate cause of aotion.
Amount Reooverable.
1J

Seotion 5.

The amount reoovered

. 2'Grimaldi v. Board of Education of City of Utioa, 107 N. Y.
S. (2nd) 658, (1958).
2400de, Artiole 3, p. 458.
statutes, Seotion 823, p. 2101.
250ode, Artiole 4, p. 458.
Statutes, Section 824, p.2l01.
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in eaoh separate oause of aotion against a public sohool
shall not exceed $10,000.00, exoept as is otherwise provided by law.

The amount reoovered in eaoh separate oause of aotion
against a non-profit private sohool shall not exoeed
$10,000.00. 26
It is suggested that, the term "exoept as otherwise provided by
law," in the statute is ambiguous, and that it oould be interpreted to grant the oourts the power to impose additional liability in future oases where the sohool distriots purohase insuranoe
in exoess of ten thousand dollars. 27 It is argued that it will
probably have little effeot sinoe it is unlikely that sohool distriots will purohase more insuranoe than is neoessary to cover the
maximum ten thousand dollar liability.
The ten thousand dollar limitation olearly app11esto "nonprofit" sohools, oolleges, and universi'ties.

It also applies -to

the publio sohools, but not to the University of Illinois and its
branohes.

Limitat10ns for this inst1tution are fixed at twenty-

five thousand dollars under the Oourt of Claims Aot .28

Another

exoeption to this limitation also appears in the oase of death.
The statute expresses recovery for injuries sustained, but it make_
26code , Artiole 5, p. 458.
Statutes, Section 825, p. 2101.
27"Governmental Immunity in Illinois,"

!. !!. l!. l!.,

p. 597.

28Statutes, Chapter 37, Court of Claims Act, Article 439,
part D, p. 1698.
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no mention of injuries resulting in death. 29

If suoh would be the

oase, the statute would be inapplioable, and reoover,y would be obtained up to a maximum of thirty thousand dollars under the Wrongful Death Aot. 30 The prooedure for filing notioe and oommenoing
aotion against the sohool distriot would also be inapplioable,
thereby allowing the plaintiff two years to bring suit as provided
by the Wrongful Death Aot, under the general statute of limitationa.
Damages awarded through the Court of Claims are final beoause .
the Court of ClaimS is not a oourt of law and appeal is not available.

The ten thousand dollar limitation on reoovery plaoed on th

sohool distriots does not represent the full amount of reoover.y
available to parties in future ORses.

The oourts could award addi

tional damages or deolare this artiole unconstitutional or the
legislature could amend the artiole.

Ten thousand dollars repre-

sents an amount hardly adequate in a speoific instance where a
ohild is maimed for life.

The limitation does not apply to indi-

vidual employees of a sohool distriot, and the individual suoh as
a teaoher oan be sued for any amount.
Artioles six through nine of the Aot st&te the same language
as artioles one through five, but they applY onlY to oases arising

- --

29"Governmental Immunity in Illinois," N. U. -.,
L. R., p. 595.
30
.
Statutes J Chapte r 70, Wrong:f'ul Death Act, Artiole 2 t p. 434 ~

....
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prior to the aot, and subsequent to the first Molitar opinion.

ThE

legislature had anticipated the application of the :first Molitar
opinion and enaoted these sections in reference to those cases.
These articles require that parties injured prior to the llot must
file notioe within six months of the effeotive date of the Aot.'l
Suit must also oownenoe within one year of such date,32 and the tel
thousand dollar limitation also applies."

These articles were

rendered void by the Molitar rehear1Ps which stated that the ruli~
in regard to school liability would go into effect on Deoember 16,
1959.

This e1imina"ted all suits prior to the Act, and follow ing

the first opinion. 34
Section ten states that the statute is not to be oonstrued as
authorizing the bringing of suit or the entry of judgment against
a school distr1ct, indioating that liability does not fall under

the statute, but under tba oommon law.
Construotion. Section 10. Nothing oontained in this aot
shall Se deemed to authorize the bringing of any action
against any sohool distriot or non-profit private school,

'lCoda, Seotions 7 and 8, p. 458, 459.
Statutes, Artioles 827, and 828, p. 2101.
32Code, Seotion 6, p. 458.
Statutes, Article 826, p. 2101.
33Code, Section 9, p. 459.
Statutes, Article 829, p. 2101.
'4Bergman v. Board of Education of City of Chicago, 30 Ill.
App. (2nd) 65, 173 N. E. (2nd) 565, (1961).
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nor the entry of a judgment in any suoh aotion. 35
Seotion eleven allows the oourts to modify or deolare unoonstitutiona1 any seotion without effeoting other seotions.

If the

statute were written in one paragraph, the whole statute would be
jeopardized i f part of it were found to be unoonstitutional.

t.

severabi1it
Seotion 11. If any seotion or part of any
seo~ron othis aot is held unoonstitutional by a oourt of
oompetent jurisdiotion, all other seotions or P~6ts of
sections shall remain in full foroe and effect.'b
The Illinois legislature has been critioized for reaoting so
quiokly in grantink oomplete immunitt to the different quasi-oorporations.

It be.' been suggested th$t there is need for further

study and modification i f these statutes are to appear rea1istio.
The statute in regard to eduoation oannot be regarded as a statutory frustration of judioial reforQt.

The statute did not impede

the oourt's intent, but set limitations to the sonoo1 liability,
the most prominent of which is the ten thousand dollar 11m1t. 37
Clearly it is a job for legislature.

Thus the combination·of

jud~

cial deoision and legislative reaotion oreates a reform which enoourages the use of liability insuranoe as a proteotion for aooident viotims while yet proteoting the sohools against disastrously
35Cede, Seotion 10 p. 459.
Statutes. Article 830, p. 2101.
36Code, Seotion 11, p. 459.
statutes, Artiole 831, p. 2101.
T.... ,.Q~1~~~erlTf~er~R~?~Cr~~~ive

Continuity in Tort Law, n Harvard
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high judgments.

The question as to whether ten thousand dollars

is an adequate amount will have to be answered
in future cases.

by

court opinions

CHAPTER V
ELEMENTS OF AOTIOBABLE NEGLIGENCE IN THE SCHOOLS

Negligenoe deals with oonduot whioh falls below or does not
measure up to the standards of behavior established by law for the
protection of others against unreasonable risk of harm.

The idea

of risk involves a reoognizable danger based upon the eXisting
faots at the moment;

the danger must be apparent to the aotor.

Judgment of the aotor's oonduot is likewise made from the faots
apparent to the aotor at the time.
Negligenoe alone does not give rise to a cauae of aotion.

Al~

elements of aotionable negligenoe must be present and the absenoe

of one element will bar reoovery.

These elements are:

a.

legal duty to oonform to a standard of behavior
or oonduot for the proteotion of others against
unreasonable risk of harm.

b.

A breaoh of duty or the fa1lure to oon:f'orm to that

o.

SuffioientlY olose oauaal oonneotion between that
oonduot or behaTlor and the resulting injury.

d.

Injury or damag e r8sul tills to the rights or 1nt erests of another. 1

A

standard.

lWilliam L. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts, 2nd ed.,
(st. Paul, I,~inn., 1955), 1'. ItS?
- 79
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Duty oan be defined as an obligation on the part of one persOl
to oonform to a partioular standard of conduct toward another.

Tb!

oourts will reoognize and enforce this obligation aris1ng out of
the relationship of two parties 1nvolved in a law suit.

In the

prooess of a law su1t,a oourt will first establish the duty owed
by the defendant to the plaintif'f before it oan determine whether
the defendant has breached his duty.

The conoept of duty, however.

must be established in regard to that partioular plaintiff involv«
in the suit.

Aotion oannot be based upon the breaoh of duty owed

to some other person.
must be a personal one.

In a sense, the duty owed to a plaintiff
Prosser states that the plaintiff must

bring himself within the soope of a definite obligation so that it
might be regarded as personal to him. 2
Breaoh of duty is determined by comparing the defendam t soon
duot against a standard whioh i8 set by law.

This standard bears

purely on the aotor's oonduot and upon what was apparent to him at
the time.
afte1'?lsrds.

It does not matter i f the risk seems to be greater
On

the other hand, it must be taken into aooount that

the aotor has no time to refleot.

Thus all aspeots are taken into

View, and the aotor's conduot is judged aooordingly.
imposed must be an external one.

The standard

It must not be based upon the

individual t 8 own notions of what is right and what is wrong.

The

failure to do so would bring about a multiplioity of "standards."
2Prosser~ p. 167.

81
Prosser states that an honest blunder or a mistaken belief that no
damage will result does not absolve the aotor from the f'aot that
the risk was still there and the harm to others was still as
great.'
In judging the aotorts conduct, the gravity of the risk must
be balanced against the purpose served by that oonduot.

Oertain

risks are acoepted as oommon, everyday risks, and are justified by
society as long as their benefit outweighs the risk of probable
harm.

In the interest of education, students are exposed to the

apparent risks involved 1n phys1cal eduoation olasses, soience
orator" aotiv1ties, and vooational arts olasses.

la~

To eliminate

these risks would mean curtailing these aotivities.

Negligenoe is

not absolute,but is relative aocording to the need and oocasion.
In attempting to es"tablish a uniform standard of behavior
against whioh to measure the oonduot of the aotor, the courts have
oreated a fiotitious person: the reasonab!l Erudent person. 4

This

person symbolizes the average prudent person of the oommuni ty who
is possessed of ordinary sanse and skill, and who is always up to
standard.
The oonduot of the

re~sonable

man will vary with the situatiol

with whioh he is oonfronted, and in judging the aotor's oonduot,

'Prosser, p. 121.
4Ibid ., P. 124.
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the jury is instruoted to take the oircumstances into account; neg
ligenoe is the failure to oonduot oneself in the same way that a
reasonable man would "under the same or similar oircumstanoes."
This takes into aooount the external faots which surround the aoto
from one situation to another.
The oharsoteristiosat the prudent person itself are allowed
to vary to some degree sinoe persons or individuals will vary.
Allowanoes are made as far as physioal oharaoteristios are oonoerned.

It the aotor is blind or deaf or is an amputee, his oon-

duot must meet the standard of a reasonably prudent blind or deaf
person or an amputee.

Allowanoes are also made in the oase of the

aged and of ohildren simply beoause they oannot meet the standard.
The standard of oonduot applied to a child is the conduct expeoted
of a reasonable ohild of the same age, intel11genoe, and experieno •
The oonduot of a sohool teaoher 1s held to be the oonduct of

a reasonable prudent teacher having the same physioal attributes,
the same training, and experienoe. faoed with the same situation.
The standard of oonduot of a sohool oh1ld beoomes important only

when the faots in question bear upon oontr1butory negligenoe, as
will be disoussed in the latter part of this paper.

If the aotor has knowledge, skill, or intelligenoe superior
to that of the ordinary man, the law demands a higher standard of
conduoty whioh is oommensurate with these skills.
oases involvi

these situations have involved

Most of the

rofessional

le
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suoh as dootors and nurses.

The same could be true, however, of

any teaoher possessing a special skill or knowledge.
The term proximate oause is oonfusing and diffioult to understand beoause it involves more than one problem.

It is better un-

derstood if it is disoussed from the viewpoint of oausation and
legal or

Prox1mat~

oause.

_-

Oause in faot deals direot1y with the problem and determines
.....................
whether the injury or loss of the plaintiff was a oonsequenoe of
the aotor's oonduot.

This is a question of faot usually deter-

mined by a jury, and it oovers all events whioh oould have oontributed to the injury_

It entails the aotorts nonfeasanoe as well

as his misfeasanoe.
In determining whether an aotor's nonfeasanoe has oausal relation to an injury, the oourts have formulated the

!!E! qua

~

--

rule, commonly known as the but for rule, which states that the
defendant's oonduct is not a oause of the injury if the event
oould have ooourred without it.

This test is one of exolusion and

is restrioted to the question of oausation alone.

The test OalLnot

be used in situations where two oauses oocur and bring about an
event whioh either oause, operating alone, would have been suffioient to bring about the same Nsul t.

While oausation is s.n es-

santial element of liability, it does not determine liability
slone, sinoe other oonsiderations may prevent liability.
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If a oausal oonneotion is found, the oourt must determine if
the aotor is legally responsible or not.

The failure to find a

causal oonnection ends further lit1gation and absolves the aotor,
from tort.
Legal cause 1s a lim1tation whioh the oourts have placed upon
the aotor's responsibi11ty for the oonsequenoe of his conduct.
This is done

8S

a matter of P190tio.al neoessity sinoe an aotor's

oonduot may have,far-reaching effeots.
~rosser

In a philosophical way,

states that consequences could go forward to eternity:

"The fatal trespass done by Eve was the oause of our woe. uS
,

In determining liability, the oou~s limit legal responsibility to those oauses whioh are olosely related with the results and
signifioant enough so as to justify imposing liability.

Prosser

states that an attempt to impose liability without these l1mita~ions

would result in infinite liab1lity for all wrongful aots and

~ndless l1tigation. 6

The problems involved in determining proximate cause
nerous and of a oomplex variety.
~s

a~

nu-

At times, however, the problem

approaohed by determining whether the interests of the plaintiff

ire entitled to legal proteotion from the aotions of the defendant.
Phis, of

o~urse,

routes the problem

5Prosser, p. 218.
6Ib1d., p. 219.

to

the question of duty of
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care owed by the actor to the plaintiff.
Some courts plaoe the legal responsibility on the last wrongdoer where the cause is traced to sevelg1 sources.
doer is not, however, always held responsible.

The last wrong

An earlier actor

may be held responsible.if he is under an obligation to protect
the plaintiff' against the conduct of the wrongdoer.

Tr..is commonly

happens in school cases where a stud.ent is injured by the negligerli
aot of another

~tudent.

The teacher always has the obligation to

protect the students in his care from injur.y and i8 legally bound
to effectively control pupils conduot so as to prevent injury to

any.
The last element of' actionable negligenoe is the injur,y or
damage which constitutes the actual physioal harm to the plaintiff
This is an element upon which a law suit is baesd and without whid
aotion oannot be initiated.
Duty of the School District
The Supreme Court of Washington stated that it is the legal
duty of the sohool districts to proteot the students under their
oustody.

In defining the duty owed to the sohool child, the court

also defined the standard of oare required of the sohool district.

7Brisooe v. Sohool Distriot No. 123, Grays Harbor County, 32
Wash. (2nd) 353, 20 P. (2nd) 697, (1949).

r;
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The oourt made speoial reference to the supervision of games
which are inherently dangerous for an age group, or could beoome
dangerous i f allowed to continue without supervision.

In the 1m-

mediate c_se a group of students were playing a game of football
during reoess.

In the game, wh10h was oalled "Keep away" footban.

it was required that the members of one team taokle any member of
the opposing team who had possession of the football.

This game

was forbidden at the grade sohool, but at the time there was no
teaoher present on the playground.

During the game an eleven year

old boy was taokled and injured.
In determining the duty owed to the ohild, the oourt stated:

a duty is imposed by law on the sohool distriot to take
oertain preoautions to proteot pupils in its oustody
from danger reasonably to be antioipated, among whioh
dangers, we th1nk, should fa1rly be inoluded the dangers
inourred from playing games inherently dangerous for the
age group involved, or likely to beoome dangerous i f allowed to be engaged in without supervision.

In an early oase involving the duty of care owed to the
sohool ohildren in a sohool distriot, the Supreme Court of Bew
York stated: "The Board of Eduoation of the oity of Iew York is
oharged with the duty of providing for adequate supervision of
aotivities within the sohool yard. u8
The sohoold1striot was not required to keep the ohildren
8Graff v. Board of Eduoation of City of New York, 15 N. Y. S.
(2nd) 941, 358 App. D1v. 813, (1939).
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during the lunch hour in the oase of Miller ~. Board

£!

Eduoatio~

The primary sohool allowed the pr1mar,y sohool ohildren to eat
their lunohes in the sohool building, and aftemards allowed them
to play on the playground for the remainder of the lunohhour.
While playing on a defeotive fire esoape, a sohool ohild fell down
and injured himself.

The Supreme Court interpreted the statute referring to supervision and added:
What the board oould not do under the statute was
to undertake the oare and oontrol of ohildren during the
lunoheon period and then, after they had lunohed, turn
~hem out upon the school property upon whioh there existed a known dangerous and defeotive condition and provided no supervision for them although they were in the
school yard or playground, and it was during sohool hours.

In a reoent deoision, the Supreme Court of New York stated
that a school distriot has fulfilled its duty when it provides for
proper supervision. 10 "Appellant's duty was to provide for proper
supervision of activities within the school, and its duty was fulfilled when it provided adequate supervision in the person of one
or more oompetent instruotors."
In a prominent oase, a California court defined

~he

duty owed

9Miller v. Board of Eduoation, Union Free Sohool District No.
1 of Albion, 291 N. Y. 25, 50 N. E. (2nd) 529, (194').
lOperrill v. Board of Eduoation, Central School Distriot No.
1, 174 I. Y. S. (2nd) 91, 6 A. D. (2nd) 690, App. Div., 175 N. Y.
S. (2nd) 304, (1958).
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to the ohild: "Every teaoher in the public sohools must hold pupii
to a strict acoount for their oonduot on the way to and from
sohool, on the playground, or during reoess."ll

The oourts in

that state deolared that in order to provide effeotive oontrol and
supervision of students, the sohool distriots have the duty to

pr~

vide, and to enforce, rules and regulations.
In the oase of Tallor !. Oakland Scavenger 00.,12 a girl was
struok down by a garbage truok on the sohool grounds as she ran
from the gym to the athletio field.

A prinoipal issue in the oaSe

'was the failure of the sohool distriot to provide rules and regul&
tions in view of the danger to whioh the students were exposed s "It
is the duty of school authorities to supervise at all times, the
oonduot of the ohildren on the school grounds and to enforce those
rules and regulations neoessary to their proteotion."

Ili· the

oase of Brown !. Oi ty

Sl!. Qakland,13 a young girl

strayed away from her parents while attending a baseball game at
the school.

The child wandered into a sand pit used for the broad

jump, and while playing in the sand, out her hand on a broken

glas~

llBuzzard v. East Lake Sohool Distriot, 93 P. (2nd) 233, 34
Cal. App. (2nd) 316. (1939). See Seotion 5.543 of the Sohool Code
of California.
12Tarlor v. Oakland Soavenger Company, 110 P. (2nd) 1044, 17
Cal. (2nd) 594, (1941).
13Brown V. City of Oakland, 124 P. (2nd) 369, 51 Cal. App.
(2nd) 150, (1942).
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bottle.

The Supreme Oourt asserted the sohoo1 distriot's duty in

this regard: "It is the duty of sohoo1 authorities to enforoe or
oause to be enforoed rules and regulations in the supervision of'
pupils on sohoo1 grounds."
It has been stated, however, that in providing for proper
supervision, the school boards are not required to provide

detai1~

regulations oovering ever" aspeot of a ohild's activity in school •
.!

"The legi$lature did not hereby intend to cast upon school trustees or, b+ards of eduoation the burden of an attenpt to fashion
guides for the safe conduct of pupi1s. n14
Atter the Bohoo1 day terminates, the sohool ohildren are no
longer in the oustody or oontrol of the sohool, and the sohool
d1striot owes no duty to proteot ohildren who might linger or play
near Bohool buildings.

Plaintiffs bringing suit against sohool

distriots for injuries ocourring in these situations have been
denied relief by the courts.

---..............
mitted the gates of the sohool yard to remain open after sohool

In Kantor v. Board of Eduoation,l5 the board of eduoation pe~

hours so that ohi1dren could play their games in t he yard instead
of on the streets.

While watohing a stiok ball game, a nine year

14Hoose v. Drum et a1., 22 N. E. (2nd) 233. 281 N. Y. 54,

(1939).

s.

15Kantor v. Board of Eduoation of Oity of New York, 296 N. Y.
516, 251 App. Div. 454, (1937).
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old boy was struok down by a boy riding a bioycle who was playing
'tag

with other bicycle riders.
The

oourt defined the sohool's duty toward the ohildren:

We find that under the oircumStanoes herein presented.
there was no duty upon the board of education to have
watohers in the yard to prevent any particular form of
play. The purpose of the board of eduoation in open1ng
yards to the ohildren is obvious17 to keep them off the
street and to that extent to 8ssist in avoiding street
accidents. No supervision is attempted; no organized
play is established. There is no pretense 'of having
supervisors there.
In a similar situation, a neventeen year old boy entered a
sohool playground after school hours for the purpose of playing
handball.

While he was watohing a game of stickball, the, st1ck

used 1n the game as a bat s11pped out of the batter's hands and
struck the youth, oausing severe injuries.

In denying liability

for the sohool distriot. the oourt stated: "The defendant was
under no duty to provide supervision of the public users of its
playground."16
In

dete~in1ng

whether the sohool distriot has been negligent

in regard to the oare and supervision of the sohool children, the

oourts often refer to, and impose, the standard £! ordinary
or tha't cu:re expeoted of the ordinary prudent person.

~,

The failure

of the sohool boards to use ordinary oare in providing supervision
16Lutzker v. Board of Education of City of New York, 28 N. Y.
S. (2nd) 496, 262 App. Div. 881, (1941).

91
for sohool ohildren oonstitutes negligenoe on the part of the
sohool distriot.

Sohool board members in creating polioies and

supervisory personnel in supervising school ohildren must act in
the same manner that a person of ordinary prudence would act in
the same ciroumstanoes.
The Supreme Court of California, in determining whether a
sohool district was negligent in providing supervision during a
reoess period employed a test: "The question is whether the sohool
offioials used the same oare as persons of ordinar,y prudenoe
charged with the duty of oarrying on the public system would use
under the same ciroumstanoes."17
The oourt then defined ordinary care: "What is ordinary care
depends upon the- ciroumstanoes of eaoh particular case and is to
be determined as a fact with reference to the situation and knowledge of the parties. nlS
The Supreme Court of Washington has referred to the same
dard in determining negligence.

sta~

"The extent of the duty thus im-

posed upon the respondent school distriot, in relation to its
supervision of its pupils within its custod7. is that it 18
required to exercise such care as an ordinarily prudent person
17Buzzard v. East Lake Sohool Dis triot of Lake County, 93 P.
(2nd) 233, 34 Cal. App. (2nd) 316, (1939).
18Ibid •
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"would exercise under the same or similar oiroumstanoes."19
Sohool distriots are generally held responsible for the proteotion of sohool ohildren from dangers which are foreseeable to a
reasonable prudent person.

School districts are oharged with

fo~

seeability, and the failure of sOhool board members to aot in the
faoe of a foreseeable danger oonstitutes liability on the part of
the distriot.
The oourt in the oase of Oakland .!. ·Soavenger
deoision upon this prinoiple.

.2.2. 20

based it.

In that oase, the prinoipal and the

sohool officers had known for some time that students frequently
ran aoross the area used by truoks, but they imposed no rules of
oonduot or supervised the students.

The oourt in deoiding this

oase imposed liability: "Their negligenoe is established if a reasonable prudent person could foresee that

inj~ries

of the same

ge&

eral type would be likely to happen in the absenoe of suoh safeguards."
The oourt then went farther and stated that in holding a
sohool district liable it was not neoessary that the supervisor or
the sohool board foresee the speoific injury.

In order to prove

,

negligenoe, the plaintiffs needed only to show that an injur,y of a

19Brisooe v. Sohool Distriot No. 123, Grays Harbor County,
201,P. (2nd) 697, 32 Wash. (2nd) 353, (1949).
2°Oakland v. Soavenger Co., 83 P. (2nd) 948.
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general type was foreseeable: "Nor is it necessary that the ver,y
injury whioh ocourred must have been foreseeable by the sohool
authorities in order to establish that their failure to provide
additional safeguards oonstituted negligenoe. n21
In the osse of Charonnat ~. ~ FranOisoo,22 two students
were involved in a minor dispute in the sohool yard.

One stUdent

walked away and started playing on the sohool fenoe.

The other

student followed him, grabbed his leg, and twisted it in suoh a
way that the leg bone fraotured.

In holding the sohool liable,
•
the oourt relied on the prinoiple deoided in the Oakland oase: "It

was not neoessar,y that the injury to the pupil whose leg was
broken by a fellow pupil must have been foreseeable by the sohool
authorl ties or the yard supervisor."

The oourt maintained that

where arguments and fighting ooour, injuries are likely to result,
and it was not unreasonable to insist that the supervisor should
have foreseen that injury oould ooour.
It is the oommon law duty of school distriots to provide and
arrange for the supervision of sohool students, and sohool distriots whioh fail to do so are held liable for injuries received
by students as a result of this negleot.

Most states have enacted

statutes requiring supervision and these are expre.ssed in the
2lOakland v. Soavenger 00., 83 P. (2nd) 948.
22Charonnat v. San

Un1f'ied Sohool Distriot, 133 P.•
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the school codes of the states.

In the case of Forgone

~.

Salva-

dore School District,23 a group of students were left unattended
----------~-to eat their lunch in a school room. During the lunch hour some

----

of the students started to play and souffle, and during the fray,
a student twisted and injured a girl' arm.
The oourt stated that laok of supervision oonsti tuted caus's
of action against the school district.

"In the present

oas~ th~

negligenoe r::illet:ed to have oonsisted of an omission to supply the
supervision of stUdents during an intermission of sohool whioh is
required by law • • • • Indeed, we may assume that if the teacher
had been present, the souffling would not have ooourred and the
injuries would not have resulted."
Providing supervision, however, does not guarantee that the
school district will be absolved from liability when pupils are
jured.

in~

Sohool distriots oan be held liable for failure to provide

adequate supervision.

The question as to what oonstitutes adequata

supervision depends upon the faots of the particular situation.
What would be adequate in one situation would not be in another.
This is a question of fact, and when it is before the court, it is
left for the jury to deoide.

Reoent deoisions have not brought

an agreement on the question.

23Porgone v. Salvadore Union Elementary Sohool Distriot, 106
P. (2nd) 932, 41 Cal. App. 423, (1940).
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did not provide adequate supervision when it assigned one teacher
The court in Charonnat v. San Franoisoo 24 held that the soho

to supervise some one hundred and fifty students in the sohool
yard.

It stated tlEt one teacher could not account for the condu

of that number of pupils.
Other courts have not been as definite as to what constitutes
proper supervision.

"In determining whether the school district

was negligent in Rffording supervision of its pupils" there is no
absolute rule as to the number of pupils one supervisor may adequately oversee, nor is there any fixed standard of supervision .• " 2
The court in Ohman

.!. Board .2! Eduoation,26 in which the art

teaoher went out of the room, stated: "Proper supervision depends
largely on the ciroumstanoes attending the event. r
Sohool distriots whioh use inoompetent or untrained help in
8upeM"1sing student s have been he 14 liable by the' oourts •

Studen

under suoh supervision are exposed to unreasonable risk of h9rm.

-

The oase of Garber v. Central Sohool Distriot 27 is a good illustration.

---~--

240haronnat v. San Franoisco Unified Sohool Distriot, 133 P.
(2nd) 643, 56 Oal. APP. Div. 840. (1943).
25Rodriquez v. San Jose Unified Sohool Distriot. 322 P. (2nd)
70, 157 Oal. App. (2nd) 842. (1958).
260hman v. Board of Eduoation of Oity of New York, 300 N. Y.
'06, 90 N. E. (2nd) 474, (1949).
1 of
ron,
Div
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During the lunoh hour a school janitor was usually left to

supervise the students in the gym and keep them out of the halls
until the bell rang.

The students were left alone to amuse them-

selves with no rules or regulations oonoerning disoipline.

On the

day of the aooident some of the students started playing "shoot
the crow It"

One boy would lie down on a mat and draw his knees up

against his chest.

Another boy would sit on his upturned feet,

and would be shot into the air, landing on a nearby mat.

The

janitor joined the game and "shot up" a small student who was not
experieno.d with the game.

The student was thrown five, feet in

the air, and came down head first on the gym floor seven feet beyond the mat, sustaining a fractured arm and other injuries.
The Supreme Court in holding the school liable stated that
leaving young boys under the oare of a person without tra1ning,
skill, or experience amounted to a failure of the school authorities to meet the requirements of the oommon rule as well a8 neglect of duty as imposed by statute.

"It is indioative not only

a disregard of the statutory mandate to make

~les

o~

and regulations

to establish order and discipline, but also to oarerully seleot
suitable supervisol'lI1 to whom the safety of children was to be intrusted while under school restratnt. ft28
It oan be seen from the opinions that there are no binding
28Garber v. Central Sohool Distriot No. 1 of Town of Sharon,
Sohoharie Oounty, 295 N. Y. S. 850, 251 App. Div, 214, (1937).
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rules or f1xed standards
supervision.

8S

to what constitutes adequate or proper

However 1t can be certain that the courts w1ll hold

a sohool distriot liable for negligenoe if the jury should f1nd
that the sohool failed to provide the proper superv1sion.
Duty of the School Teacher
Under the common law a teacher owes the school child the duty
to protect him from unreasonable risk of harm.

Proteotion from

physioal harm involves the proteotion from the teaoher's own negligence as well as from the child's acts or those of his olassmates.

Sohool children require oonstant care and supervision be-

oause of their immaturity. their inab1lity to reoognize danger
where it exists, and because of their implusive nature..
A sohool teaoher is in effect a supervisor whenever the
teaoher is in oustody of a group of children.

This responsib1lity

is exercised while in the classroom. and in any other 1nstances
where the teaoher mar be delegated supervisory duty.
The relationship of a sohool teacher to a sohool distriot is
that of an employee, and a teacher does not reoeive immunity from
tort liability the way a school officer would.

Teaohers are held

liabl. in all cases where a stUdent receives an injur.y as a direot
result of the teaoher's, negligence.

In holding a teaoher liable

the oourts have used the same standards of conduot by whioh to
measure a teaoher's oonduot as is used for sohool districts or the
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oommon man.

In special situations, a higher standard is used.

In

jurisdiotions where the sohool districts are held liable tor their
torts, a teacher's liability reverts on the distriot, and the

rela~

tionship between the teacher and the sohool district is that of
master and servant.
A teaoher's legal duty toward the school ohild is largely ful
filled through proper and effeotive supervision, and teaohers have
been held liable for breaoh of th1s duty beoause of

imp~pper

or in

adequate supervision.
~

In passing judgment in oaaeo involving teaohers, sare courts
have based their decisions on the legal relationship between the
ohild and the teaoher whioh is known as

~

parentis.

!fhis rela-

tionship imposes upon the teaoher a duty to oare for the ohild in
the aame manner that a parent would.

Under this theory the paren1J

delegate their respons1bi11ty to the teaoher.
A noted oas .. which 11lustrates the duty of the teaoher to the
sohool ch11d through this legal oonoept is the oaS8 of Gainscott
29 In that case, the teaoher had asked an eight year
-v.oldDavies.
pup11 to water the plants whioh were looated 1n the "oonservatory,· a room adjacent to the classroom, used to display b101ogioa
speoimens and plants.

The plants in the room were in boxes which

were suspended from the oei11ng, and were too high for the child

29Gainsoott v. Davies. 275 N. W. 229. 281 Mich. 515. (1937).
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to reaoh.

With the knowledge of the teaoher, the young girl took

a ohair, stood on it, and prooeeded to water the plants with a
milk bottle.

In the prooess, the bottle slipped from her hand and

broke on the oement floor.

The girl slipped and fell on the

broken glass and reoeived severe outs.
In passing judgment, the oourt stated that the relationship
of a teacher to a pupil is that of one

~

1222

2arentis:

Weare not ooncerned with the law applioable to the
punishment at a pupil by a teaoher, but rather with the
law applioable to the duties of a teaoher in the oare and
oustody of a pupil. In the faithful disoharge of suoh
duties the teaoher is bound to use reasonable oare, tested
in the ~ight of the existing relationship. If through
negligenoe, the teaoher is guilty of a breaoh of suoh
duty and in oonsequenoe thereof a pupil Buffel's injury,
liability results.
Another oourt based its deoision on the same relationsh1p.30
'In that oase, a manual training teaoher, with approval of the

board, was oonstruoting a vooational training building.

Katerials

from a razed building were used. and boys were permitted to volunteer for this work during their manual training olasses.

A tem-

porary stage was ereoted entirely around the building and the boy.
ould stand on it to fintsh the walls.

The plaintiff, Brooks, was

rking with a oompanion when the stage oollapsed and Brooks reoeived severe injuries.
The court oited the, Gainsoott oase and stated that duty was
:;OBrooks v. Jacobs

31 A. (2nd
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based upon the teacheIf.pupil relationship of

!!!

~

;earentis,

and that beoause the teaoher had the oare and custody of his

pupi~

with the right to govern and control them, he must so act as not
negligently injure them, whether the aot is one of misfeasance or
nonfeasance.
In instanoes where negligenoe oan be shown, the oourts will
hold a teaoher liable for nonfeasanoe, the failure to aot
1$

8S

re-

qui red in ord.er to prevent injury to the ohild, as well as for
feasanoe, the wrong oonduot oausing injury.
illustrat~s

the breaoh of duty

~nder ~

.!!!.

The following case

parentis by misfeasanoe.

It also indioates the limit of the teaoher's authority under this
legal oonoept. \

cJ.<

In the oase of Guerrieri ~._Tlson,31 a teaoher notioed that
a boy who was playing baseball had an inflamed finger.
the boy to report to the offioe after sohool was out.

She told
After sohoo:

she heated a pan of water to the boiling point, and with the help
of an assistant, held the hand of the student under the water for
about ten minutes.

The boy was then sent home, and later taken to

the hospital by his parents.
1nf~ction

.

The burns required , treatment and an

complicated the affair.

the hospital fer twenty-eight days.

The boy was required to stay in
The scalding aggravated the

infeotion, and soar tissue permanently disfigured the hand.

3lGuerrieri v. Tyson, 24 A. (2nd) 468, 147 P. Sup. 239,(1942)
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The oourt did not judge the teaoher's good intent, i f there
~as

one, but her laok of prudenoe in treating the

student~

In

holding the teaoher liable, the oourt stated the limitations of
the teaoher's authority UDder this relationship:
Under the oiroumstanoes, we think it olear that these
defendants are legally liable for the damages resulting
from their tort. These teaohers stood in 1000 ¥arentis
to the ohild, but there i8 nothing in tnat-riIa IonsHIp
which will justify the defendantts aots. Under the delegatsd parental authority implied from the relationship
of teaoher and pupil, a teaoher may infliot reasonable
oorporal punisbment on a pupil to enforoe disoipline, but
there is no implied delegation of authority to eXercise
her lay judgment as a parent may in the matters of the
treatment of injury or disease suffered by a pupil.
The court then added that the teache rs we re not aoting in /;:to
emergency, and furthermore t neither had any medical training.

A

teacher's authority over a school ohild does not extend beyond
supervision, and

~atters

which require medioal attention should be

referred to t he medically trained personnel.

The above Cllse was

an extreme one, and teaohers have been held liable in cases of a
less serious nature.
Apart from the legal relationship of

~

parentiS, a teaoher

has the oommon law duty to proteot all students, whioh are under
the oontrol or oustody of the teacher and a dereliotion of this
duty will bring about liability.

In the oase of Hoose .!. B.!:!!!,32

a group of ohildren were playing among some goldenrods growing in

t,

,2Hoose v. Drum et al., 22 B. E. (2nd) 233, 281 N. Y. 54,

Q~Q\
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a field adjacent to the school grounds.

The ohildren were out on

reoess, and were under the supervision of their teaoher •. While
playing with a goldenrod stalk, one pupil struok another pupil in
the eye, oausing him the loss of the eye.
The court stated:
Teachers have watohed over the play of their pupils
time out of mind. At reoess periods. not less than in
the olassroom, a teaoher owes to his charges to exeroise
such care of them as a parent of ordinary prudenoe would
observe in oomparable oiroumstances • • • • The effeotive
cause of the plaintiffts injuries was a failure to proteot the boys against themselVes. Any dere1iotion in
this aspeot was the fault of the teaoher.
other oourts have held teaoher liable for omission or their
duties.
simil~

-------

The court in Miller v. Board of Education"
----~~manner.

--

~iled in a

After taking lunoh a group of grade children was told by
their teaoher to go

~lay

in the playground.

The teaoher remained

inside of the building, aud watching the ohildren through a window.

While playing, a girl olimbed over a defective fire esoape,

fell down. and received injuries.

The oourt later held that the

teaoher had falled her duty of supervision because she had not
adequat~ly

supervised the ohi1dren.

A student obtained permisSion from his teaoher to bring a gun
"Miller v. Board of Eduoation, Union Free Sohool Distriot NQ
1 of Albion, 291 N. Y. 25, 50 N. E. (2nd) 529, (194').

to the sohool workshop tor repairs in the oase ot Govel .1 • .Board
.2!. Eduoation. 34 The gun oonsisted only of the barrel and. the
breaoh meohanism.

In the days whioh followed, the teaoher failed

to supervise the work on the gun.

One day the student brought

live ammunition to test the mechanism and the teacher took no
notioe.

While trying out the mechanism, the gun'discharged aooi-

dentally and wounded a student standing nearby.
The court did not hold the teaoher liable, saying:
Without ammunition' the portion of the gun whioh was
brought presented no more of a haB~ than any other metal
oylinder with attaohmen~s • • • • It was obvious to anyone who looked that Taylor was using live ammunition in
testing the gun. Duffy (the teacher) was negligent in
not adequately supervising the work and for not warning t~
plaintiff and others who were within range of the danger.

r In deteirmining liabil1ty

~f

sohool teachers for the'ir negli.-

gence, the oourts have imposed the standard of conduot required of
an ordinary prudent person.

T~acher8

are required to use reason-

--

able oare. and their failure to do so will bring about liability.

-

In Govel v. Board of Education,35 the boys physioal education

-

classes were requir'ed to somersault over a set of parallel bars by
bouncing on a springboard plaoed on one side of the bars and landing on the opposity side where some mats were plaoed on the floor.

34Govel v. Board of Eduoation of City of Albany, 48 N. Y. S.
(2nd) 299, 267 APP. D~Y. 621, (1944). The sohool board in this
oase was not held liable beoause it was a delegated duty.
35 Ibid •
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While attempting this maneuver a pupil oaught his foot on the bars t
fell on the bare floor, and broke a leg.
In stating negligence, the court said, "A teacher of physioal
education bas the duty to exercise reasonable care to prevent in3uries, to assign pupils to such/exercises as are within their
abilities, and to properly and adequatlly supervise their activities, a breach of which duty constitutes actionable negligence on
the part of the

teacher.",_~

- -

_

In the case of Luce v. Board of ................................
Ed.ucation,'6 a school student
bad received previous fractures of the forearm, and on her return
to sohool was permitted to forego her gym olasses on doctorts
orders.

Durlng(the seoond sohool term her cast was removed and

she was allowed to participate in gymnasium activities.

While

1P1aying «jump the stick relay, ,. a game in whioh the participants
have to jump as a stick is swung under them, the plaintiff was
!pushed and fell down, breaking her arm in the same plaoe again.
In stating charges, the plaintiff contended that the girl should
pot have been 8l10".ed to play that type of game resulting in her
~all.

.

The court cited the Govel case, and stated that a physical
• ducation teacher has the duty to exeroise reasonable oare to

'6Luce v. Board of Eduoation of Village of Johnson City, 157
N. Y. S. (2nd) 12', (1956).

I(
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preven~

injuries and to assign pupils to suoh aotivities as are

within their abilities.
Judgment was passed aga1,nst a physioal eduoation teaoher who
allowed two unskilled boys to box without any previous instruotions as to the proper method of boxing.

As a result. one pupil

reoeived severe injuries and the oourt allowed reoovery from the
teaoher.'7
In passing judgment the oourt stated s

It is the duty of a teaoher to exeroise reasonable
oare to prevent 1n~ur1es. In this partioular oase the
pupils should be warned before being permitted to engage
in a dangerous and hazardous exeroise; Skilled boxers at
t~es are injured, and these two vigorous athletiC young
men should have been taught the prinoiples of defen$e if.
indeed it was a reasonable thing to permit a 81uggihg
matoh of the kind wh,1.oh the testimony shows this oontest
was.
r--

\ Under ordinary oiroumstanoes, the standard of oonduot require

of sohool teaohers seldom goes beyond that of reasonable care.
teaoher may

"A

be oharged only with reasonable oare suoh as a parent

of ordinary prudenoe would exeroise under oomparable oiroumstanoes."'S
Under oircumstances in whioh students are exposed to a
degree of risk than the ordinary, the oourts

m~

great.~

impose oare of tb

37La Valley v. Stanford, 70 N. Y. S. (2nd) 460, 272 App. DiY,
183, (1947)

0

\'SOhman v. Board~of E4uoa~ton oI City of New York, 90 N. E.
{2ndJ 474 .. 300 B. Y. ')06 .. \.194:'/.

(
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(

highest degree upon a teaoher beoause the safety of the students

-

depends upon the precautions taken by the teacher. The oase of De
Gooler y. Harkness 39 serves as an illustration. An athletic coach
~oined

in with a group of high school boys intent on in1tiating

the new members of the football squad who had "lettered" that year.
The in1tiation was oustomarily held towards the end of the school
year, and oonsisted of giving the oandidates an eleotrio shook.
The shock was produoed by using wires oonneoted to a transformer
whioh in turn was oonneoted to a set of batteries.

The equipment

was not available that partioular year, and the current was drawn
from an eleotrio sooket while a rheostat was improvised from a jar

c~ntaining

salt watlr.

After the third oandidate to receive the

shook complained that it was tou strong, the salt solution was
diluted in half, and the wires were tested by the ooaoh.

~he

plaintiff, De Gooyer. reoeived a shook and immediately oollapsed.
He

oould not be revived and died as a result of the shook.

The

ooaoh was implioated by the faot that he was at the time in oontlnl
of the situation and responsible for the safety of the initiates.
In the ensuing trial, the court stated that the ooaoh was

bound to use care of the

hi~hestde5ree:

The defend:mt, Gardner, must be charged with knOW.
letfe that electricity is dangerous. His duty in 'j)iificipa ng in the act of transmitting the electric current
to the body of Gerald was to use the highest degree at

'9De Gooyer v. Harkness, 13 N. W. (2nd) 815, 70 S. D. 26,

(lq44).

jt

'
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care that skill and vigilance oould suggest. The facts
disolose that the rheostat used was at best a very orude
and hastily prepared contrivanoe; the shook was administered while the boy reclined on a wet damp floor (it is
generAlly known that an eleotrio shock is enhanced when
a part of the person who receives the shock oontaots a
wet surfaoe); the tests that were made inoluded only two
of the eight or more wires; the evidenoe disolosed that
the boy preoeeding Gerald had reoeived a severe shock.
These faots in our opinion are suffioient to support the
finding of the jury that Mr. Gardner failed Gerald to
observe the high degree of duty owing to Gerald.
\
,..I'

Duty in Sohool

Transpo~ation

In sohool distriots where the sohool dnildren are transported
to and from sohool, the oourts have imposed the duty of oare for
the ohildren's safety.

The same rules of negligenoe whioh apply

to other sohool situations apply ln transportation, and sOhool
distriots have been held 11able for injuries to pupils arising
from their negligenoe. 40 If all elements of actionable negligenoe
are not present, 11ability oannot be imposed upon a sohool dlstrict. 41
In formulating a standard of care the courts are not in aooord, but in all oases the degree of care was dependent upon the
designation given to the vehiole used in transportation.

A

common

oarrier is a vehiole used in publio transportation and under the
40The liabi11ty of the sohool distriots in Illinois was based
on a school bus aocident.
41 Baase v. Central Union High Sohool Distriot, 59 P. (2nd)
193, 15 Oal. App. (2nd) 102, (1936).
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oommon law it owes the public the highest degree of oare.

/
\

While

some courts have identified school buses as being oommon carl'iers,
others have designated these as private oarriers.

The following

oases are used in illustration.
In the oase of Shanon!. Central Sohool Distri~,42 a student
stepped from the sohool bus, ran home, and was struok by an approaohing oar.

The oourt in deoiding liability held that the bus

driver owed the ohildren ordinary oare: "We are of the opinion
that a bus which is operated only for the oonvenienoe of a partioular school under the oiroumstances of this case is a mere private
oarrier as

distinguis~d

from a oommon carrier, and that ordina£l

Erudenoe for the safety of the children under s 1milar oircumstancEIII
is all that is required of the distriot or the driver of the bus~4 ~
The ordinary oare of children, however, does not oonstitute
a minimum of effori on the part of the distriot for the safety ot
the ohildren.

Ordinarily more stringent measures

m~st

be taken

when dealing with children than when dealing with adults.
failing to warn, or to halt a student who was getting off a

In
sol~ol

bus, a driver was found guilty of negligence: "It is ordinarily
42Shanon v. Central Gaithe~ Union Sohool District, 23 P. (2nd
769, 153 Cal. APP. 124, (1933).
43This deoision has been cited ~nd upheld in more recent
casesl Hanson v. Reedley Joint Union High School District, 111 P.
(2nd) 415, 43 Cal. App. (2nd) 643, (1941), Fos~er v. Einar, 158 p.
(2nd) 978, 69 Cal. App. (2nd) 341, (1945).
\
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"necessary to exercise greater care for the protection and safety
of young ohildren than for an adult who possesses normal and
mature faoulties.

One would anticipate thoughtlessness and impul-

siveness in the oonduct of a young ohild."44
Some oourts have stated that the standard of oare used in the
transportation of children is extraordinary .2.!£!.:
While a carrier of passengers is not an insurer of
the safety of his passengers in the sense that a common
oarrier of goods is said to be an insurer of the safety
of goods oarried, he is bound to exeroise extraordinarz
oare and discipline for the safety of his passengers, and
Iiimatters not the kind of conveyance used or the nature
. of the motive power employed. Hence, the operator for
hire of a sohool motorbus who operates along a oertain
route every sohool day, taking all sohool ohildren alike
to and from a oertain sohool is a oarrier of pass.ngers
required to exeroise extraordinary oare and diligenoe
for the safety of every one at sUCh sohool ohildren
'riding in his bus.45
In the oase of Phillips !. Hardgrove 46 the oourts in Washington imposed oare of the highe»t degree. whioh is the oare.imposed
44Shanon v. Central Gaithsr Union Sohool Distriot, 23 P.
(2nd) 769, 133 Oal. APt>. 124, (1933).
45Sheffie1d v. Lovering, 180 S.E. 52', 51, Ga. APP. 353,
(1935). The oourts in Georgia have acihared to this standard:
Roberts v. Baker, 196 S. E. 104,57 Ga. App. 733, (1938) •. Baker v.
Langely, O.O.A. Okla., 144 Fed. (2nd) 344, 154 A. L. R. 1098,(1944
.

46Phi1lips v. Hardgrove, 296 P. 559, 161 Wash. 121, (1931).

The oourt based its deoision on a prior case involving a common

oarrier: U. S. Lincoln Oity Lines, Ino. v. Schmidt, O.A.leb. 245,
Fed. (2nd) 600, (1927), and it was upheld in reoent deoisions in
Washington: Leaoh v. Sohool Distriot No. 322 of Thurstone Oounty,
85 p. (2nd) 312, 22 Wahs. (2nd) 596, 158 A. L.ft. 810, (1945).
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on common oarriers.

A young girl was struok and killed by a car

after alighting from a sohool bus.

The court in decidingtha case

stated that the standard of care required of the school district
in transporting children should be based on publio polioy.

The

standard of oare in referenoe to sohool buildings and equipment
was based on publio polioy, and the court saw no reason why standards imposed on sohool
lic polioy as well.

transportat~on

should not be based on pub-

Public policy demanded the highest degree of

care of publio oarriers, and the same would be demanded of oarrier.
of sohool ohildren.
If a school distriot is liable for the failure to
exeroise ordinary care with reference to the school building, sohool grounds, and manual training eqUipment, there
would appear to be no 'reason why it should not, when it
engages in the oarrying of passengers by a sohool bus, be
required to exercise the same degree of care that is exeroised by passenger carriers generally. If the rule of
the highest degree of oare arises, as all authorities say,
from the nature of the employment and on the grounds of
public policy, there is no reason why it should not be
applied to a school distriot the same as any other passenger carrier. Certainly school ohildren are entitled to
the same degree of care as are adults.

The standard of care was defined in Illinois prior to the
Kolitar deCision.

An

-

appellate oourt in Van Cleave v'. Illinois

-

Coaoh Compw 47held that the highest degree of care was required
in the transportation of sohool ohildren.

In the oase it was al-

leged that the driver oarelessly propelled the bus, and oaused a

47Van Ole ave v. Illinois Ooach Co., 344 Ill. App. 127, 100 I,
E. (2nd) 398, (1951).
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student standing in the aisle of the bus to be thrown forward and
strike the plaintiff.
In holding the oompany liable, the oourt stated: "We believe
that this sets up the proper standard of oare and those engaged in
the transportation of sohool ohildren should be held to exercise
the highest degree

£!

~."48

There was no prior deoision on

this partioular question in Illin.ois. and the oourt in handing
down this deoision made reference to ~ !._ Oi ty

.2! Seattle, 49 a

sohool oase from Was,hington.

... -

-

In Prioe v. "York,50 an Illinois Appellate Court has approved
-..;;.;.

the holding. of the

.!!!!

Oleaveoase.

In this oase a yo'Wlg ohild

was crOSSing a highway in order to board a sohool bUS, and was
struok by a passing motorist.
I

The oourt held the sohool district

not liable beoause there was no breach of duty_

It stated that

sohool distriots ow.d no duty to escort stUdents.

The court how-

ever went on to state that it reoognized the prior holding in the
Cleave oase to the effect that those who conve,y ohildren to
-Van
and from sohool must exer01se the highest degree of oare consistent with the praotical operation of a sohool bus.

48Van Oleave v. IllinOis Ooaoh Co., 344 Ill. App. 127. 100 X.

E. (2nd) 398, (1951).

49webb v. Oity of Seattle. 157 P. (2nd) 312, 22 Wash. (2nd)
596, 158 A. L. R. 810, (1945).
50
.
Prioe v. York, 24 Ill. App. (2nd) 450, (1960). '
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Proximate Cause as Deoiding Liability
After showing that a sohool distriot's

of~ioers

or a sohool

teaoher has been negligent in some respeot, a parent must allege
and prove that the aot of negligenoe was the proximate oause of
the injury to the ohild.
In the oase of G3l!en ~. Rhodes 51 all indioations show that
the teaoher was negligent, but the oourt held him not liable beoause his aotions were not the proximate oause of the injury.

In

that CAse a student threw a milk bottle and injured another stu~ent

during the teacher's absenoe from the olassroom.

The olass

was oomposed, of incorrigible youths, and although the teaoher knew
of previous assaults upon the injured ohi1d, he placed no one in
charge of the room during his absenoe.

The teaoher furnished the

milk bottles to the olass and 81l01'4ed them to retain them.

The

court in deoiding liability found that ttle teaoher's aotions were
not the prosimate oause of the injur,y, and absolved the distriot
and the teaoher, "The violent disposition of the pupil assaulting
the plaintiff appears to be the first and proximate cause of the
~laintiffts

injur,y and the absenoe of the defendant is a remote

oause only, if any."
In oases where the negligent aot of a teaoher 1s the proxlmat4
5lG~en v. Rhodes, 29 N. E. (2nd) 444, 65 Ohio App. l63,(19~)
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oause of a child's injury, the sohool teachar can be held liable.

-------

In the case of Benedetti v. Board of EducF.ition,52 a vocational

----- -

-

arts teacher was found liable for negligence because his act was
a direct and

prox~at.

cause of a student's injury.

In that case

the teaoher failed to look a maohine and left it unattended for an
unreasonable length of time.

While a student tried to extricate-

a pieoe of metal from the maohine, another student stepped on the

foot threadle and oaught his hand in the gears.

Although the

teacher was nine feet from the machine at the time of the accident
the oourt found him negligent because he failed to observe whether
the maohine was being used or tampered with and his negligenoe W8S

the proximate cause of the student's injur,yo
In determining, the proximate cause, the oourt used the "but
:f

for" test and estabb.1shed that the aocident would not have ooourmc
"but for" the teaoher's oonourring negligenoe in failing to ob...
serve whether the machine was being used or tampered with: "But fa
the negligence of the teaoher, no aot of a third person oould have
operated
to OBuse the injury o:f the :tnfant plaintiff."
,

The

teaoher was found negligent and the sohool was held liable.
In an instanoe ."here a teaoher's negligent aot is tbe cause
of an aocident, an independent intervening oause mRy break the
ohain of oausation between the teaoher's negligent aot and the

52Benedetti v. Board of Eduoation of Oity of New York, 67 N.
Y. S. (2nd) 30. 271 App. Div. 886. (1946).
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injury.

This aot beoomes the proximate oause of the abcident,

while the aot of the teaoher beoomes a more remote oause.
In the oase of Tallor ~. xevlin,53 a teaoher of meohanical
arts direoted a student to olean a printing press.

While the stu-

dent was cleaning the press a classmate moved the flyviheel and
oaught his har.d in the gears.

The oourt stated that the student's

aot was an independent aot whioh intervened and became the proximate oause of the injury: "We conclude that the aot of the fellow
pupil in setting the gears in motion was suoh an independent int.
vening oause as to break the ohain of oausation between the aooident and any conduct on the part

~

the defendant.

It was the

proximate oause of the injury."
This case bears some similarity to the Benedetti case, howev
in

that case the instruotor had the duty to look the IIBchine or

watoh over it so that no one 1iampered

In the

T!llo~

V'1it~l

it, Etnd he did neither.

case the instruotor had asked a student to perform a

normal operation.

It should be noted that a third party being the

immediate

causing an injUl7 does not in all oases absolve

aoto~ ~n

J

a teaoher or a school district from liability.

This is specially

true in iDDtnnces whore the school distriot failed to provide adequate supervision. 54

53Taylor v. Kevlin, 1 A. (2nd) 433, 121 N. J. 142,(1938).
540haronnat v. San
6

Unified School District, 133 P.
1
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In instanoes where an unforeseen aot is tbe proximate oause
o~

an injury teaohers are not held l1able.

In the oase of Ohman

Board of Eduoation,55 a student in the aot of passing a pen011
-tov. another
--boy
--------threw the penoil and struok another one in the eye
when the student for whom the penoil was intended duoked out of
the way.

The teaoher at the time was out of the olassroom obta1n-

ing supplies.

The oourt held that there was no liability beoause

the proximate oause of the acoident was the unforeseen aot of the
pupil, and not the absenoe of the teacher.

The absence of the

teaoher was a remote oause, and in all probability the aocident
would have happened in the presence of the teacher.
The court stated:
)

Non~theless, it does not follow such absence was the
proximate produoing oause of the injury, whioh was due, as
we see 1t, to the tossed pencil. Whether it was done misohievously, and heedlessly or wantonly and willfully, or
with the serious purpose of return1ng the penoil to its
owner, 1t was the aot o~ an 1ntervening third party, whioh
under the oiroumstanoes oould hardly have been antioipated
in the reasonable exeroise of the ~eaoh.r's legal duty
toward the plaintiff.

---- - ------

In Pollard v. Board of Eduoation,56 a girl had eaten lunoh
and gone to t.he playground for the remainder of the per10d.

In

returning to her olassroom, she followed other pupils over a fenoe
550hman v. Board of Eduoation of City of New York, 90 N. E.
(2nd) 474, 300 N. Y. 306, (1949).
56Pollard v. Boal~ of Eduoation, Barker Central School Distriot, 117 N. Y. S. (2nd) 184, 280 App. Div. 1033, (1952).
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whioh separated the playground area.

She plaoed one

~oot

over the

wire and was bringing the other over when, a classmate raised the
wire so that it struck her foot and threw her to the ground.

The

oourt stated that the proximate cause of the injury was the unforeseen act of the third party: "We find no evidenoe in the record to
support a finding that the fenoe involved in the aooident was negligently oonstruoted or negligently maintained, or that defendant
breaohed his duty to provide adequate supervision of the playground.

In our opinion, the sole proximate oause of the aooident

was the unforeseen intervention of the plaintiffts olassmate in
raising the wire."
Extent of Liability of the Sohool Distriot
Sohool distriots are not held to striot liability, and they
are not insurers of the ohildrents safety.

Striot liability is

generally limited to situations where the plaintiffs are exposed
to extraordinary risk, and the aotor is "an insurer against the
oonsequenoes of his oonduot. n57
In holding that the sohool districts are not insurers of
safety, the courts have stated that liability oannot be imposed
for injuries reoeived by students whioh ooourred through the fault
of no one.

Parents must allege and prove that the school distriot

of their employees were guilty of some aot or omission whioh

57Prossert p. 338.
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amounts to negligenoe.

The sohool distriots in

ef~eot

are not

liable for the "pure aocidents. n
Sohool distriots are ordinarily responsible for the injuries
of students whioh are oaueed

by

their olassmates beoause students

can not always exercise mature judgment for their actions.

The

sohool distriots, however, oannot be held liable for aooidents
whioh a person of ordinary prudenoe could not foresee.

In the

--

case of Reithardt v. Board .......
of Education,58 a girl was Sitting on
a window ledge waiting for her ph3'sioal education class to start.
Suddenly and without warning a classmate grabbed her ankles,
raised her legs, and pulled her off the ledge so that she fell on
the noor and received injuries.

The sohool district in this oase

was hel; not liable beoau.. the sohool personnel could not have
~

~

foreseen the aot in order to avoid the aooident.
Theoourt in the osse, Underhill

~.

Alameda Elementery School

District,59 held that a school distriot could not be held liable
~or

injuries suffered by a stUdent in the playground unless the

sohool district failed to provide a safe playground or allowed the
studente to engage in games of a dangerous nature.

The student iD

this oase was struok by a bat whioh slipped out of the

batte~ts

58Reithardt v. Board of Eduoation of Yuba County, 111 P. (2nd~
440, 43 Cal. App. (2nd) 629, (1941).
59Underhill v. Alameda Elementary Sohool Distriot of Alameda
County, 24 P. 849, 33 Cal. App. 733, (1933).
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hand while watohing a supervised game.

The parents brought suit

against the sohool distriot, but failed to prove that the sohool
distriot had in any way been negligent toward the student.

The

oourt, in passing judgment for the defendant, stated,
. The injuries whioh may result from the playing of
ssid games are ordinarily of an inoonsequential nature
and are inourred without the fault or part of anyone.
In suoh oases there is no liability and of oourse the
f\tndamental rules governing liability remain the same,
~ven though the partioular injury may prove to be of a
more serious nature. The law does not make sohool distriots insurers of the safety of the pupils at pl~ or
elsewhere, and no liability is imposed upon a distriot
under the above mentioned seotion, in the absenoe of
negligenoe of the distriot, its offioers, or employees.
In physioal eduoation olasses where students are more likely

to be exposed to risks, the oourts have ruled in the same manner,
maintaining that some of the risks are a natural part of the ourriculum and the students must assume the risks involved.

--------- -

-- -------After taking the

In the oase of Oambareri v. Board of Eduoation,60 the studentl

were partioipating in a relay raoe in the gym.
~or

tumble, a student resumed his feet, and the mat slipped on

the floor under his feet.

The student reoeived a bruised knee and

sprained leg as a result, and the sohool distriot was named a defendant in a law suit.
The oourt stated that the defendant distriot, in meeting the
600ambareri v. Board of Eduoation of City of Albany, 284 N.
Y. S. 892, 246 App. Div. 127, (1936).
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legal requirements towards providing a reasonably safe place, was
absolved from liability.

It maintained that slipping and falling

were common ooourrenoes in physioal eduoation olasses despite proper oare and supervision.
the plaintiff's safety.

"The defendant was not the insurer of
Common experienoe teaohes us that innumel\

able hazards surround the individual and injuries are thereby sut:

fered despit, the eXeroise of proper oare and for whi9h no legal
liability attaches to anyone."
In the oase of Walter ~. Everett,6l a student was injured
while performing gymnastios whioh were held in the sohool basement
under the. direotion of a W. P. W. instruotor.

The oourt in absol-

vtng the diatriot'stated: "School ohildren stand under the protecting arms

of

the sohool distriot while they are at sohool and while

going to and from home.

•

But a sohool distriot is oertainly not an

insurer of the safety of ohildren in its oharge."
In alleging that a sohool distriot has been negligent, the
burden of proof rests on the parents, and all elements of negligence must be present.

Failure to show negligenoe absolves the

distriot from liability, no matter how grave the consequences.

---------

The olassioal oase is Friedman v. Board of Eduoation,62 in

--

61 Walter v. Everett Sohool Distriot No. 24, 79 P. (2nd) 689,
195 Wash. 45, (1938).

62Friedman v.Board· of Eduoation of City of New York, 262 B.
Y. 364. 186 N. E •. 865. (1933) •.
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whioh a New York sohool board was held not liable beoause it had
not breaohed a duty where none existed.

In that oase a helper was

employed by the "cus1;odian engineer" of the school and his job can
sisted mainlY of maintaining the sohool fUrnaoe and keeping the
school warm.

While working after school hours, the helper obtaine

the help of a fifteen year old boy who was not a pupil.

While

riding the ash hoist of the school building, the boy was aooidently orushed to death by the elevator.

It was stated in oourt that

the hoist had no safety devioes to prevent such aooidents, and the
sohool was therefore negligent.
Although no one witnessed the acoident and the boy's own negligenoe oould bave been involved. it was presumed that the aooidan

..

oould have occurred beoause the board failed to use reasonable
oare in the malntenanoe of the hoist.

In deoiding liability, the

question was whether tha board of eduoation owed any duty to the
boy.

After reviewing the facts the oourt established that the

board owed no duty to the boy because the board had not in effect
Invited:the boy into the building:
The board of eduoation, at the hour of the aooident,
had exoluded the publio from the building. It had given
no authority, express, implied, or apparent, to invite or
even permit others to oome into the premises • • • • Not
only'was no permiSSion or invitation ertended by any person aoting for the board, but the boys had no reason to
believe that the helper had a right to extend suoh permission or ,invitation. The defendant owed no duty to
persons introduoed.
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SUmmary

(~n

jurisdiotions where the sohool districts are liable in

tort, the courts have clearly defined their duty and have imposed
a standard of care on those districts.
School distriots are requ1red to exero1se ordtnar,y care for
the proteot10n of sohool ohildren.

Ordinar,y oare 1s that care

that a person of ordinary prudenoe would exeroise under similar
curoumstances and negligenoe 1s determined on this basis by the
oourts.

The quest10n of whether a sohool offioer has exeroised

ordinar,y ;are 1s a question of fact wh1ch is decided by a jUr,y~

I,

In negligence cases referenoe is commonly made to the super\

vision of school ch1ldren, and the oourts have insisted that the
school districts prov1de proper and adequate supervision.
triotts failure to do so may bring about liability.

The

d~·

The courts

have not agreed on what oonstitutes adequate supervis10n, but the
sohool boards are required to aot with prudenoe and foreSight in
providing supervision.

Some oourts have ruled that school d1s-

triots must oreate and enforoe rules and regulations in
student oonduot.

controll~

The problem of providing supervision is delegate(

to administrative personnel who assign the neoess8r,y supervisors
from the staff.
School teachers aDe held responsible for the safety of sohool
ohildren in their oustody.

This applies to the olassroom as well
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as to other plaoes where the teaoher has been assigned to supervise, suoh as hallways, the playground, the gym, or the oafeteria.
The failure to assign supervisors would be the fault of the distriot, and the failure to supervise as directed

~ould

be the fault

of the teaoher.
In determining

~egligenoe,

the oourts hold the teaohers to

the same standard of;oonduot applied to sohool

board8~

reasonable

,

oare.

T.aohers are tequired to foresee and prevent aooidents

are foreseeable at t .. time.

wh1c~

A teaoherts failure to foresee and

~

.\

prevent an aooident 40es not necessarily absolve the teaoher from
liability.

The question is not whether the teaoher oould foresee

the aooident, but rather it is whether the teaoher should have
foreseen the aooident in the same manner that a person of reasonable prudenoe would have.
Oooasionally teaohers or other personnel are required to
oise the highest degree of oare.

exe~

ThiS, however, ooours only when

the students are exposed to extraordinary risk, and \vhen the
teaoher has complete oontrol of the children's sa.fety.
Sohool boards and personnel are not ordinarily held responsible for aocidents whioh ave not foreseeable.
are not insurers of the childrents safety.

Sohool distriots

In order to hold a

school board or sohool personnel liable, there must be an aot or
omission which amounts to negligenoe.

The burden of proof rests

on the parents. and all elements ot aotionable negligenoe must be
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present.
The ordinary rules of negligence are

~ound

in the Illinois

Oommon Law, and they will be used by the courts in future oases
involving sohool distriots and sohool personnel.

In order that

there may be actionable negligenoe in Illinois, there must be a
legal duty to exeroise due care in fovor of the person injured.
his duty extends only to those consequenoes which are probable
oreseeable.

There must be a bI'each or failure to perform such

uty, and the defendantts

actioI~

must be the proximate cause of

Proximate cause in Illinois is stated as the "direct
auser of an injur,y, and not a mere possibility."
The duty of

ca~e

of the school districts and of school person

i

e1 for the protectlon
of school children is found in the Oommon
i
<~

w.

The standard of care of the school districts has not been

sfined in Illinois, but it can be anticipated that the courts
ill hold the school districts to the standard of reasonable oare
or the protection of sohool ohildren.

When dealing with ohildren

person 1s required to take notice of the child's lack of judgent, caution, or discretion, and to reasonably guard against in·uring tlim or causing the ohild to injure himself.
constitute a breach of duty.

The failure to

In regard to transporta-

Illinois Appellate Oourts have held the school district
o the highest degree
The dut

E.! .2!!!:!.

of oare of sohoot teachers is def
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parentis by oommon law.

The standard of oare has not been defined

in Illinois, but teaohers may well be held to the standard of !!!-

-

sonable oare, and be judged by the standard of a reasonable pruden
teaohi'r.

A teaoher may be held to the highest degree of care in

situations where he exposes the pupils to a higher risk of harm
than is customary and where the safety of the pupils depends upon
his skill, and the pupils are under his oontrol.

OHAPTER VI
LEGAL DEP.BlfSES

L1abllit7 for damages is not oonolusive in all oases where
the parents ot the platntitt allege and prove negligen98 against
defendant teaohers and aohool distriots for injur1e. to pupils.
Teaohers and sohooldistriots have reoourse to legal defenses and
the ordina17 rules of negl1genoe app17 to a ohool oaaes.
Two of the most oommonly used legal deten.es of sohool distriots are oontrlbuto!7 neglisenoe and assUBl;et10n

!!.!:i!!.

In

addit10n to these two defense., !!! major, an aot of God, oan be
used as a bar to aotion.

If it oan be shown that an aot of God,

suoh as an unoontrollable aot of the elements, is the prime faotor
in oausing inju17 "to a ohUd, there is no negligenoe.

It, howeveI;

reasonable preoaut1ons oould have prevented the aooident,

!!! majo;-

oannot absolve negligenoe.
~he

following ohapter w111 be lim1ted to a diaoUBsinn at

assumption of risk and
40•• not inolude

!!!

oontributo~

negligenoe.

The disoussion

major beoause of 1ts rare app11oation.

Im-

puted negligenoe and oomparative negligenoe are also omitted beoause imputed negligenoe doe8 not apply to sohool oase., and oomparative negligenoe doe. not apply in Illinois.
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Sohool oases from other states are used to illustrate the
applicat10n of the oommon law prinoiples in sohool situations by
the oourts.

These oases may be persuasive in future Illinois

sohool oases wbere the faots of these oase8 may be 8im11ar.

The

underlying legal prinoiples, however, will be determined in aoooJd.
anee with the Illinois Oommon Law.

For this reason, and in order

to orient the reader in the proper direotion, eaoh section oonta_
a

brie~ ~ary

of the Illinois deo1sions from OUt-of-80hool oase.
Assumption of Risk

Assumpt10n of r1sk, aooordi1'l8 to Blaok'. Law Diotionary,
ex1st8 where none of the fault for injury rest8 with the

~laintiff

but where the plaintiff assumes the oonsequenoes of 1njury ooourrthrough the fault of the defendant, third person, or fault of
no one. l
ing

GenerallY, the defense of assumption of risk re11eves the de.
fendant of liabi11ty.

fhis assumption, however, rests upon the

oonsent of the plaintiff to relieve the defendant of an Obligation
of oonduct toward him, Bnd to take his ohances with the risks 1nvolved.

3uoh oonsent may be founded by an e!press agraement be-

tween the parties, or by implicat10n fram
ties.

~e

conduct of both par-

Where CODsent is implied, the plaintiff enters voluntar11y

lHenry Campbell Blaek, Blaok' 8
1951), p. 158.

J!!!. Dietionarz, 4th, (St. Paul.
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into a relation involving danger, assuming all risk, and thus reliertngthe detendant of responsibility.

The soope of this study

will be limited to implied agreement.
Immplied assumption of risk requires that the plaintiff bave
full knowl.dge and appreoiation of the risks, and a voluntar,y
ohoio. to enoounter the risk.
The terti assumption

.2!. £!!!

has

been surrounded by muoh oon-

tusion beoause it i8 used in at least tour different meanings
the oourts, and the distinotions are seldom olear.

~y

Implied asauup.

tion of risk is interpreted in at least three different meanings.
A

meaning whioh is most commonly used by the oourts is that

"the plaintiff, with knowledge of the risks, has entered voluntar.
ily into some relation with the defendant whioh neoessarily involves it, and so is regarded taoitly or impliedly agreeing to
take his own Ohano ..... 2 This meaning is commonly applied in situatioDa where a spectator entering a baseball park may be regarded
aa oonsenting that the players may prooeed with the

game

'Wi-thout

taking preoautions to proteot him from being hit by the ball.

In

sohool athletio events, both players and speotators assume the
normal risks of the game.
Assumption ot risk may also be implied in two other ways.
2Willi8m L. Prosser, Handbook of the Law ot Torts,. 2nd ed.
- --

(s-t. Paul. 1955), p. '0'.

A
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person may be aware of a partioular risk oreated by the defendant,
but voluntari17 assume. the risk.

!his ·meaning is oommonly applieC

to situations where workmen who, in finding that a maohine i8 defeotive, oontinue to Use it without protest, and by their conduct
imply that they are wllling to assume lihe risk involved.'

In a dlfferent situation a plaintiff may assume a partioular
risk whioh is all out of proportion to the interest whioh he ls
seeking, suoh as dashing into
SUoh conduot in itself

1s

8

burning buil.ding to save a hat.

unreasonable, and, aooording to'prosser~

amounts to contrlbutorJ negligenoe.

In these oas.s, both assump-

tion ot risk a$d oontrlbutor" negllgenoe are available as legal
defenses.
Implied assumption of risk requires two neoessar,y elements:
the plaintiff must have full knowledge and appreoiation of the

p~

ticular risk, and he must have a Yoluntsl"1 ohoioe to enoounter it.

If either requlrement ls not met, the dootrine oannot bar aotion.
Where the requi-rementa are me t, the oourts have applied the
dootr1ne~ln

sohool oasea, but have restrloted its use, beoause

ohl1dren are treated as a special olass.

Beoause of their 1mma-

turit7 and. lack of judgment, ohildren are not held to the Baa.

'This meaning 1s rarely' used sinoe Workmen t s Oompensatiol);
Acts have made the employer striot17 l1able.

4prosser. p. '0'_
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standards as are adults, and in many oases the dootrine
apply to them.

d08S

not

A child's oapaoity to reoognize and appreciate a

partioular risk is deter.mined by a jury aooording to the ohild's
intelligenoe, maturity, and experienoe.
The defense of assumption of risk rests upon the fact that
the defendant is relieved of any duty towards the plaintttt.
sohool oases, however,

th~teaoher.

standing!e!!22

In

Rarenti~,

baa

proteotive custodJ of thelohild, and is never entirely relieved of

his dutr toward the OhildJ

~h1s

relationship

t

m~

also limit the

applioation of the defense in another way.

The tesoher has

linar,y authDrit7 over the ohild's oonduot.

An

di80~

aot by the ohild

whioh places him into unreasonable risk may be interpreted by a
oourt as the child's oonforming to, or following, the teacher's
authority, thereby being denied a free ohoice.
The following school oases illustrate the applioation of the
dootrine of assumption of risk by' the courts in school situations.

In the osse of Hal! ~. Davies,S the plaintiff's son, a boy of
.txt.en, had been injured previousl1 in football praotioe, and at
the request of the ooaoh again partioipated in football praotioe
and reoeived an additional injury to hi5 arm and 5hou14er.

Aotion

was brought against the high sohool athletic assooiation and the
SHale v. Davi0S e'~ al •• 86 Ga. App. 126, 70 S. E. (2nd) 923,
(1952).

1'0

ooaoh.

It was alleged that the assoo1at10n was l1able for the

ooaoh's neg11gence and resultant 1njury to the student.

~he

court

d1sm1ssed the oase, stat1ng that a master-servant relat10nship d1d
not ex1st between the assoo1at1on and the ooaoh.

It went further

to absolve the ooaoh by stat1ng that the 001' was oapable ot, and
had assumed the r1sks of the game &
He was 16 years of age and, in the absenoe of an
allegat10n to the oontrary , W88 a normal bOl' and of
average intelligenoe tor that age, and no doubt knew
and realiZed that football 1s a rough and hazardous
game and that anyone play1ng or praoticing suoh games
may be injured. A person of th1s age i8 presumed to
be oapable of realising danger and ot exerc1s1ng oaut10n to avo1d 1t.
As to the boy's ohoioe of assum1ng the r1sk, the oourt stated
that be1ng a member of and playing on a high sohool football team
was voluntary, not a mandatory endeavor.

If

It does not appear that

he made any objeotlon or entered any protest to engaging 1n the
praotloe of the team."
Ordinar1ly where ball players assume normal rlsks of t he game
ln whioh they are playlng, speotators also are taken to assume the
rlsks ln watohing the game.
In the oase of Ingerson y. Shattuok Sohool,6 the plaintiff,
Mrs. Ingerson, was a spectator at a football game be1ng played at
the sohool football field.

While she was standing near the slde

6Ingerson v. Shattuok Sohool, 185 Minn. 16, 239 N. W. 667,

(1931) •
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lines towards the end of the game, two players went out
and rolled against her, fraoturing her

bounds

o~

]a g.

SUi t was brought against the sohool alleging that the sohool
was negligent in not providing a barrier in order to

a~ford

pro-

teotion for the speotators.
The

0

ourt stated that a rope plaoed along

the Sideline s would

not have prevented the players from rolling over, and the use of a
fenoe might have resulted in greater 1njur.y if the players orashed
into it.

The sohool wae therefore not negligent.

The oourt added

that assumption of risk oould not be established as a matter of
law, but there were inferenoes that Mrs. Ingerson possessed knowledge of the risks and had a free ohoioe to assume tnlUI.

Mrs.

Ingerson had attended three previous games, and during those game.
1t w•• not unoommon for players to oross and go outside the lines
of the playing field.
present game.

This had happened several t 1mea during the

Furthermore, Mrs. Ingerson t s son was a member of

the football squad, and she eleoted to stand near the benoh where
he

W8S

seated.

The normal risks of a football gamo do not inolude the risks
oooasioned by a sohoolemployee'a negligenoe. 7 A player oannot
assume the r1sk of reoe1v1ng permanent eye injury when

N.

w.

~8

faoe

7Kokowioh v. Independent Sohool Distriot, 177 Minn. 446, 225
292, (1929).
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oomes in contaot with unslaked lime which is used to mark the lina
on a football field.
The normal risks of a sohool baseball game run somewhat similar to those of a football game, the differenoe being that the baI
itself instead of the players may oause injury to speotators.
Courts have ruled that generally pe mons who know and apPNoiate
the danger from thrown or batted balls assume the risk and oannot
e181m. the management was guilty of negligenoe when a OOoioe is

given between a seat in the open and one behind a proteotive
soreen. S
In the oase of Sayers ~. Ranger,9 a fourteen year old boy was

jumping over a gymnaSium horse in a physioal eduoation olass, and
while doing so. he fell and broke his arm.

It was alleged that

the phys10al eduoat1on teaoher was negligent in failing to supervise the final jump

pm

also in direoting him to walk to the supeX'

visor's office after he wss hurt.
The oourt held that there was nothing negligent in the oonduot' ot the defendant.

The instruotor demonstrated the proper way

to jump, and set out mats to pl"otect the students and supervised
the jumps.

The instructor also warned the students that it was

SWells v. Minneapolis Baseball and Athletio Assooiation, 122
Minn. 327, 142 N. w. 706, (191').
'
9Sayers et ala v. Rangeret &1., 16 N. J. Sup. 22. 83 A. (2nd)

775. (1951).
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dangerous, and that 11' they didn't think theY' oould do it, they
should not do it.

The court oommented, "If negligenoe was assumed

in the defendant, still no right of recover,y was established.
Knowledge oitha danger compels assumption of risk in suoh a

oase~

The warn1rtg from the instruotor that the aot was dangerous and the
instructions that they were not t.o do it i f they didn't think they
were able, seM'ed to give the boy knowledge of the risk involved
and a free ahoioe to jump over the wooden horse.

In an earlier and similar case,a New York oourt ruled in the
same manner •

Although the case does not involve a publio sohool,

it was deoided that a twelve year old minor assumed the risk when
u&ing a

buo~

horse upon the invitation of an instruotor: "plaint1!j

assumed the risk of jumping, the danger being open and obvious. "10
A

pupil must not only know of t he facts whioh oreate the dan-

ger, but must understand and appreoiate the danger itself. l l In
oases where a DUlnor is of suoh fan age that he oannot oomprehend or
appreoiat4 a danger, a minor is not oapable of asswming, the risk,
and the dootrine of assumption of risk oannot be used as a bar to
aotion.

Oases involving minors seem to indicate that there is no

~rbitrarY,age

risk.

at which a minor is oapable of assuming a paatioular

Ordinarily a minor is deolared oapable of appreoiating a
lOxanofsky v. Brooklyn Jewish Oenter, 265 N. Y. 634, 193 N.

E. 420, (1934).

Ilprasser,

D.

~~9a
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partioular risk by a jur" acoording to his individual

exp~r1enoe

and intelligenoe.
A person oapable of assuming risk must have a free and

If a person·is denied a ohoioe or alternate

untar,y oholoe.

vol~

oours~

the defense will be negated.
In the oase ot ~.!. Board

.2!

Eduoation,12 the oourt ruled

that assumption of risk was not avplioable as a defense beoause
the plaintiff was foroed to assume the risu.

In this partloular

08se, the plainti:f:f' was injured while taking a ph7810al oltam1nat1Dn
:tor the board ot eduoat1on.

The examination was held inside a

gymnasium and the pla1Jl1iiff was required to show ber abil1ty in
playing baseball.

She batted a ball and ran to "first base."

The

base slid trom under her on the slippery floor, and she fell and
broke a leg bone.
The sohool board oontended that, in taking the examination,
the plaintitt had assumed anJ risk involved, but the oourt held
otherwise on the ground that there oould be no assumption
unless it "88 voluntary.

~

risk

She had to '''prooeed or forgo tbe examin-

8tion~"

Denial of

8

tree ohoioe or al ter.nate cours., as in the pre.

vious cas., need not be so explioit. ·A oourt has interpreted
teaoherts authority over a pupil as. denying him a tree ohoioe.
12·· -

-

8

1'5
In the case of ~ .!. !!,alel. 13 the physical educatlon teacher ordered a group of pupils to
1

frayed rope.

~erform

an overhand olimb on a

The pupil was injured from a tall when the rope

broke, and action was brought against the teacher for negligenoe.
It was contended in the defense that the pupil had seen that the
rope "as frayed, but he had chosen to cl1mb 1t.
sumed the risk of injur.y.

Be

had thus

&8-

The oourt held that assumption of risk

could not be used a8 a defense beoause, "a youth, acting under
orders of an older teaoher, set in authority

0,/'81'

him and maintain

ed in a position of superiority by means of olass disoipline,
oould not be oonsidered to bave consoiouslY or unoonsciously considered the possib11ity of risk of 1njur.r, or to bave exeroised a
ohoice not to perform an aot his teaoher ordered him to do."
While most oourts bave not limited the application of assumption of risk,

80me

oourts have applied the doctrine onlY to

maste~

servant oase8.

Sinoe 1909 the Illinois oourts have limited asSUBP·
t10n of risk to master-servant oa888. 14 In dealing with such
oases, the Illinois courts have defined the term master15 and ser-

vant~6

An

-

extension of the doctrine to other than master-servant

l'nl18 v. Haley, '34 Mich. 146, (19'1).
14Conrad v. Spr1ng~ield Oons01idated Railroad Co., 240 Ill.
12, 88 B. E. 180, (1909).
.
15Helson v. RiOhardSOn 108 Ill. App. 212, (190').
Bill v. Strong, 132 Il i • App, 174.
161'0048 v. Berman, 200 Ill. App. 612. (1915),
Schmid v. Heath, 17' Ill. App. 649, (1912).
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oases bas reoently been denied by the Illinois Appellate Oourt:
"The dootrine of assumption of risk is applioable only in oases
arising between Master and Servant."17

In another reoent oase

whioh did not invol...e a _tel'-Hrvant relationship, the Appellate
Oourt stood by its forme,%.- deoision.

In refusing the dootrine a8

a defense where a IDaster-servant relationship dld not eXist, the
oourt stated: "The dootrine of assumptlon of risk was oonoeived
in the law of oontraot, whereas the parentage of oontributory
negligenoe is in the law of torts. n18
The Illinois oourts apply the dootrine of oontrlbutor,y neg11-

genoe in the plaoe of assumption of r1sk in 08se. where the mast
servant relationship dQe. not exist.
upon 8 person,

~

his own proteotion.

The law in Illinois imposes

juris, the obligation to use ordinary oare for
One who unnecessarily assumes a position of

danger, the hazards ot whioh he understands and appreoiates, oan
not reoover from an

in~ur7

inoident to that risk.

A bar to aotio

is found under the dootrine of oontributory negl1genoe. 19
Cont:ributor,y Negligenoe
Oon"tributor.r negligenoe i8 an aot or omission amounting to
17Davis v. Springfield Lodge No. 158, 24 Ill. APP. (2nd) 102,
(1960).
18Hammer v. Slive, 27 Ill. App. (2nd) 196, 169 N. E. (2nd)
(1960).
19awe

Oity of Rookford, 129 N. E. (2nd) 52, 7 Ill. App
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want of ordinary care on the part of the oomplaining party, whioh
concurring with the defendant's negligence, is the proximate cause
of the injury, according to Black's Law Dictlonary.20
Everyone is required to exeroise care and caution for his own
safety and oontributory negligenoe is the oonduot on the part of a
pla1nt1t':t whioh falls below the standard to whioh the plaintiff is
required to oonform for his own proteotion.

Suoh conduct wUl bar

reoovery if it oontribute. as a legal cause to the damages by exposing the plaintiff to the partioular risks from whioh he suffers
the harm.

The pla1nt1t'f may fail to exeroise reasonable oare at

the time of his injury, but unless bis injury results from that
particular risk, his conduct will not bar recovery.
Oontributory negligenoe is determined in the same manner as
negligenoe: the plaintiff is required to aot as a reasonable person would under similar oiroumstanoes.

The aotor's oonduct must

oonform to the conduot of a reasonable prudent person under simils
oiroumstanoes.
In judging the reasonableness of the aotor's oonduct, the importanoe of the interest the aotor is seeking to advanoe is balanced against the gravity of the risk of harm to 'Whioh he exposes
himself.

It may be oonsidered unreasonable oonduot to dash into

a burning building to s ave a hat, but it may not be unreasonable

20Blaok, Law Diotlonar,y, p. 1185.
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to dash into the path of a train to save a ohild. 2l
Generally the burden of proof of oontributory negligenoe of
the plaintiff rests upon the defendant.

A minority of jurisdio-

tions, however, require that the plaintiff prove his freedom from
oontributory negligenoe.

These oourts have relaxed the rule, and

require very little in the way of evidenoe to sustain the plaintUft 8 proof.

Illinois oourts follow this ruling.

,

Oontributory negligenoe differs from negligence in that negligenoe constitutes conduot which creates unreasonable risk to

o1ihers, while oontributory negligenoe involve. risk: of
to the aotor.

harm.

only

B'egltgenoe involves an obligation of oonduot to

others, but oontributory negligenoe involves no duty exoept to the
aotor himself.
Oontributor,y negligence and assumption of risk are the two
most common defense. in negligenoe actions. but they differ in
that the plaintiff, in assuming the risk, relieves the defendant
of any duty towards him, while in oontributory negligenoe, the
plaintiff is not entitled to aotion because of his conduot.

22

The oourts do not hold young ohildren to the same standard of
oonduot whioh is required of adults.

21Prosser, p. 283.
22 Ibid., p. 283-284.

Allowanoes are made for
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their immaturity and inability -GO "appreoiate -r;he faots."

The

same oonduot which might be oonsidered below standard for an adult
may

be

reasonable for a ohild.

This in effect makes it diffioult

to use contributory negligenoe as a bar to aotion in oases where
ohildren are plaintiffs.
In dealing with ohildren on the issue of oontributor,r negli-

genoe, two footors

whio~

are oonsidered by the oourts are the

J

ohild'-s oapaoity, and the standard of conduot imposed on the ohil
Capaoity is the ohildts ability to realize and appreoiate a given
danger and act aooordingly.

Oapaoity is related to the ohild' s

age, and the oourts -t.ake this into oareful consideration.
is

It it

found that the ohild has the oapaoity, the oourt must then de-

termine the standard of oonduct to whioh the ohild will be held.
In allowing these oonsiderations for children, there are two
major views oonoerning the issue of contributory negligence of
ohildren.

The two views are usually olassified as the Illinois

rule and the !:!assachusetts rule.

The Massaohusetts rule holds

that a ohild, regardless of age, is held to the same standard of
oare whioh is eXercised under similar oircumstanoes by children
of the same age, intelligenoe, and experience.
The Illinois rule, whioh is oalled the "arbitrary age limits
rule," is a slight modifioation of the MassE1ollu.eetts rule, and
holds arbitrary age limits for ohildren t S oapaoity •
rule

ohildren

~,~,::

Under this

seven years of a e oannot be oharged with
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oontributory negligenoe in sohool situations.
In the first oase, Juntilla 1:._ Everett Sohool Distriot. 23 a
sohool distriot employs a suo088s:ful bar to aotion when it alleges
and proves oontributory negligenoe on the part of an eighteen year
old student.

The oourt took speoial note of the youth's age and

his ability to appreoiate a risk.

In this case, a parent brought

aotion for injuries reoeived by his son (William Juntilla) in a
tall from the sohool bleaohers during a football game.
night of the acoiden"

On the

a football game was being played between

Everett High School and an out of town team.
large, and all the seats were taken.

The attendanoe was

Young Junt11la, with several

girls and boys, prooeeded to the top seats of the

~leaohers,

there they took a standing position on the top seats.

After

and
star.d~

lng there for a short tim!;;, leaning agains"t the railing, Juntilla,

wilh :five or six others, sat upon the railing behind the top seats
of the bleaohers.
Juntilla, with

The railing gave way under their weight, and

30me

others, fell to the ground behind the bleaoh-

ers, sustaining severe injuries.
It was stated in the allegation that the defendant sohool

offioials failed to meet the stwldard of oare required by law because they should

h~ve

foreseen that many speotators would

o~owd

upon the back seat of the bleaohers, subJeoting the railing to a
2'Juntilla v. Everett Sohool District No. 24, 48 P. (2nd) 613

183 Wash. 357. (19' ...
5)10.1._ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _----'
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pressure it was not oonstruoted to withstand.

fhd.s oontention was

not aooepted beoause the railing did not

to lateral pressure

y18~d

against it, but yielded trom a downward pressure from persons sitting on it, a use tor whioh it was not intended.
fhe oourt stood by a lower oourt ruling and held Juntilla
guilty of negligenoe,
What we have said in our disoussion ot the question
ot the respondent's primary negligenoe to some extent
disposes of the oontention that young Juntilla was not
guilty ot oontributory negligenoe. fhis oase is not one
involving the maintenanoe of an attraotive nuisanoe entioing immature ohildren into harm t s way. Juntilla was
18 years of age, of mature judgment, and fullY able to
appreoiate the risk he took in sitting, with numerous
others, upon the railing. He testified that he kne. it
was not a seat. In taking his seat upon the railing,
he assumed the attendant risk.
!he oourt further asserted that an owner of a premises oould
be liable in damages to those invited i f they were injured beoause
of an unsafe oondition of the premises.

Unreasonable oonduot on

the part ot those invited, however, oonstitutes a defense to

aot~~

Where one voluntarily and willingly puts himself or
his property in danger, there is the presumption that he
assume. all the risks reasonably to be apprehended from
suoh oonduot. In oas •• of this kind, this assumption is
oalled oontributory negligenoe, and is as muoh a defense
in these oases as any other to whioh it DlEI\Y be applied.
In the oase ot Hough~. Orleans 24 an eleven year old boy was
tound guilty of negligenoe.

In this oase, Vernon Hough, a student

24Hough v. Orleans Elementary Sohool Distriot of Humboldt
Oounty, 144 P. (2nd) 383, 62 Oal. App. (2nd) 146, (1943).
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at the sohool ran against a flagpole while playing a game of tootball in the sohool yard.
It was alleged by the plaintitf'that the flagpole was supported by two braces on two sides running three teet bigh.
~ere

The braoes

attaohed by a bolt about thirty-four inohes above the ground,

and the end of the bolt extended two and one halt inohes beyond ib..
brace, the washer, and nut.

There was no o ave ring or guard over

this bolt in order to mate it reasonably safe for the students.
It was oontended that inluries were reoeived through the negligen~
t

of the sohool distriot.

i

"

The oourt stated that the plaintiffs failed to prove negligenoe on the part of the school distriot.

It was neoessary that

they prove that there existed a dangerous and defective oondition,
and that the sohool district had bad prior knowledge of this oondition.

In the court's opinion. however, the faot that the studem

ran into the flagpole and was injured did not show that the 1'18gpole was dangerous.
BaYing found that there was no breach of duty, the court fo'UDd

it unnecessary to pass upon the question of whether or not there
twas oont ,'butory negligenoe on the part 01' the minor.

However, it

went on to state that bad there been a breaoh of duty, or had the
distriot been guilty of negligenoe, there would have been a bar to
aotion because the student was guilty of contributory negligenoe:
However his testimony that while he and another boy
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were throwing a football about, after he had been dismissed
from sohool for the day, he ran into the flagpole, that he
knew 1 t was there and he "kind of seen it" when he ran
for the ball, but did not think he was going to hit 1t,
so kept gOing, would have justified a find1ng of oontributor,y negligenoe on his part. He was nearly eleven years
old and a ohild above average intelligence.
In the oase of Hovel ~. State,25 a defendant sohool failed to
bar aotion beoause it failed to prove contributor" negligenoe.

In

the present oase, the parents of a student brought suit against
the school for
way.

in~uries

on the day of

reoeived when she fell down an unlit

stai~·

the aocident, the student had attended a musi-

cal rehearsal held after sohool hours in the auditorium on the
(

second floor of ttp.e main building.

After t he rehearsal terminated

the student remained to talk to the teaoher for a few minutes, and
then lef1; the auditorium.

!rhe lights had been turned off, and the

girl had to descend tbr0U.8h an unlit sta1rway.

The girl descended

the first set of 81;&11"8 by using the bandrail, and turned at the
first landing.

The handrail did no1; continue around the landing,

but stopped several feet short, leaving about three steps with no
handra1l.

While groping in the darkness for the other handrail,

the girl slipped and fell down f1fteen steps 1;0 the next landing.
Pla1nt1f'fs oontended that 11' the girl was perm1tted or invi_
into the aud1torium, she was entitled to a safe ex11;.

The

25Bovey v. State, 27 B. Y. S. (2nd) 195, 261 App. Div. 759,
(1941). Although this 08se involve. a 8tate Normal Sohool, the
l"Uling would apP17 under similar oiroumstanoes.
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oharacteristics ot the handrail did not oonstitute a hazard, but
the total lack of light oonstituted negligenoe.
The defendant sobool stated that the student had gone up and
down the stairway dai13' and was familiar with the physioal oharaoteristios of the stairway.
The oourt did not aooept this as proof that she was guilty of
oontributor.y negligenoe: "The fact that olaimant went up and down
the stairs daily in daylight is immaterial.

There is no proof ths

she ever had been down them (the stairs) under 1;he oiroumstanoes
existing at the ttme of tbe aooident.

Darkness makes a differenoe

in even the most familiar plaoes."
In the oase of Andre .!. Allz!h

26 the sohool distriot fa.1l.ed

to prove oontributor.y negligenoe on the part of a student, and
henoe failed to bar aotion tor injuries·reoeived by the student.
The basio question is to determine whether momentary forgetfulness
or distraotions oonstitute
law.
an

oontribu~or,y

negligenoe as a matter of

This oase is signifioant beoause the oourt' s opinions give

1~sight

as to the oourt's unwillingness to apply the prinoiple

as a matter of law.
Aotion was brought against the sohool distriot for injurie.
sustained by a sixteen year old student when he stepped and s11ppe(
26Andre v. Allyn, 190 P. (2nd) 949, 84 Cal. App. (2nd) 347,
(1948).

((
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on a portion of a non-skid oork oarpet whioh had worn off.

The

sohool building oonsisted of two floors, oonneoted by ramps at
both ends.

The student lett his looker and walked down the ramp

on the way to ohoir praotioe.

While walking on the ramp on the

slippery spot, he hailed a fellow student, lost his balanoe, and
his right .foot slid trom unde r him.

ae went down and broke his

lett leg above the knee where it had broken six months before.
Betore passing judgment, the oourt expressed the opinion that
oontributory negligenoe is not readily applied as a matter of law:
But in oases in whioh it oan be said that the negligence of the plaintlff oontributes proximately to the
aooident as a matter of law are rare. The rule has been
stated in various ways in a legion of oases, that ooutributo~ negllgenoe is not established as a matter ot
law unless the only reasonable hypothesls is that such
negligenoe exists: that reasonable or sensible men oould
have drawn that oonolusion and none other; that where
there are different inferenoes that may be drawn, one
for and one against, the one against shall be followed,
and before it can be held as a matter of law that oontributory negligenoe eXists, the evidenoe must point
unerringly to that oonolusion.
On the question of forgettuln••• t the oourt stated that momen
ta~

forgetfulness of a known danger not induoed by a sudden dls-

turbing oause would oonstitute oontributory negligenoe.

To forge

however, would not oonstitute negligenoe unless there was a want

ot ordinary oare on the part of the plaintiff.
added that in the immediate oase, momentary

The oourt then

~orgetfulnes.

was In-

deed a sudden distraotion.
The oourt

t..!~1nat.4 b~"

expressing a standard of care tor th

I(
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sohool boy:27
We oannot say as a matter of law that abstraotion
oonoerning ohoir praotioe, or forgetfulness due to hailing a sohool ohum suddenly, is not an instinotive reaotion or aot of sudden impulse, or that it was out of
oharaoter for the ordinary sohoolboy of plaintiff's age
and experience. Plaintiff is bound only to that duty
of oare whioh a nomal ohild of the same age wou.ld be
expeoted to exeroise in suoh a situation.
This deoision illustrates the faot that in the last few years
the tendenoy of the Supreme Court has been away from the strioter
view ot preoeeding years, where frequently oontributory negligenoe
was established as a matter of law, to the present situation in
whioh suoh cases are rare.
In the case of Ridse

!. Boulder Creek Union Distriot,28 the

sohool distriot failed to bar aotion when it failed to prove oontributory negligenoe as a matter of law.
The student, Ridge, 1njured the index f1nger of his right
hand while operating a power saw without a guard or a fence over
it.

The student was aware that these parts were needed to prevent

injury, but he had seen others use the power saw without the guard
The other students did not use the guard beoause the fenoe was
broken.

The fenoe guided the wood into the saw, and if the saw

Wall

27The oourt oited Taylor v. Oakland Soavenger Co., 17 Oal.
(2nd) 594, 110 P. (2nd) 1044.

28R1d~ v. Boulder Oreek Union Junior-Senior High Sohool Distriot of Santa Oruz Oounty, 140 P. (2nd) 990, 60 Oal. App. (2nd)
45'____ (1943).
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operated with the guard and without 'the fenoe, it was extremelY
41:11ou1t to saw the boards on the markings.

Ridge was not

in~

struoted not to use the power saw without the safety devioe, and
the instructor and other students used the saw without the safetydeVices on several ocoasions.
The appellant sohool distriot alleged that the minor was
guilty of contributory negligenoe as a matter of law beoause he
kne~

tha't there was'danger in using the saw in that manner.

It

was stated further that the student's reoord attested to the faot
that he was a oapable student in shop ..
The oourt found the student not guilty beoause mere knowledge
of a danger was not oonolusive that a minor was guilty of oontributor.J negligenoe as a matter of law.

The court stated that know-

ledge that danger existed was not knowledge of

~he

amount of

dAn~

whioh was neoessary to oharge a person with negligenoe in assuming
the risk caused by suoh danger.

The doing of an 80t with appreci&

tion ot the amount ot danger would be neoessary to oonolude as a
matter of law that a person was negligent.
The oourt conoluded by stating, "We cannot 88.7 that the knowledge of 'danger whioh Walter Ridge bad, in the faoe of the facts
that he reoeived no instruotions not to use the saw without the
guard and that the instruotor used the saw in front of the students
without the guard attaohed, was a matter of law suffioient to
charge him with negligenoe contributiruc to his acoident."
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Thus the sohool failed to bar aotion, and the oourt sustained
a prior judgment allowing reoovery against the sohool.
To the writer's knowledge there are no cases involving sohool
ohildren on the issue of oontributory negligenoe in Illinois.

The

legal prinoiple, however, is well established and aooepted in the
Illinois Common Law.
and

There are numerous oases involving ohildren

the courts have formulated rules :for applying the principle.

The rules for the most part favor the minor plaint iffs.
The rule whioh bas an immediate effeot on oontributory negligenoe ooncerning ohildren is the Illinois Arb1trar,y Age Limits
Rule, which makes speoial allowanoes for ohildren.
This rule olassifies a ohild's oapaoity acoording to three
age levels,
(8)

A child under seven years of age oannot,be oharged
with oontributory negligenoe,

(b)

Children between the ages of seven and fourteen may
be oharged, but this is a question of faot for a
jury to deoide through oareful oo'nslderation of the
individual's age, intelligenoe, oapaoity, and experienoe.

(0)

Children over the age of 'fourteen can be charged with
oontributory negligence.

It has been established in Illinois that a ohild under seven
years

o~age

does not have the capaoity to realize or appreoiate

a given danger, and hence oannot be oharged with oontributory negligenoe.

This rule is analogous to the rule regarding a ohild's
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oapaoity to oommit a crime.

Thus a ohild under the age of seven

i.s presumed to be not responsible for his aots.
This rule has been applied to ohildren below the age of maturity in Illinois.

Case. are reoorded where the rule has been ap-

plied to speoifio age levels.

The rule has been appl1ed to child-

ren seven years 01d,29 between the ages of f1ve and six,30 and
f1ve years 01d. 31
Children between the ages of seven and fourteen are also presumed not to be respons1ble for their aots.
,

t10n is not oonolus1ve and
oapaoity and experienoe.",2

m~

However, this preaDp-

be overoome by proof of "requis1te

A presumption of 1noapab1lity bas

been found not applioable to oh~ldren over eleven years of age~33
Whe re 1t has been found by a jury that a ohild between the ages of
seven and fourteen is fully able to comprehend danger and use oare
to av01d injury, the courts have ruled that the ohild

may

be found

29Rom1ne v. City of Watseka, 91 N. E. (2nd) 76, 341 Ill. APPo
'70, (1950).
'Ofr10lo v. Fr1sella, 121 I. E. (2nd) 49, , Ill. APP. (2nd)
200, (1954).
31Duffy v. Cortes1, 119 lie E. (2nd) 241, 2 Ill. APP. (2nd)
511, (1954).
32Moser v. East St. Lou1s and Interurban Water Co., 62 N. E.
(2nd) 558, 326 Ill. App. 542 (1945).
Levin v. Lauterbaok Coai & Ioe Co., 67 N. E. (2nd) 303, 327
Ill. App. 180, (1946).
.
Ill.

3'Saens v. Chioago, W1lm1ngton, and Vermil10n Coal Co., 160
467, (1911).

A~D.
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guilty of oontr1butor,y neg11genoe. 34

The Illinois oourts, in
following this rule, have found an eight year old gir135 and a ten
year old boy,6 guilty of contributory negligenoe.
While children over the age of fourteen may be found guilty
of oontributor,r negligence, the courts do not hold them to the
same standard of care as an adult, unless tbe age, intelligence,
oapaoi ty, and experienoe of the partioular ohild are suoh that he
should be held to that standard of oare .37
In measuring the oonduct of children who are oapable of being

found guilty of oontributory negligenoe, there is no exaot

stand~

exoept "that degree of oare whioh children of like age, oapaci i!y,
intelligence, and experience would naturally use in the same situation and under Similar circumstanoes.-'S
Baoent oases involving ohildren between the ages of seven and
fourteen have indioated that these ohildren are not required to
exercise as bigh a degree of oare for their own safety as a person

'4M1ndeman v. Sanitary Distriot of Chioago, 229 Ill, App. '54
(192,).
35eity of Chioago v. Cohen, 139 Ill. App. 244, (1908).
36XOehler v. Chioago City Railroad Co"
(1911).

166 Ill. App. 571,

37Binder v. Chioago City Railroad Co., 175 Ill. 503, (1912).
,SFannon v. Mot'ton, 228 Ill. App. 415, (1923).
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o~ mature age and experience. 39

They are required to exercise o~

that degree of oare and oaution for their own safety that a ohild
of similar age, intelllgenoe, oapaolty, and experience would exeroise under the dame or similar c1rcumstances. 40
Ohlldren over fourteen are generally requlred to exerclse
that degree of oare and oaution whioh oh11dren of the same age,
capac1ty, .1ntelllgenoe, and experlenoe may be reasonably expeoted
to use under l1ke c1rcumstanoes. 41
In present1ng a oause of act10n in Illino1s, the burden of
proof of negligenoe rests on the plaintiff.

Prosser states that

freedom from contributory neg11genoe is an essential part of the
plaintiff's oause of aotion. 42 This rule has no applloation to
ohildren under seven years of age, but it does apply to ohildren
between the ages of seven and fourteen who are found to have the
oapacity,45 as well

8S

to those over fourteen years of age.

Free-

dom from oontributory neg11gence oan be proven by the plaintiff i f

39XSxnowsk1 v. City of LaSalle, 43 N. E. 852, 316 Ill. App.
115, (1942).
40wasnelus v. Melton, 128 N. E. (2nd) 355, 6 Ill. App. (2nd)
434, (1955).
.
41peterson v. Chioago Consolidated Traction 00" 83 N. E. 159
231 Ill. App. 324, (1907).
42Prosser, p. 283.
43Segal v. Ohicago Oity Railway Co., 256 Ill. App. 569, (193q.
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it oan be shown that the plaintiff exercised ordinar.y oare.
Summa 17
Negligenoe aotions are based upon the defendant's failure to
exercise the required degree of oare, and a subsequent damage, or
inju17 to the plaintiff. In some oases defendants oan bar aotion
sinoe plaintiffs are required to oonfozm to a standard of oonduot
for their own proteotion.

Two oommon legal defenses whioh are

employed by defendants are assumption of risk and oontributory
negligenoe.

A defendant oan bar aotion under these dootrines i f

it oan be shown that the plaintiff with full knowledge and appreoi
ation willingly assumed a partioular risk from whioh 'tne harm aoorued, or if the plaintiff aoted in an unreasonable manner and
oontributed to the oause of the injury.

Suooessful aotions are

partly based on the merits of the plaintiff's aotions.
The applioation of these legal degenses is more limited in
oases where ohildren are named plaintiff,.

Children are treated

as a speoial olass beoause they are not presumed to posses the maturity at an adult, and oonsequently they are not required to oon.
fom to the same standards of oare for tl;teir own proteotion whioh
are required of adults.

Generally where ohildren are oharged with

the assumption of risk or oontributory negligenoe, the issue beoomes a question of faot, and the ohild's oulpability is judged by
~

a jury aooording to the ohild's age"

intelligenoe, and experienoe.

15'
The oourts in Illinois rest riot the applioation of assumption
of risk to parties whioh are under a master-sel'vant relationship.
This relationship does not exist between the sohool distriot or
teachers and pupils, and. the dootrine is inapplioable to sohool
08ses.

The sohool districts, however, have recourse to oontribu-

tory negligenoe as a defense.

There are instances where the two

doctrines overlap and situations of 8ssumption of risk are covered
under contributory negligenoe.
The Illinois courts follow the Arbitrary Age Limits rule ill.
applying contributory negligetnce ssa legal defense, and the courts
severely restriot its use against ohildren who are named plaint1.tra
in litigations.
In following this doctrine, the Illinois oourts have ruled
that young children of ages seven or below cannot be charged with
contributory negligence beoause they do not have the ability to
realize and appreCiate a given danger.

In following precedent,

the courts will deny the school districts the use of the dootrine
as a legal defense in actions arising from injuries to children
attending kindergarten, first grade, and to some extent those in
the second

g~ade.

-

In effeot there is no legal defense.

Defenses under these oases would be limited to disproving nEgligence. suoh as disproving causation or asserting non-breach of
duty.

A teaoher oould bar action of she oould show tba't her ac-

tions were not the oause of the ohild's injunes.

A teacher oould
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also bar aotion if she showed that she used reasonable oare in the
disoharge of her duties (acted as a reasonable prudent person wou
under l1ke circumstanoes).
duty, since under

~

A teacher oould not plead absenoe of

Rsrent1s, a teacher is never relieved of

duty.
In oases involving children from ages seven to fourteen, or
from seoond to ninth grade, school distriots have a reoourse to
oontributor.y negligence as a legal defense.

In applying the doc-

trine against a child of this age level, a jur.y must show that the
child has the capaCity, and comp_hends the partioular danger.
Ohildren of ages fourteen and over may be oharged with oont
butory negligenoe, and while they are not held to the standard of
care required of adults, they. are judg.d by the standard of care
required of Children of the same age, oapaoity, intelligence, and
eipe rience •

CHAPTER VIr
COIWLUSIOl~S

The purpose of this thesis

~as

to reveal and interpret the

legal liability of the Illinois publio

schools~

It is expeoted that law suits will be brought against sohool
distriots in the :future.

In building a body of cases, the Courts

in Illinois will invariably refer to oases from other states in
applying the Common Law to sohool situations.

In imposing the

care of the highest degree on sohool buses. the Illinois oourts
oi ted a oase from Washington.

The IllinOis oourts may rule simi-

larly to the oourts of other states, exoept in the matter of legal
defenses.

The Illinois oourts impose striot limitations on legal

defenses When they are employed against ohildren plaintiffs.
The Tort Liability Aot may need to be amended in order to pro
vide the same proteotion to school employees that it affords the
sohool distriots.

A teaohe r may be sued to any amount.

It may

beoome common praotioe for plaintiffs to sue sohool teaohers for
unspecified amounts, while at the same time SUing the school d1striot in tue hope of obtaining additional damages.
The conolusions derived from this paper are listed on the
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following pages.
School districts are political subdivisions of the states,
created for the sole purpose of publio education.
A school district is a quasi public corporation, having only
those powers incident to its purpose.
The doctrine of Sovereign Immunity, whioh renders the school
districts immune from tort liability, is almost universallY appl1e
by the .courts.
In states where the school districts are immune, school offioers share their immunity, but employees do not.
The courts of several states have expressed dissatisfaotion
wi th the immun'i ty doctrine, and several states have made exoepti
to the rule, while four states have abrogated the rule.
In 1959 the Supreme Oourt of Illinois, with the Molitar deciSion, abrogated the immunity doctrine and made the sohool distriot
liable for the negligent acts of its employees.
In 1959 the Illinois. Legislature, with the passage of the

Tort Liability Act, placed limitations of the liability of school
distriots.

These statutes covered both publio and private elemen-

tar.y and seoondar" sohools and mainly oonsisted of:
(a) time limitation of one year from the date of injur.y to
initiate oivil actton,
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(b)

a six month limitation in whioh to file a statement
of injury,

(0)

Ii

reoovery limitation of ten thousand dollars tor
eaoh separate oause ot aotion.

The individual teaohers do not have the protection of the
statute limiting the amount of liability, and a teaoher oan be
sued for any amount.
The usual rules of negligenoe apply in Illinois. in order to
bring action against a sohool. distr10t or a sohool teacher, parent

must show:
(a)

evidenoe of a duty on the part of the defendant,

(b)

tailure of the defendant to pre:torm that duty,

(0)

plaintiff suffered in3ury as a direot result of that
duty.

From the reoords of oases whioh have been brought against
teachers and sohool d1striots in states where the immunity doot
has been abrogated, it oan be ooncluded that aotions will be
brought against sohool teaohers and sohool distriots in Illinois.
Sohool distriots are held to the standard of reasonable oare.
Teaohers may be held to a standard of' reasonable oare.

Persons

involved in the transportat1on of sohool ohlldren are held to the
standard of the hi6hest degree of oare.
The dootrine of assumption of risk does not apply to sohool
oases in Illinois beoause it is limited to master-servant
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relationship, and this relationship does not

eX~8t

between a pupil

and his teaoher.
Legal defenses applied to sohool 08ses are rest rioted to the
dootrine of oontr1butor,y negligence.

Oases

no~lly

applying to

assumption of risk may apply this dootrine, but the oourts will
restriot its use against school ohildren.
The Illinois oourts do not apply oontributor,y negligenoe
against ohildren of ages seven and below.

The Illinois oourts

will not permit the use of this dootrine as a defense against
sohool ohildren in Kindergarten, first gl'Bde, and some of those
in seoond grade.
There may be some diffioulty in applying the dootrine to
ohildren between the ages of seven and fourteen.

Defendants must

show that the aotions of the ohild were below the standard for a
ohild of the same age. oapaoity, intelligenoe, and experienoe.
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Recommendations
Classroom teachers are more closely related to pupil activities than any other school employees, and for this reason they are
most often named defendants in pupil injury aotions.

Knowledge of

the principles of negligence and liability disoussed in this paper
will help the teaoher proteot himself against possible pupil-injury litigation.

Teachers have the legal and professional obliga-

tion to protect pupils from the possibility of harm.

I f the

teaoher is negligent in this regard, he beoomes liable for injuries to the pupil.
The areas where accidents are most likely to occur are the
shop, the laboratory, the gymnasium. and the playground.

The

olassroom, where dangers are ordinarily not inherent. is not exempt from the possibility of pupil injuries.
Recommendations are listed as an aid to teachers and administrators in preventing injuries to pupils in the sohools.

These

reoommendations are olassified aocording to the subjeot areas, an
oonstitute generalizations derived from the writer's research as
well as recommendations proposed by the Research Division of the
National Education Association Commission of Safety Eduoation.
The majority of accidents ooourring in the classroom are the
result of lack of proper supervision.

A t;1.UIDber of oases arise be

cause of misoonduct or oareless behavior of pupils resulting in

160
harm to fellow pupils.

Injuries sometimes are inflioted on one

pupil by another while the teaoher is present.

Sometimes these

injuries occur while the teacher is out of the classroom.

Under

what circumstances will the teacher's inadequate supervision or
lack of supervision constitute negligence?

Generally it can be

stated that when the conduct causing the harm could not have been
foreseen or anticipated by the teacher, the teaoher will not be
held negligent.

Action can be brought against a teacher, however,

if the pupil's conduot could have been foreseen by the teacher
with a reasonable exercise of prudenoe, and the teaoher failed to
regulate the conduct to prevent injury.

The same rule holds true

for injuries which ocour while the teacher is out of the

classro~

A teacher who leaves an unruly class to its own devices oan anticipate a charge of negligenoe in the event that a pupil is injured.
It is the best policy never to leave the classroom unless it
beoomes absolutely neoessar,y to do so.
When leaving the\olassroom, oall on a fellow teacher or an
administ rator to take oharge.
Maintain pupil oonduot under oontrol at all times.

A teacher

is expected to avert accidents which are foreseeable to a pers?n
of ordina 17 prudence.
Do not expose pupils to a greater risk of harm than 1s called
~or

in the classroom.·
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Do not assign pupils to do chores where pupils oan oause injury to themselves.
Do not send pupils on errands.

Pupils beoome agents of the

teaoher and harm caused to the student or by the student becomes
I

!

the teaohtr's

respons~bility.

i

Becalise of the dange r iOOe rent in the use of sharp hand tools
power tools, and power-driven machinery, shop teachers must aot
with great oaution and
these cla.srooms.

pru~ence

to prevent serious aocidents in

Generally a shop teacher may be held liable fo

negligence if an aooident occurs, and the teacher has failed in
duty to properly supervise the activity, instruot the students on
the proper use of the instrument or device, or if he has failed to
warn the student of the dangers whioh are inherent in the use of
the tools or deVices.
In order to minimize the possibility of accidents in the

shops, the following reoommendations are proposed to the vocational arts teaohers:
Report knowledge of hazardous conditions and defects relating
to the shop, the machinery and eqUipment, and environmental factor
for safety.
Regularly inspect maohiner.r, equipment, and environmental
factors for safety.
Post oons touGUe notioes or regulations

possible hazards,
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safeguards, and preoautions.
Make oertain that appropriate safety devices and guards are
available and used by students.
Make sure the students know and understand pertinent safe
praotioe. relating to aotivities in which they are engaged.
Require students to wear appropriate personal proteotive
equipment, such as goggles, aprons, helmets, and gloves during
hazardous activities.
Thoroughly instruct and demonstrate the use of power tools

t

or other hazardous equipment before Url,tlally permitting suoh use
by a pupil and permit initial use. only under direot supervision.
Shut off power tools when leaving the shop.
Exercise continuous supervision to see that shop safety praotices are observed.
Set the example for pupils to follow by personally obeying
safety rules and praotioes.
Never leave the shop while students are engaged in aotivities
The greatest number of aocidents whioh ocour within the
sohool building ocour in Ehysioal.eduoation
dents result from a variety of oauses.
tiona are proposed to

olasse~.

These aool-

The following reoommends-

sioal eduoatlon teaohersl

Always maintain adequate supervision of physioal eduoation
aotivities.
Make frequent periodio examinations of all equipment in the

gymnasium and correct defeotive equipment.
Do not allow pupils to use defective equipment until the deteot is oorreoted. '
Do not allow pupils to attempt physioal feats whioh are beyond their skills.
Give adequate instruotions and warn pupils of the danger invalved in gymnastios.

I

Allow a large enough area in whioh to conduot gam&s and exeroises.

Overorowaing enhanoes the risk of one pupil injuring an-

other.
Do not permit a student who has bad a prior injur,y to yartioipate in an athletio game if it is likelY that his injur,y will be
aggravated.
Take great oare in the removal of an injured player from the
scene of the aooident in order not to aggravate his injuries.
The science laboratorl is an area in which the aotivities are
inherently dangerous, and pupils are usuallY more aware of the de
gers in this area than in others.

Nonetheless,

teaohe~

in the
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sCience laboratories must provide adequate instruction and supervision of all laborator,y activities.
in the

ohem1st~y

The m.sbandling ofohemioals

laborator,y, for 1nstanoe, may result in serious

harm to the students.

The following recommendations are proposed

to science teaohers,
Make certain that the pupils know and understand the nature
of the experiment to be performed.
Make certain that they understand the dangers that may arise
if proper prooedures are not followed.
Give careful and adequate instruotions on the use of the
equipment and materials available for experiments.
Maintain proper supervision of the classroom tests and expe1""
1ments at all, times.
See that ohemioals and other substances used in the laborator,r are properly packaged, labeled, and stored.
,

Keep potentially dangerous chemicals under lock and key.
Do not hand out chemioals for experimentat10n at hame.
Oontrol aocess to the supply room so that pupils oannot take
ohemioals for private use without permission.
Never leave the classroom when an experiment is in progress.
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Administrators, like teaohers, are liable for personal aots

ot negligenoe oausing harm to pupils.

Lawsuits are seldom brought

against administrators, such as superintendents or principals, but
are usually direoted against the person directly conoerned with
the aooident, suoh as teaohers.
puvi~s,

Teaohers have direct oontaot with

and administrators usually do not.

Adm1nistrators are not held liable for the negl1gent aots ot
employees beoause the employer-employee relationship does not exist between admin1strator8 and teaohers.

A teaoher is an employee

ot the sohool board, not an employee ot tb.e administrator.
Although sohool boards are the employers of teaohers, they do
not respond tor 11abilities incurred by teaohers, exoept in those
states where the immunity dootrine has been abrogated.

In these

states sui t8 are brought against the sohool distriot, a oorporation.
Although school administrators are not legally liable tor injuries resulting trom the negligenoe of employees, they are in a
position to proteot the satety ot pupils.

Administrators may be

held liable for the negligence of an employee if' he employs the
subordinate, knowing that he was inoompetent.

Adm1nist:rators may

also be held liable tor fa1lure to assign and provide proper supervision where it :J.s needed or the failure to adopt and enforce
rules and regulatiOns for adequate supervision.
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The following reoommendations are proposed to sohool administrato1"8 to minimize aooidents in the sohools:
Adopt prooedures for sohool personnel to report dangerous
praotioes and unsafe oonditions they beoome aware of.
Institute a system of regular inspeotion of buildings, faoilities, grounds, and equipment to uncover hazards and dangerous
oonditions.
Take steps to promptly eliminate, repair, or oorreot defeots
and deterioration and to remove obstruotions.
Seleot oompetent personnel.
t

Hold regular meetings with the professional staff and with
main~enanoe

and servioe personnel to review and evaluate sohool

aooidents and to oonsider ways to avoid their reourrenoe.
Develop reasonable regulations for student traffio in

oor~~i

dors, on stairways, and elsewhere on the sohool prem1s6s.
Provide adequate supervision for field

t~p.

and other educa-

tional aotivities away from the sohool.
Provide

adequ~te

supervision in play areas and other areas in

the school where large numbers of pupils oongregate.
Adopt rules and regulations for safe sohool bus t ransportation.
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Require all sohool aooidents to 'be promptly reported and investigate all aooidents.
Initiate a oomplete

sy~tem

of aooident reporting and analysis

In regard to sohool transportation, the following reoommendations are proposed to sohool administrators:
Use only safe and properly equipped vehioles.
should measure up to at least

min~

Sohool buses

standards and speoifioations

set up by the state department of eduoation.
Maintain a regular oheok of the meohanioal oondition of' the
buses by qualified meohanios.
Employ drivers who are oompetent, experienoed and physically

Give regular and systematio instruction to bus drivers on
driving and traffic regulations, partioularly as they relate to
sohool buses.
Establish a definite pattern for school bus drivers to use
approaohing loading, parking, and leaving the sohool grounds.
Adopt. and enforoe rules and regulations for supe rvising pup
during loading and unloading.
Promote sate bus riding habits among pupil passengers.
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Instruot drivers to park in a safe plaoe before disoharging
pupils and to oaution pupils to use oare in orossing streets and
highways after alighting from the sohool bus.
Establish definite and well-understood prooedures and regulations to safeguard the bus and its passengers from aooident whenever the bus is used for field and other non-route trips.
In regard to the safety of ohildren on the plyground, the
following reoommendations are proposed to sohool administrators:
Provide adequate and oompetent supervision.
Sohedule use of the play area to avoid crowding.
Separate older ohildren from younger o"a.es.
Prohibit bioyole riding and other inherently da.ngerous Bot1v
ties in the play area.
l'omulate and enforce rules and regulations for the oontrol
of pupil oonduot on the playground.
Maintain playground equipment and apparatus in good repair.
ICeep the playground area free of obst ruotions and rubbish
piles.
During the oourse of the sohool day, in spite of all preoau-

tions taken by the sohool staff. aooidents will ooour.

These are
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the aocidents which oocur through the fault of no one, and they
are termed "pure acoidents."

These may range from the minor type

of accident to those of a serious type requiring emergency treatment •

Although a teaoher is not held liable in cases of "pure

accident," liability oan attaoh, if proper procedures are not followed in the handling of these cases.

When a pupil is injured,

the teaoherin charge or one witnessing the acoident should immediately call the sohool nurse.

If a school nurse is not available

the aotion to be taken by the teaoher depends upon the nature of
the ir;jury.
If the injury requiI"3d emergenoy treatment, the teaoher

should render immediate aid.

The teaoher by his relationship to

the pupil is obligated to aid the pupil.
gency, prompt aotionmay save a lite.

In some oases of emer-

Laok of aotion in an emer-

genoy might lead to a oharge of negligenoe against the teaoher.
First aid should be rendered until the injured pupil oan reoeive
a physioian's servioes.
aid,

and

Treatment should be restrioted to first

not medical treatment, which is the responsibility of the

physioian.
Oare must be taken so as not to aggravate the oondition.
Liability will attaoh if additional bodily harm is inflioted by a
teaoh~r

in rendering first aid, regardless of whether the aots

were done in a proper or a negligent manner.

In essence, a teaoh-

er may be held liable for not rendering first aid in oases where
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it i8 needed.

A teaoher may also be held striotly l1able for any

additional injury which ocours as a result of first aid treatment.
It is reoommended that teachers learn first aid prooedures.
In cases where an emergenoy exists and the sohocl nurse is
not available, apply emergeno7 first aid.
the child 1mmediate17.

Not1fy the parents of

Bot1fy the fam1ly ph1'aioian.

If the in-

jured pupil does not require emergency treatment, reference to a
physic1an or the parents can be made at the disoretion of the
administrator.
In all cases where a school nurse is available, and an emergency exists t the following procedure is recommended s send for the
nurse immediately.
oall the parents.

Notify the principal.

Have the office stat'f

If the parents cannot be reaohed. notify the

persons listed on the pupil'. !'emergenoy oard."

Have the offioe

staff oall the fam11y physician indicated on the pupil's

"e~ergen

oy oard."
In all cases where a school nurse is available, and an emer-

genoy does not exist, simply refer the pupil to the nurse.
fhe following reoommendations are proposed to sohool administrators as an aid in hand11ng pupil injuries requiring emergency
med ical aid:

Two or more deSignated sohool personnel should be qualified
in first aid by taking Amerioan Red Cross First Aid Courses.
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Emergenoy oare prooedures should be well planned so that proper first aid oa1'8 oan be given until a physioian oan be oonsulted
Everyone on the sohool staff should have a knowledge of the sohool
first aid prooedures and polioy.
One or more oompletely equipped first aid kits should be stra
tesioally looated in eaoh sohool.

The greatest need for these

kits will be in the shop and in the laborator,r.
A oumulative health reoord or emergenoy information oard
should be oompiled for eaoh

PUPll.~

Eaoh reoord should list the

family physioian, and person to be notified when a student needs
emergenoy medioal attention.

Plans should be made for engaging

transportation for ohildren.
Information oonoerning eaoh illness Or injur,y and what was
done should be entered on the pupil's oumulative health oard.
Field trips may be termed an extension of the olassroom.
Aooidents are not as oommon as they are in the sohool, but there
is the possibility that they may ooour •. This paper does not inolude research on field trips, but reoommendations from Lee O.
Garber's Yearbook of Sohool Law are inoluded in order to render
----~~

--

---

a more oom»rehensive ooverage of liability_
Administrators should develop a polioy whiah will guarantee
adequate planning for eaoh field trip,.
Administrators should have all teaohers follow sohool

olioy
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o'Z the planning of field trips.
Students should be "aroed of dange l'S

to be enoountered on

the field trip.
Provide adequate supervision of students.
not able to adequately superv1se

It" one teaoher is

the group, reasonably prudent

adults who have been briefed as to their duties and potent1al
dangers t should be used to supervise.
Determine "hether the host for the f1eld trip w1ll assume
liability in the case 0'Z an aocident on hi. premises.
Parental approval suold be obtained for eaoh student going on
the trip.

While this gives the teacher no proteotion, it may

prevent severe oritioism of the sohool.
If there i8 no school policy regarding field trips, the
teacher should obtain the approval of the administration before
holding the trip.
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DICTIONARY OF LEGAL TERMS
Abrogated - To annul, repeal, or destroy.
Aotion - An ordinary prooeeding in a oourt by whioh one party pro
aeoutes another for the enforcement or proteotion of a right,
tne redress of a wrong, or the punishment of a publio offense
Aotionable Negligenoe - The breaoh or non-per.fo~noe of a legal
duty through negleot or oarelessness, resulting in damage or
inju1'7 to another.
Appellant - The party who takes an appeal from one oourt to anoth
er.
Oode - A oompilation o~ statutes, soient~ioally ar~ed into
ohapters, subheadings, and seotiona, with a table of oontent
and index.
Oammon Law - As used in this paper, legal prinoiples derived from
usage and oustom, or from oourt deciSions affirming suoh
usages and oustoms.
Damages - Peouniar,y oompensation or indemnity whioh may be reoovered in oouri by the person who has suttered 10s8 or injur,y
to his person, property, or rights through the unlawful sot,
or omission, or negligenoe of another.
Defendant - The party against whom relief or reoovery is sought
in a oourt aotion.
Defens& - That whioh is offered and alleged by the defendant as a
reason in law or faot why the pla1nt~f should not reoover.
Duty - Human Aotion whioh is exaotly conformable to the laws which
require us to obey them.
Equity - A branoh of remedial justioe, administered by oertain
tribunals, distinot from the common law oourts and empowered to deoree -equity" (impartial justioe) between two
persons whose rights or olaims are in oonfliot.
Governmental Immunity - Immunity from tort aotions enjoyed by
governmental un! ts in common-law 8tate8.•
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In Looo Parentis - In plaoe of the pa rent; oharged w1 th some of

the parentts rights, duties, and responsibilities.

Judgment - Deoision of the oourt, usually that part involving the
payment of damages.

Law - System of prinoiples or rules of human oonduot, whioh includes deoisions of oourts as well as aots of legislatures.
Liebili ty - Legal responsibilitY'.
Litigation ... contest in a oourt of justice for the purpose of en:toroip.g a right.
Malfeasanoe ... Commiss~on of an unlawful act, applied to publio
offioers, and employees.
Misfeasanoe - Improper performanoe of a lawful actJ negligenoe.
leglisenoe - The omission to do something whioh a reasonable man,
guided bY' those ordina17 considerations which ordinarily
reg'.l.late hum~ at'fairs, would do.
Non!easan~e ~

Omission to perton. a required duty.

Nolens Volens - With or Without Consent.
Nuisanoe - A oontinuous oondition or use of property in suoh a man~
ner as to obstruot the proper use of it bY' others lawfully
having a right to use it, or the publio.
Plaintiff - Person who brings an aotion.
Power - The authority to do something express17 or impliedly
granted.
Precedent - A deoision oonsidered as furniShing an example or
authority for an identioal or sim1lar oase afterw&.rd aris ..
ing on a similar question of la••
Prudence - Carefulness, precaution, attent1veness, and good judgment, applied to action or oonduot. That degree of oare required by the exigenoies or circumstanoes under whioh it is
to be exeroised..
Quasi - As ift almost as i f it were.
Regulations - Rules :for management or government.
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Respondeat Superior - The master is liable in oe~a1n cases for tb
wrongful aots of his servant. Let the master answer.
Stare Deoisis - Prinoiple that when a oourt has made a deolaration
of a prinoiple it is the law until ohanged by a competent
authoritYJ upholding of preoedents within the jurisdiotion.
statute - Aot of the legislature.
Tort - Legal wrong oommitted upon the person. reputation, or property of another, independent of oontraot.
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